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This thesis seeks to explore the perspectives of women involved in feminist and 
women’s activism in Iran on important aspects of their political identity and priorities. 
This study draws on forty seven one to one semi-structured interviews with Iranian 
feminists and women activists, through an explanatory approach. It engages with the 
participants’ perspectives on key concepts and issues such as feminism, women’s 
rights, gender equality and democracy. Participants of this study include a spectrum of 
women with different beliefs and strategies: secular feminists, religious reformists and 
religious conservative women. As Iran is a country that has a difficult context for 
gender politics, Iranian feminists and women activists apply different approaches to 
seek to improve the status of women. Key findings include: (1) Approaches to being a 
feminist and supporting feminism relate both to participants’ beliefs, but also the 
strategies they apply to advocate women’s rights. (2) There were important 
differences and similarities in what participants understood by gender equality and 
what aspects of equality they prioritised. (3) Working towards greater democracy was 
important to all participants, but there were important differences in their views over 
whether democracy should be secular or Islamic and how far Iran was from being a 
‘full’ democracy. This research contributes to the existing literature by considering a 
variety of feminists’ and women activists’ views about the terms feminist and 
feminism, their approaches to gain gender equality and also their views about 
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Aemmeh: A plural name of Imam. 
Ahkam: Islamic and Quranic rules. 
Ahlebeyt: The family of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. 
Chador: A type of Islamic women’s dress code comprising of a full-body cloak that 
covers a woman’s hair and body, but revealing her face. 
Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence. While Sharia is defined as divine law, Fiqh is the human 
understanding of Sharia.  
Fuqaha: An Islamic jurist who is an expert in Islamic law and Fiqh. 
Hijab: Any hair and body covering which Islamic women wear in the presence of 
men to whom they are not related.  
Ijtihad:  The making of an independent verdict within Islamic law by independent 
reasoning and personal effort. 
Imam: The name of an Islamic leadership position or the title of a mosque leader. 
Khobregan Majlis: A group of experts who are able to dismiss The Supreme Leader 
of Iran. However, these experts need to be approved by The Supreme Leader in order 
to become members of the assembly.  
Majlis: The Islamic Republic of Iran’s equivalent to the British Parliament. 
Mardom-salari-ye dini: Islamic or religious democracy. 
Mojtahed: A qualified religious person who is an expert in Islam and has the 
authority to interpret the Quran.  
Mojtahedin: A plural name of Mojtahed 
Quessas: An Islamic word that means equal revenge, like the English expression ‘an 
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’. 
Shariah: Islamic law built upon moral code and religious law. 
Shi’a: A strand of Islam whose followers believe that Ali (the Islamic prophet’s son-
in-law) is the first Islamic caliphate. 
Special Court for Clerics: A court system for examining misbehaviour within the 
clerical establishment in Iran. 
Tafsir: Inferring the meaning of the Quran. 
The Guardian Council: A constitutionally-mandated 12-member council composed 
of six Islamic faqihs (experts in Islamic Law), and six jurists, specialising in different 
areas of law. The Council has considerable power and impacts upon the Islamic 
Republic of Iran as bills passed by the Majlis must be evaluated and approved by this 




The Supreme Leader: a person who is the head of Iranian government and has the 
highest ranking religious and political authority in the Iranian state. 
Ulama: People considered to be the guardians of legal and religious tradition in Islam. 
Valie Faghih: The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, who is Khamenei (Supreme 







CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
Research context 
My motivation for conducting this research derives from my experiences as a mother 
and international student in the UK. Equally, my position as an Iranian woman who 
has suffered legal and cultural discrimination has always made me feel a second class 
citizen in my country, and so this was influential in directing my research. In this 
Introduction, to provide context to what I am exploring in the research, I will explain 
the gender inequalities which exist in different fields in Iran, and how feminists and 
women activists challenge these discriminations. Later, I move on to a brief review of 
the literature related to feminist and women’s activism in Iran. Then, I will address 
the gap that this research attempts to fill, followed by the research aims, objectives 
and questions. Finally, I will draw the outline of the thesis. 
  
Women in Iran experience varying degrees of discrimination and inequality across 
different fields such as law, family, economy, employment and culture. It can be seen 
that discrimination across these different areas mostly derives from legal and cultural 
inequality. In terms of legal inequality, there are a number of governmental state 
regulations that clearly differentiate women from men. One example is a religious 
tradition, enshrined in Iranian law, called Quessas,1 whereby a woman’s life is valued 
less than a man’s in murder cases (Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008). In court, women’s 
legal testimonies are valued less than a man’s and, in some cases, worth nothing 
unless corroborated by a man (Hojati, 2015). Polygamy is also allowed in Iran, and 
divorce is legally only a right for men (Shirazi, 2012). According to Article 1117 of 
the Iranian Civil Code, a husband may deny his wife the right to work if he thinks that 
her job is incompatible with his or his wife’s dignity or the interests of the family. In 
this context, Iranian women’s labour force participation remains among the lowest 
rates in the world (Majbouri, 2016; Tohidi, 2016). This is in spite of the fact that, 
alongside reduced fertility rates in recent decades, there have also been increases in 
Iranian women’s educational attainment. For example, in 1970 the average number of 
                                                 





years spent in education for women aged 20 to 30 was 1.7 years; however, by 2010 
this had increased to 10 years of education (Majbouri, 2016; Barro and Lee, 2013) 
This discrimination of women in employment and economy is mostly associated with 
the inequality in both the legal system and culture. 
  
In terms of culture, gender stereotypes constrain women who choose to be in 
employment (Bahramitash, and Olmsted, 2014). For example, In Iran the association 
of men with being breadwinners and women as carers continues to be very influential 
in society. Such a gendered culture is an influential factor on the low level of 
women’s participation in the workforce in Iran (Yousefy and Baratali, 2011; 
Bahramitash, and Olmsted, 2014). Another example of gendered culture that 
discriminates against women relates to divorce. A divorced woman in Iran faces 
challenges in respect to being accepted in society. This discouraging atmosphere may 
influence a woman’s decision to remain in a life in which she is unhappy. These 
examples indicate how women are discriminated against in a variety of fields because 
of their gender, and show that circumstances are far from fair and equal.  
 
From this quick glimpse into legal, social and cultural position of women in Iran, it is 
clear that they live in a secondary position to men. This information also tells us about 
some of the gender norms in Iran and the extent to which the state considers a Muslim 
woman as an obedient wife, daughter, or mother, whose main roles and duties lie 
within the private realm (Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008). In order to stand against 
these discriminations, feminists and women activists have taken on significant roles.  
 
Reviewing the history of feminists and women activists in Iran reveals that they have 
been continually challenging the existing inequalities and seeking change via different 
types of activities, protests and efforts (Ahmadi, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). However, as 
Iran is an Islamic country in which religion plays an important role in regulating the 
cultural and political systems, feminists and women activists face many difficulties in 
relation to the religious and political issues involved with advocating women’s rights. 
It is important to acknowledge that throughout Iranian history religion has always 
been one of the main sources of government regulation. After the Islamic Revolution 
in 1979, religion was completely unified with the government and conservative 




not accept equality between men and women and their gendered policies have limited 
the activities of feminists and women activists. However, these limitations have 
varied due to the existence of distinct policies supported by different ruling parties, 
mainly reformists and conservatives. In Chapter Two, I will discuss the different 
gender policies of reformists and conservatives in further detail. Public visibility and 
the activities of feminists and women activists have varied depending on the gender 
politics of the ruling party. There are also other key factors related to women’s 
identification and the strategies that influence their types of activities and visibility in 
the public realm. 
  
In terms of the characteristics of feminists and women activists in Iran, most 
researchers have focused on the existence of two different categories of Iranian 
feminists and women’s rights activists and their strategies: the secular, and the Islamic 
(e.g. Ahmadi, 2006; Mir Hosseini, 2011; Tohidi, 2016). Secular feminists are one type 
of feminist who challenge the impact Islamic beliefs have on women’s rights. The 
strategy of secular feminists links to their idea that politics and religion should be 
separated from each other and, therefore, they challenge the impact of religion on 
women’s lives (Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008). In contrast, Islamic feminists and 
women activists use religious texts as grounds for their activities to improve women’s 
rights and question patriarchy (Badran, 2005; Mir Hosseini, 2006; Salem, 2013). They 
advocate the temporality of the explanations of the Islamic sources in order to adjust 
to modern situations (Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008). Islamic feminists and women 
activists challenge the patriarchal understanding of the Quran as based on male 
experiences, and thus they call for a reinterpretation of Islam in a more egalitarian and 
women friendly way (Mir Hosseini, 1996; Ahmadi, 2006; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 
2006; Mir Hosseini et al., 2015). 
 
The identity and strategies of Islamic feminists and women activists have enabled 
them to be more visible in the public sphere compared to secular women (discussed in 
Chapter Two). The activities of these Islamic women have taken place through two 
organisations and coalitions: namely reformist and Islamic. Notably, Islamic feminists 
and women’s activities have not only been limited to women’s organisations and 




active role in publications and journals in respect to women’s issues (Ahmadi, 2006). 
However, as they challenge the state’s gender policies and call for change, not all of 
their activities have always been accepted by male politicians, particularly 
conservatives. I will discuss in Chapter Two how the visibility and activities of 
Islamic feminists and women activists in the public realm have fluctuated based on 
the ruling party. For example, women’s activities in the public sphere were more 
invisible during the era of the conservative party, and instead the women continued 
their activities through virtual networks, websites and blogs (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010; 
Shirazi, 2012). 
 
Secular feminists and women activists have been less active publicly compared to 
Islamic feminists and women activists in the public realm. These secular women have 
been more engaged in informal gatherings (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010), critical and 
feminist teachings/writings (Sedghi, 2007), and more importantly in the digital public 
sphere (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010). Importantly, during the reformist time (1997- 2005) 
secular feminists and women activists participated in some women’s NGOs due to the 
limited openings in society. These women, alongside religious reformist feminists and 
women activists, called for human rights (Tohidi, 2016) and the UN Convention for 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. They also demanded 
legal modifications and women’s legal equality (Mouri, 2010; Mouri and 
Batmanghelichi, 2015). I will also discuss in Chapter Five in detail how secular and 
religious reformist participants share the same concerns of inequality in different 
fields, including legal and cultural inequality, to improve women’s rights.  
 
Previous research has shown the challenges facing feminists and women activists 
seeking to improve women’s rights in Iran. Many of the existing studies address the 
ways that the activities of feminists and women activists in Iran have been limited due 
to the discourse on the relationship between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ (e.g. Barlow and 
Akbarzadeh, 2006; Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010;  Tohidi, 2016). Most of the literature 
about Iranian feminists and women activists also notice how being ‘feminist’ is 
problematic, particularly in the eyes of conservative religious political leaders, due to 




applicable in Iran (Ahmadi, 2006; Mir Hosseini, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). The majority of 
the existing literature highlights the roles of Iranian feminists and women activists in 
improving gender equality (e.g. Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010; Mir Hosseini, 2012; Tohidi, 
2016). In addition, in terms of the relationship between feminists and women activists 
on the one hand with democracy on the other, some of the literature has addressed the 
role of feminists and women activists in the democratic process (e.g. Moghadam, 
2002; Mir Hosseini and Tapper, 2006; Afshar, 2016; Tohidi, 2016). Some studies 
have examined the strong association between women’s rights and democratisation 
(e.g. Jahanshahrad, 2012; Moghadam and Haghighatjoo, 2016; Moghissi, 2016). 
Some scholars have engaged with the role of reformist leaders on democracy and 
women’s rights in Iran (e.g. Mir Hosseini, 2002; Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010). While such 
studies and knowledge are important to understand the social realities of feminists and 
women activists in Iran, they do not provide specific details about the strategies that 
feminists and women activists with different beliefs and approaches to improve 
women’s rights. Women’s strategies, such as the way they identify themselves, their 
priorities for women’s rights and whether democracy should be secular or Islamic, 
have been overlooked in the literature. In the same vein, while the existing studies 
explain the characteristics of Islamic feminists and women activists, they are only 
concerned with religious reformist women and have neglected the voice and role of 
conservative women activists. Exploring the strategies and views of feminists and 
women activists with different beliefs concerning their political identities and 
priorities might influence academic understanding about feminists and women 
activists in Iran. It would do so by providing a more varied understanding of how 
different beliefs about religion shape political priorities amongst feminists and women 
activists. In addition, understanding feminists’ and women activists’ perspectives 
about feminisim, women’s rights, gender equality and democracy is important, as this 
understanding contributes not only to the work of Iranian feminists and women 
activists but to policy makers as well. It can do so by suggesting new possibilities for 
collaboration between feminists and women activists of different viewpoints. 
 
This thesis aims to fill the existing gaps in the literature on feminists and women 
activists in Iran by addressing feminist and women activist perspectives on what terms 




study explores participants’ views across the spectrum of beliefs and strategies, 
including secular feminist, religious reformist and religious conservative women, on 
the terms feminist and feminism, and also examines their reasons for accepting or 
rejecting these terms. Although the existing studies (e.g. Ahmadi, 2006; Mir Hosseini, 
2006; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008; Tohidi, 2016) have highlighted the extent to 
which the identity of feminists is problematic in Iran, they have failed to explore how 
feminists and women activists in Iran take different positions about being identified as 
feminist and supporters of feminism.  
 
It is worth mentioning here that I use the terms feminists and women activists 
throughout this thesis and I am cautious about applying these terms. I used both terms 
even when reviewing the literature since only the term ‘feminist’ is used in these. It 
will be discussed in Chapter Two that most scholars do not differentiate ‘feminists’ 
and women activists in their work and they only use the term ‘feminist’ without 
paying attention to women advocators’ preferences and self-identification. Therefore, 
this study explores the participants’ views about the terms feminists and feminism. 
Moreover, the notion of activism is key to this study. Activism is a category that is 
defined in a variety of ways. The working definition of activism that I am using here 
is: different forms of engagement in the social and political sphere working towards 
social change in relation to a range of issues concerning women. Therefore, in this 
thesis some of the activists are feminist in their focus, some are, but do not use the 
language of feminism, and some explicitly do not approach their activism as feminist, 
but they all share an interest in women’s position in society. 
Secondly, this research explores the ways that feminists and women activists prioritise 
women’s rights in Iran. The research to date has tended to focus on the attempt of 
Iranian feminists and women activists to gain gender equality rather than their 
priorities. This thesis examines how Iranian women holding different beliefs and 
strategies give priority to women’s rights. Thirdly, the perspective of women about 
democracy is another focus of this study. As women suffer from many different forms 
of discriminations in Iran, democracy may be considered a good way to tackle this 
imbalance and discrimination. This thesis examines feminists’ and women activists’ 





This research is an empirical exploration of the political identity and priorities of 
feminists and women activists in Iran. To explore women’s perspectives about women 
and feminist politics and their understandings of key issues, this thesis is an 
explanatory study. I draw from ideas within feminist research and methodology to 
help understand the nature of women’s involvement in feminist political activity in 
different contexts. 
 
Although there is little research focused on the activities of feminists and women 
activists in Iran, I attempt to cover and review the existing relevant literature. This 
strategy enabled me to maximise my understanding of the key concepts, for example 
feminists and gender equality, before collecting the empirical data. I used qualitative 
interviews to collect the data. A group of feminists and women activists with different 
beliefs and strategies was interviewed. I investigated the feelings, knowledge and 
arguments of Iranian feminists and women activists through in-depth interviews to 
achieve a better consideration of this research area. This thesis is important in the area 
of feminist studies because it gives a deeper insight into contemporary understanding 
of Iranian women who advocate women’s rights. This study contributes by improving 
the understanding of feminists and women activists across a spectrum of beliefs and 
strategies in Iran, by researching the women’s perspectives about feminists and 
feminism, gender equality and democracy.  
 
Research questions, aims and objectives 
The primary aim of this research is to explore the perspectives of women involved in 
feminist and women’s activism in Iran on important aspects of their political identity 
and priorities. In order to reach this aim my key objective is to understand feminists’ 
and women activists’ perspectives on: 
1) Feminists and feminism. 
2) Gender equality and priorities of women’s rights. 





To achieve these objectives, I explore the following research questions: 
 What are the characteristics of feminists and women activists in Iran? 
 How do they prioritise women’s rights in Iran?  
 What are the notions of gender equality among feminists and women activists? 
 Does the conceptual space of democracy share the same meaning among 
feminists and women activists with different beliefs and strategies?  
 
Chapter structure 
The overall structure of the study takes the form of seven chapters, including three 
data chapters. Chapter Two begins by reviewing the literature around feminists and 
women activists in Iran, and looks at how women activists advocate women’s rights 
in Iranian context. This chapter begins with the historical background and gender 
politics of Iran and moves on to explore the strategies that feminists and women 
activists use to improve women rights. In doing this, I examine the characteristics and 
strategies of secular and Islamic feminists and women activists, and their affiliations 
and achievements, alongside their views about gender equality. The final part of the 
literature review explores the discussion around feminists and women activists, 
religion, and democracy.  
 
Chapter Three addresses the methodology and methods applied in this study. This 
chapter describes the process employed in conducting this research, including the 
research design and sampling process in three phases, followed by the design of the 
interview questions. This chapter also provides the detail of the ethical issues, 
interview process, and data analysis. 
 
Chapter Four examines the views of interviewees on the terms ‘feminist’ and 
‘feminism’. I examine three major stands taken by participants in relation to the terms 
feminist and feminism. The chapter also analyses what is shaping the understanding 
of the women about what feminists and feminism means and why these women take 




participants to reach a fair society and their agreement and disagreements on adopting 
human rights to gain an egalitarian society will be explored.  
 
Chapter Five examines how and why the participants understand and believe in 
gender equality and gender justice and also explores the different ways through which 
women give priority to certain rights, such as court testimony, polygamy, employment 
and the age of marriage for women. In addition, this chapter examines the 
respondents’ views about both formal and informal inequalities, respectively existing 
in both the legal and cultural systems. 
 
Chapter Six explores the participants’ views about democracy and its relation to 
religious and gender issues. I examine whether democracy in the respondents’ views 
is Islamic or secular and to what extent they believe that Iran is far from being a ‘full’ 
democracy. I also discuss the participants’ views about the possibilities of democracy 
in Iran, including factors that can act as enablers to democracy or barriers to 
democratic process.  
 
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter, and it summarises the key findings. I explain 
how this research contributes to knowledge, and also discuss the similarities and 
differences of this research’s findings with other studies. Finally, this chapter suggests 










This chapter presents previous research in order to understand how feminists and 
women activists in Iran advocate for women’s rights. While there is limited literature 
on gender, feminism, and women’s activism in Iran, in this chapter, I discuss the 
major empirical studies on Iran that are relevant to this thesis. Understanding the 
existing empirical work is important in terms of analysing the ways Iranian feminists 
and women activists express themselves, advocate women’s rights, and define 
democracy. This chapter includes three main sections. Section one explores the 
history of Iran and its gender politics. Section Two describes strategies that feminists 
and women activists apply within the complexity of gender politics in Iran. It explores 
two different approaches: secular and Islamic feminists and women’s rights activists. 
In addition, it explains the affiliations between these types of activists. Moreover, this 
section describes the ways that feminists and women activists seek change in Iran and 
the meaning of gender equality among them. Section Three explores the conceptions 
of democracy among secular and religious feminists and women activists.  
 
Gender politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Extensive research has presented the difficulties and limitations that women have 
faced within the Islamic Republic of Iran after the Islamic Revolution (e.g. Mir-
Hosseini, 1996; Tohidi, 2016). However, a small number of scholars have highlighted 
the positive influence of the Islamic Revolution on women, particularly Muslim 
women. In her earlier and recent studies about feminists and women activists in Iran 
Mir-Hosseini (1996) and Mir-Hosseini et al. (2015) argued that the Islamic 
Revolution has catalysed the creation of an indigenous local feminist consciousness. 
She believed that Islamic feminists have been the ‘unwanted child’ of Islamic 
Republic (Mir‐Hosseini, 2011: 71). However, the gender policies in Iran have varied 
since the Islamic Revolution. According to Tohidi (2016), there have been four 




(1979-1997); the period of pragmatism and reform (1997-2005); the conservative 
period (2005-2013) and the period of moderation (2013 – present). Across these 4 
periods the position of women in Iran has remained problematic. However, there is 
specific time that reforms were happening and NGOs were growing. In the following 
sections, I will briefly discuss the gender policies and political trends of these four 
eras after the Islamic Revolution in Iran.  
 
Table 1: Timeline of four eras after the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
           Leaders       Year The Ruling 
Government 








2) Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei (1989- 
present)  
Presidents: 1) Ali 
Khamenei (1981-
1989). 2) Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani 
(1989-1997) 
    
 













The politics of this era is 
associated with 
discriminatory and strict 
conservative laws against 
women. For example, 
wearing the Hijab in public 














  Reformist 
government 
Gender politics was less 
restrictive in terms of the 
relative freedom afforded to 
feminists and women 
activists. For example, the 
number of women’s NGOs 



















   
 







The politics of this era were 
particularly restrictive in 
terms of women’s activities. 
For example, many 

















The gender politics is less 
restrictive than during the 
Third era; however, 
conservative politicians are 
still influential in limiting 
feminist and women’s 
activities. For example, 
some of the women’s NGOs 
have reopened during this 
time but their activities are 
constrained by conservative 
politicians.  
Source: adapted from information provided by Tohidi (2016) 
 
The political structure of Iran is not the same as multiparty democracies (Shuja, 
2016). Iranian political parties are by and large loose formations of grouping. Parties 
tend to be considered in public debate as being either reformist, conservative or 
moderate in their approach to key aspects of how the state should be ruled. Reformist 
groups believe that they need to reform the structure of the state and these groups call 




argue that Quran should be re-interpreted in accordance to the demand of time and 
place. Conservative groups block reformist groups and reject democracy. They 
believe that Islam should be ruled by Islam in a traditional way (Parsa, 2016). 
Conservatives advocate preservation of the Islamic government in its present form. 
Moderate groups are somewhere in the middle of conservative and reformist groups; 
but have more in common with reformist groups. In particular, they do advocate 
social and political change (Mllina, 2017). Reformist victory happened due to the 
support of moderate, reformist and some middle of the road conservatives 
(Farhi,2017). It is important to note that there are small groups who are associated 
with these three different umbrella categories only really become important during 
elections. 
 
The first era, between 1979 and 1997, followed the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In 
October 1977, demonstrations were held against the Shah2 and on 1st April, 1979, Iran 
became an Islamic republic; by December 1979, it was under the leadership of 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.3 After the revolution, Islamic traditions were given 
priority and there was a reversal of the modernisation processes that had been adopted 
in previous periods (Mir-Hosseini et al., 2015). Khomeini stated that the Islamic 
government would return dignity and actual social worth to women, and as a result 
religious women were one of the key participants in the Islamic revolution’s 
demonstrations (Hoodfar and Laws, 1999). 
 
 
The Islamic Republic during this period influenced the participation of Muslim 
women in the public sphere. For example, in Khomeini’s decade (1979-1989) women 
could vote and run for parliament, and four women entered the parliament in 1980, 
although many of them in decision-making positions that were discharged or reduced 
in rank (Afshar, 1996; Esfandiari, 2010). Here, it should be mentioned that secular 
women were not permitted to participate in parliament or take part in any official 
political activity; only religious women were permitted. 
                                                 
2 Mohammad Reza Shah was the last king of Iran from 1941 to 1979. Due to his advocation of 
modernism, he lost support from the Iranian clergy.  






This participation was important for religious women as during the period of 
modernisation before the Islamic Revolution, they were constrained to the private 
realm. The ideology of modernisation supported during the Shah’s time (1960s-
1970s) was before the Islamic Revolution. During this time, modernists claimed that 
women’s exclusion from society, and especially from education, brought about a loss 
of economic and political power. They argued that women should take part in 
building the national economy (Paidar, 1997;  Hoodfar, 1999). Modernists also 
suggested educating and rehabilitating women to be modern wives and mothers 
(Hoodfar, 1999). Many girls’ schools were constructed and educated women had the 
opportunity to be employed as teachers ( Paidar, 1997; Hoodfar, 1999). The Shah 
developed an educational system for women in order to forward the vehicle of 
modernization. While modernist ideology seemed to have improved women’s 
position, only women, who did not wear the Hijab, had the opportunity to take part in 
the public realm. Women, who wore the Hijab, were unable to participate in 
employment opportunities or advanced segments of the economy. As Hoodfar (1999) 
argued, while many women wore the Chador and scarves in public, the veil was 
depicted as a symbol of ‘backwardness’ by the government. For this reason, religious 
women continued to feel alienated in society. On the other hand, women activists 
from upper class, secular backgrounds were elevated above religious women (Kia, 
2005). These religious women were ignored by both women activists and the 
government, as religion was assumed to be regressive and a mark of traditionalist 
resistance to the Western-style modernisation of the time. However, after the Islamic 
Revolution this pattern of modernism changed and religious women started to work 
outside the home (Mir- Hosseini, 1996).  
 
 
However, women’s participation in the public sphere was the only advantage for 
Muslim individuals. Women lost many rights due to the changes to the laws after the 
Islamic Revolution (Karimi, 2014). Esfandiari (2010) points out that under Khomeini 
(1979 to 1989) the state suspended family protection laws concerning polygamy, 
divorce and legal age of marriage. There was no limitation on polygamy for men and 




their children without any problem. Conversely, women had no right to petition for a 
divorce and it became difficult for mothers to keep custody of their children. The 
legal marriage age was approved at nine years old for girls. Severe punishment, such 
as flogging and stoning, for crimes ranging from adultery to the breach of Islamic 
dress, were also approved in the parliament. Women were limited to traditional 
female roles during the Khomeini period (1979-1989). Overall, the female 
employment rate decreased and for those women who were employed they did not 
enjoy equal pay with men (Afshar, 1996). The closing of government nurseries 
resulted in difficulties for women to remain in their jobs (Esfandiari, 2010). Women 
were encouraged to consider their family and care responsibilities within their home 
as their first priority (Afshar, 1996). In this manner, governmental policies created 
conditions for women to stay at home and depend economically on their husbands or 
fathers. Moreover, forced Hijab and varying degrees of sex segregation have been in 




After Khomeini’s death, the clergy within government divided into two different 
groups: reformists and conservatives. While reformist groups are associated with 
reform of religion and politics, and the relationship between the two, conservative 
groups are associated with maintaining religious orthodoxy and rejecting reform. 
These groups have different policies that have been put in place in relation to 
women’s issues. Reformists are more flexible in relation to women’s requests within 
educational and vocational facilities; in contrast, conservatives tend to limit women to 
the domestic sphere (Karimi, 2014). Although reformists and conservatives have 
variable degrees of flexibility, both parties refer to the Quran and religion to define 
women’s rights. For example, the second era (1997-2005) happened during reformist 
time under President Khatami, and women enjoyed a growth in civil society 
organisations (Mouri and Batmanghelichi, 2015; Tohidi, 2016) and the feminist 
journals and other writings was relatively free of influence (Tohidi, 2016).  
 
 
As a result of lobbying by feminists and women activists, Khatami employed a few 




had thirteen female members who, unlike their predecessors, clearly declared their 
purpose to advocate women’s rights and change the laws in favour of women 
(Bahramitash, 2007; Moghadam and Haghighatjoo, 2016). Moreover, during 
Khatami’s presidency, women enjoyed some modifications of the family protection 
laws. For some women whose husbands divorced them for reasons that were not their 
fault, the law awarded them monetary compensation. Women’s age of marriage was 
raised to 13 and the prohibition for single women who wanted to continue education 
abroad on a government scholarship was revoked (Esfandiari, 2010). These changes 
are part of a long, turbulent history for Iranian women, who have experienced a 
variety of inequalities.  
 
 
During the era of reformists, the social-political situation was relatively open 
(Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010; Mouri and Batmanghelichi, 2015; Tohidi, 2016). For 
example, the number of women’s NGOs increased from 49 in 1997 to 248 in 2001 
(Paidar, 2001). In 2002, many feminist activists gathered to celebrate International 
Women’s Day in Tehran. They protested about family law and demanded the 
elimination of unfair rules against women (Mouri, 2010). Before the presidential 
election in 2005, secular and religious feminists and women activists from different 
ideologies demonstrated in the streets and declared their opposition in relation to 
women’s rights (Mouri, 2010). They argued that the system’s fundamental, legal 
structure impeded the possibility of fulfilling women’s complete rights as well as a 
significant democracy (Bahramitash, 2003). Several meetings took place among both 
secular and religious feminists to discuss strategies for contesting discrimination. 




However, the activities of feminists and women activists were limited following the 
change of president. In the third era (2005-2013), women experienced severe pressure 
and they faced policies that restricted women’s rights during the conservative period 
under President Ahmadi Nejad (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010; Mouri, 2010; Karimi, 2014; 
Tohidi, 2016). Between 2005 and 2009, the police had strict orders to curb breaches 




women, both secular and religious, demonstrated in Tehran to reiterate their demands 
relating to discriminatory laws. However, they faced severe opposition and treatment 
from the police (Mouri, 2010). The civil society organisations and media were under 




Before the 2009 election, secular and Islamic feminists and women activists presented 
two main requests to the presidential candidates. The first was that the state should 
sign the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW). The second demand was that the constitution be modified in 
order to create women’s legal equality. Feminist activists established websites and 
wrote articles to present their point of view and ensure people heard their requests. 
However, many of them were arrested and sentenced to a considerable period of 
imprisonment (Mouri, 2010; Mouri and Batmanghelichi, 2015). 
 
 
The fourth era is the moderation period that began in 2013 and continues in the 
present day. During this time, while some women NGOs reactivated and political 
prisoners including feminists and women activists were released, the attempts toward 
improving women rights has again been limited by conservative groups (Tohidi, 
2016). For example, President Rouhani asserted that his failure to appoint women 
ministers was due to the particular conditions of the country (Nandi, 2015) related to 
the sensitivity of conservative groups about women’s issues. Women were 
marginalised from key decision-making positions in the parliaments (Moghadam and 
Haghighatjoo, 2016). Instead, he advised other ministers to employ more women in 
their sections (Nandi, 2015). Rouhani appointed a woman activist as a vice president 
in ‘women and family affairs’ and this has been the most encouraging appointment. 
Generally speaking, so far, despite Rouhani’s attempts to move toward some 
openness in the society, there has been very little progress on women’s rights. For 
example, while there has been a reactivation of some women’s press and NGOs, they 







All of the above examples suggest how gender politics has varied due to the policies 
of different strands: reformist, conservative, and moderate leaders. One might ask 
why, if reformist, and to a lesser extent, moderate leaders have had flexible gender 
politics, discriminatory laws were not removed during these times. It should be 
mentioned here that Iran has a particular structure that limits reformist activities. Iran 
has a Supreme Leader, who is also a religious leader, and is the most powerful figure 
in the country (Golkar, 2016; Moghadam and Haghighatjoo, 2016). The Supreme 
Leader supports conservative views, which means the conservative position has the 
upper hand over reformist and moderate presidents. Moreover, there are some 
institutions such as The Guardian Council that are under the control of conservatives. 
This Council influences decisions made by parliament, and the role of this 
conservative group is to ensure that the drafts that pass to the parliament are not in 
conflict with Islam (Moghadam and Haghighatjoo, 2016). Additionally, The Guardian 
Council can qualify/disqualify members of parliaments and candidates for presidency. 
For example, during the reformist era, the conservatives considered Khatami’s 
policies as ‘creeping secularism’ and The Guardian Council used its power to 
disqualify reformist candidates from the parliamentary election in 2004 (Hoodfar and 
Sadr, 2010). Consequently, the gender policies of reformists and moderate advocators 
are and have been limited and controlled by conservatives. The complexity of the 
Iranian structure has resulted in problematic gender politics in Iran, but with some 
fluctuations. The following section will discuss the position of feminists/feminism 
within this context of gender politics.  
 
Feminists/feminism and Iranian gender politics 
Many feminist researchers argue that the needs of women differed in relation to the 
intersections between gender, region, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and race (e.g. 
Richardson, 1993; Werbner and Davis, 1999; Young, 2011; McLaughlin, 2014). In 
the same vein, contemporary feminists have questioned some feminists in the past 
because of their focus on a particular identity, that of the white, young and highly 
educated middle class (Krolokke and Sorensen, 2006; Robinson and Richardson, 
2015). The argument of contemporary feminists is based on the recognition of 




thinking (Krolokke and Sorensen, 2006; Robinson and Richardson, 2015). These 
ideas are important for this study as they suggest that feminists’ and women activists’ 
needs, demand and strategies should be seen within their own context.  
 
Being feminists and women activists in a Muslim country is more problematic than in 
a Western country. Due to the existing assumption within these countries that 
associate feminists and feminism with the ‘West’, feminists and women activists in 
Islamic societies face many difficulties to advocate for women’s rights. There is a 
wide consensus among researchers of Muslim contexts about how women in Islamic 
societies are affected by the relation between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ (e.g. Ahmed, 
1992; Ahmadi, 2006; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). Women in 
Islamic countries need to carry much of the ideological weight engaged with culture 
and tradition as they are considered as guardians of the culture (Ahmed, 1992; 
Ahmadi, 2006; Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010). Understanding the association between the 
‘West’ in a Muslim country, particularly in a political leader’s views, is significant for 
this study as it helps to explain what challenges feminists and women activists face in 
Iran and how they propose their demands within their context.  
 
In Iran being a feminist and/or supporting feminism is problematic, particularly within 
the political system, due to their association with the West (Ahmadi, 2006; Mir-
Hosseini, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). Conservative leaders portray women activists and 
particularly feminists as harmful individuals under Western influence. They react to 
feminists and women rights’ activists who advocate equal rights with arrests, negative 
propaganda, smear campaigns and imprisonment (Tohidi, 2016). Therefore, Iranian 
women need to adjust their demands in accordance with their community. As Mir-
Hosseini (2006: 639) argues, ‘[c]ontemporary Western feminists could criticize the 
patriarchal elements of their own cultures and religions in the name of modernity, 
liberalism, and democracy, but Muslims could not draw on these external ideologies 
or on internal political ideologies in their fight for equal rights’. In fact, the 
association between feminism and the West appears to be damaging to the 





As discussed earlier, the Islamic Republic of Iran was formed by a popular revolution 
to replace what was perceived as the tyrannical, secular and ‘Western’ rule of the 
Shah. Therefore, after the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader, limited 
the existing gender laws by claiming that they were Western and un-Islamic (Mojab, 
2001). This suggests that being feminist in Iran is highly sensitive politically, in 
particular in conservative political leaders’ views, not only because of the relation 
between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ but also because the Iranian political system is based 
on religion. There is a wide consensus among Iranian feminist researchers about the 
sensitivity of the Iranian state relating to ‘feminist’ and ‘feminism’ (e.g. Barlow and 
Akbarzadeh, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). For example, Barlow and Akbarzadeh (2006: 1489-
1490) argue:  
Nowhere is this issue more prominent than in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
where the regime enforced a strict dress code for women, ostensibly to 
defend Islamic values. The regime accused Western powers (the colonial 
masters of yesteryear) of trying to undermine Muslim societies by corrupting 
their women. […] Protecting Muslim women from Western influences, 
therefore, is an essential tenet for Islamists. The urgency in distancing 
Muslim women from Western values presents profound questions regarding 
the extent to which Muslim women can and should draw on Western 
feminism and its guiding principles. 
 
From the above quotation, Barlow and Akbarzadeh appear to suggest how 
conservative political leaders’ argument about distancing from Western values 
confined Iranian women activists when advocating women’s rights. They have had to 
avoid being labelled as feminist. In another example of research on Iranian women 
activists, Tohidi (2016) notes that political leaders, mostly conservatives, in Iran have 
accused Iranian feminists and women aspiring to achieve equal rights of following 
‘Western’ women. While most studies about feminists and women activists in Iran 
have focused on the pressure on women’s rights activists in Iran from the state, due to 
links with feminism, few studies have examined the positions that activists take 
related to the term feminism and how they apply this term. The majority of studies 
identify all women activists in Iran as ‘feminist’. For example, Ahmadi (2006), in her 
study, ‘Islamic Feminism in Iran: Feminism in a New Islamic Context’ states that she 




feminists or not. However, a few Iranian authors (e.g. Afshar, 1996; Tohidi, 2016) 
whose work is about women activists in Iran, are cautious in applying the term 
feminist. They try to avoid labelling every women activist in Iran as feminist. Instead, 
they use both ‘feminists and women activists’ as terms in their writing, to give room 
to those women activists who distance themselves from the term ‘feminist’. Mojab 
(2001:130) is almost unique in her critique of authors who use the term Islamic 
feminism to refer to the activism of Muslim women advocating women’s rights within 
the framework of Islam in Iran:  
Muslim activists themselves do not use the term. The Islamic women’s press, 
as an example, is generally hostile to western feminism. For instance, the 
semi-official, popular weekly Zan-e Ruz (Today’s Woman) rejects feminism 
as a western, anti-Islamic phenomenon while the more moderate quarterly, 
Farzaneh: Journal of Women’s Studies and Research, is less anti-feminist but 
avoids any identification with it. 
 
While Mojab correctly highlights the importance of the self-identification of women, 
she fails to elaborate it further and explore how women deal with stigmatisation 
around the term ‘feminist’. Moreover, she strongly states that ‘Muslim activists 
themselves do not use the term’, thus closing the possibility of considering the distinct 
positions that Muslim women’s rights activists might take to different positions on 
whether to accept the term feminist. In this research, I avoid labelling women activists 
as feminist due to the problematic issues around it. Instead, the women’s self-
definitions are considered for conducting this study. In the following section, I move 
on to discuss different ways that women tackle the problematic social position of 
women in Iran.  
 
Iranian feminists and women activists: strategies, characteristics, seeking change 
and gender equality 
While feminists and women activists have faced lots of difficulties to advocate 
women’s rights due to the sensitivity of the feminist label in Iran, they have attempted 
to create some strategies to improve women’s rights. In the same vein, in other 
Muslim societies, feminists and women activists have applied certain strategies to 




Fatema Mernissi, shifted her approach from advocating a secular reconstruction of 
Muslim society to Islamic reformism (e.g. Mernissi, 1991). This happened because of 
the history of Morocco and its experiences with secularism and modernisation. 
Mernissi (1987) advocated secular feminism; however, due to the experience of 
Morocco following a secular process (by the late 1970s and early 1980s), she had 
changed her position and proposed a reformist approach for feminist activists. The 
example of Mernissi suggests how women’s activities are intertwined with the social, 
political and economic context (Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2006). 
 
Many Iranian feminist authors place emphasis on different strategies that enable 
Iranian women to pursue empowerment and transformation. For example, Tohidi 
(2016: 85) stated that Iranian women activists:  
have entered into a strategic engagement not only with the civil society at 
large, but also with some members of the ruling elite. They engage the 
political reformers inside and outside the government, the intelligentsia, the 
media, the law and lawmakers in the parliament, the clerics, various social 
institutions, and ordinary people. This engagement takes various forms and 
tactics, constructive criticisms within as well as outside of the framework of 
the existing laws and Islamic sharia toward revision, reinterpretation, and 
reform as well as deconstruction and subversion. 
 
One of the key strategies that some feminists and women activists might take is 
defending women’s rights in the framework of religion. This strategy enables them to 
achieve a wide acceptance among society, particularly political leaders, in order to 
bring about social change. This approach might even be applied by individuals who 
avoid basing their ideas on Islam. Therefore, women in Islamic countries might need 
to present their ideas in a way that is compatible with Islam (Ali, 2015). As Sedghi 
(2007: 247) argues there are two different groups of Islamic women who ‘support’ the 
Islamic approach:  
devout Muslims and trespassers who have crossed the boundaries between 






Her quotation suggests that in order to defend women’s rights, women activists adopt 
some strategies such as an Islamic approach to improve women’s rights. Moreover, 
Tohidi (2016: 77) notes that Iranian women’s rights activists have been attempting to 
‘assure their community of their moral virtue, loyalty, and patriotism’. Women tried 
to prove to the ruling authorities in Iran that not only are their activities indigenous, 
their advocacy for equal rights is also not incompatible with a progressive 
interpretation of the Quran (Tohidi, 2016). The importance of indigenous women 
activists who could effectively challenge patriarchy has been highlighted by most 
existing feminist writers (e.g. Moghadam, 2002; Mir-Hosseini, 2006; Mir-Hosseini et 
al., 2015; Tohidi, 2016). 
 
However, not all women activists take the strategy of working in an Islamic 
framework. Based on the Islamic/non-Islamic approach that women take in Iran, they 
have been divided into two main categories by the existing literature. The following 
section explains how Iranian women engage with women’s rights using different 
approaches. 
 
Islamic and secular feminists and women activists in Iran 
In order to understand the strategies that feminists and women activists take in the 
Iranian context, it is important to discuss existing categories of women activists in 
Iran and their strategies to improve women’s rights. As Povey (2001) argues, Iranian 
feminists and women activists are categorised as secular and Islamic according to 
their position under the Islamic State of Iran. It is almost impossible inside and 
outside the Islamic Republic not to be involved in the debate about secular and 
Islamic feminists and women activists. A wealth of attention, among studies about 
Iranian feminists and women activists, has been given to the existence of two different 
categories of Iranian women’s rights activists: secular and Islamic (e.g. Ahmadi, 
2006; Mir‐Hosseini, 2011; Tohidi, 2016). It should be mentioned here the term 
‘Islamic feminists’, in the existing literature, only refers to women who maintain 
religious reformist viewpoints. However, one of the aims of this study is to unpack the 




includes both religious conservative and religious reformist women, including Islamic 
feminists and religious women’s rights activists. 
 
As discussed earlier, the notion of activism is key to this study. The definition of 
activism that is used here focuses on practices of struggling for change (Cammaerts, 
2007) concerning women’s position in the society. I am looking at activists who apply 
a variety of strategies in order to transform or reform society. Activism can be aimed 
at fundamental changes to the political system and social structures of society 
(Wallerstein, 1990). Other forms of activism are more reformist in approach (e.g. 
Beck, 1994; Giddens,1994), concentrated on social and political change that can lead 
to the extension of existing rights within the existing social order (Cammaerts, 2007). 
In this thesis, I am examining both forms of activism – revolutionary and reformist as 
both approaches to activism are present in the Iranian context. 
 
In non-Western research (e.g. Ahmadi; 2006; Badran, 2009 ; Nurmila ,2009; Rahman, 
2017) looking at feminist activism in the Iranian context, reformist approaches are 
associated with gender consciousness raising and action for social change. This form 
of feminist activism emerges from an awareness that women are subordinated to men 
and activism is needed to take action to eliminate this discrimination. For example, 
Mir-Hosseini (2011) argued that feminist activists share a general concern with 
women’s issues and an awareness of gender discrimination at home and society and 
action to change women’s situation. Iranian Islamic feminists are positioned within 
this reformist approach, but work within the framework of Islam and reinterpretations 
of the Quran (e.g. Ahmadi, 2006; Mir-Hosseini, 2011; Tohidi, 2016). In contrast 
secular feminists, are positioned as more revolutionary in approach due to their 
demand that there is a separation of religion and women’s rights (e.g. Barlow and 
Akbarzadeh, 2008; Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010).  
 
In this study I apply the term of ‘activism’ in a wide sense that includes feminists and 
women activists who engage with activism and social change differently and do not 




are all interested in creating social change concerning women. As such, I work with a 
definition of activism that includes feminists and women activists whose concerns are 
women’s position in society and seeking social change in a variety of degrees. What I 
also add to the work on activism in the Iranian context is also including the activism 
of conservative women. This is because these conservative women are reformist and 
are more aligned with activists who are reformist in approach. This illustrates that 
there is a continuum within these terms, not a simple binary of reformist/transformist, 
where along this continuum activists may be more/less reformist than those I 
characterise as reformist feminists above. These conservative women are also activists 
aimed at engaging with social change in relation to women; however, their analysis of 
the social field, the degree of social change they seek and approach is different from 
other feminists and women’s rights activists (Schreiber, 2018). They are an important 
part of the landscape of activism focused on women’s lives in Iran, so it is important 
to include their perspective and understand how they define and approach their 
activist activity. In the following section, I move on to the two approaches of Islamic 
and secular feminists and women activists discussed within the literature about 
women’s rights issues in Iran. 
 
Islamic feminists and women activists 
Among Iranian authors, there are two opposing camps related to Islamic feminists and 
women activists. Most researchers (e.g. Najmabadi, 1998; Moghadam, 2002; Mir-
Hosseni, 2017) have argued that Islamic feminists and women activists improve 
Iranian women’s situation. However, a few researchers critique Islamic feminists (e.g. 
Kandiyoti, 1996; Moghissi, 1998; Mojab, 2001). Most of these academics and 
feminists treat Islamic feminism as a contradiction in terms. They have argued that 
Islamic feminists are inadequate forces to challenge patriarchy. For example, Mojab 
(2001) argued that radical legal reform is achieved through the separation of Islam 
and politics. She claims that defending the religion in Iran is the primary concern for 






‘Islamic feminism’ emerged in Iran in the late twentieth century (Badran, 2005; 
Ahmadi, 2006; Mir-Hosseini, 2006) as structuring of gender relations in line with 
orthodox interpretations of Quran caused increased difficulties for Iranian women 
(Mojab, 2001). As Mir-Hosseini (2006) argued, the emergence of reformist groups in 
the second era and their demand for re-interpretation of Quran to move toward 
democracy inspired Islamic feminists and women activists to call for more egalitarian 
reading of Islam. In other words, the approach of reformist groups stimulated Muslim 
women to question the gender bias in Islamic law in framework of religion. Earlier in 
the eyes of the state, women were only considered as mere objects of the laws; 
however, after the failure of the Islamic Republic to improve women’s rights, Muslim 
women activists have claimed rights and actively participated in the process of reform 
and law-making (Mir-Hosseini, 2006; Mir-Hosseini et al., 2015). Moreover, this 
process has happened in line with the expansion of international feminism and 
women’s NGOs in Iran which have influenced the development of women’s rights 
within Islamists discourse (Mir-Hosseini et al., 2015). Islamic feminists and women 
activists emphasise that the understanding of the Quran has been based on men’s 
experiences, male-centred questions, and the male-controlled societies in which they 
live (Mir-Hosseini, 1996; Ahmadi, 2006; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2006; Mir-
Hosseini et al., 2015). In other words, they argue that patriarchy comes from men’s 
interpretation of Islamic text. For example, one of the well-known authors of Islamic 
feminism in Iran, Mir-Hosseini (2006: 629) states:  
Like most Iranian women, I strongly supported the 1978-79 revolution and 
believed in the justice of Islam; but when the Islamists strengthened their 
hold on power and made the sharia (or their interpretation of it) the law of 
the land, I found myself a second-class citizen. This brought the realization 
that there can be no justice for me, as a Muslim woman, as long as patriarchy 
is justified and upheld in the name of Islam. The prevailing interpretations of 
the sharia do not reflect the values and principles that I hold to be at the core 
of my faith. 
 
The argument of Islamic feminists is on the basis that there is no one ‘true’ 
understanding of religion (Ahmadi, 2006). Islamic feminists and activists analyse the 
relations between the practice of power and production of knowledge by political-
religious leaders (Mir-Hosseini et al., 2015) and apply religious texts as the grounds 




Moreover, with regards to reinterpreting the Quran, Islamic feminists and women 
activists believe that as there are some texts in the Quran that reflect the authority of 
men, women have to consider the Quran’s first audience, who lived in times of tribal 
Arab patriarchy (See for example, Ahmadi, 2006; Mir-Hosseini, 2015). In this 
manner, Iranian feminists and women activists avoid challenging the Quran, and 
apply religious text as the grounds for their argument about patriarchy (Badran, 2005; 
Mir-Hosseini, 2006; Salem, 2013) and also examine the temporality of its 
explanations to adjust to modern situations (Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008). This 
position and strategy gives Muslim women activists more room to negotiate women’s 
rights within an Islamic state, where conservative leaders are highly sensitive about 
upholding Islam in ruling the country. As Barlow and Akbarzadeh (2006) noted, the 
avoidance of placing the position of feminism as being in opposition to Islam allows 
Islamic feminists to be more influential than secular feminists in Muslim societies. 
 
Muslim women in Iran have applied the same approach as early Western feminists 
who did not reject the Bible and their faith to improve women’s rights (Mir Hosseini, 
2006). Instead, they appeal to the ‘higher’ principles and values of religion. This 
approach helped these women to reconcile their faith and identity with the struggle for 
gender equality (Mir Hosseini, 2006) and, therefore, not be labelled as ‘advocators of 
Western values’. In other words, Muslim feminists apply a strategy that has enabled 
them to work against the limitations placed on women rights within the framework of 
religion. Through these ways, these women can be closely tied to religious 
intellectualism in Islam (Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008). Any objection to the 
reinterpretation of the Quran leads to a defensible position for Muslim women, who 
face the problem of patriarchal interpretation, especially in Iran, where laws are 
approved in an Islamic framework; thus, the only way for Islamic feminists to address 
women’s rights is to reinterpret the Quran.  
 
Classic Islamic methodologies are the basic methodologies of Islamic feminism, that 
is, Ijtihad (autonomous investigation of religious sources) and Tafsir (clarification of 
the Quran) and interpretation of the sacred text with their own experiences and 




Iranian Muslim women’s rights activists’ invention. As Ahmadi (2006) argued, first, 
male reformist leaders/politicians called for a reinterpretation of the Quran, and later 
women claimed this right through the process of reinterpretation. A considerable 
amount of literature has been published on Islamic feminist discussion of woman-
centred re-readings of Islam’s holy sources (e.g. Badran, 2002; Ahmadi, 2006; 
Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008). These authors have stated that the involvement of 
women activists in the process of re-interpretation of the Quran closes the gap 
between the state’s existing gender ideology and the reality of women’s lives. 
However, these studies lack exploration of the limitations that Muslim women face 
with their involvement in this process. Moreover, most of these authors consider 
Islamic feminists and women activists as advocating the reform of religion. However, 
clearly not all Muslim women, for example conservative women, believe in reformist 
methodology and there are the distinctions between conservative and reformist 
(progressive) discourse among Muslim women activists. Conservative women argue 
that ordinances should be practised as they are defined within the Quran (in a 
traditional way) without any re-interpretation. Elaborating on this type of Muslim 
women’s demands, i.e. conservatives, has been overlooked in studies related to 
Iranian feminists and Muslim women rights’ activists. A small number of authors 
have mentioned the existence of this type of woman in Iran (e.g. Afary, 1997; Mojab, 
2001; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2006), and studies have failed to examine the 
characteristics of this type of women activist. In their study: ‘Prospects for feminism 
in the Islamic republic of Iran’ Barlow and Akbarzadeh (2008: 21-22) state:  
both secular and religious-oriented Iranian feminists should be considered 
analytically distinct from conservative religious women […] some 
conservative religious women in Iran are hiding behind the term Islamic 
feminism in order to conceal a fundamentalist view on women’s status in 
Islam. 
 
As the above quotation suggests, one key reason why conservative women activists 
have been overlooked within the literature is linked to the fundamentalist views these 
women hold. However, these conservative women exist in Iran and do have some 
activities related to women’s rights. 
  
Hoodfar and Sadr (2010) argue that Islamic women activists have had forms of 




reform associations and Islamic women’s organisations. The former includes 
feminists and women activists, who hold reformists’ views, and often secular 
feminists and women activists. The latter relates to Islamist women’s organisations 
seeking gradual change and includes religious conservative women. One of the most 
important of these Islamic organisations is called the Zeynab Society,4 which has 
more than 142 branches across Iran and has mobilised a number of women. The 
political strategy of their network has been to choose one women’s issue at a time, 
lobbying political religious leaders as well as forming coalitions with other 
organisations across the country. Afshar (1996: 134) emphasised the roles of the 
Quango and non-governmental organisations as the most successful places for women 
to challenge women’s rights and argued that ‘although in the public domain success 
depended on espousing an Islamic stance, Islam itself is sufficiently flexible to allow 
a diversity of interpretation and much leeway for women’. Hoodfar and Sadr (2010) 
also mention how these Islamic organisations have enabled Muslim women to achieve 
law reforms, such as the martyr’s widow’s5 rights, in order to have custody of their 
children. However, despite their intention to elaborate the strategy of these women 
organisations in order to change laws, Hoodfar and Sadr failed to elaborate how these 
women defined gender justice and gender equality.6 Hoodfar and Sadr (2010: 897) 
only asserted that the members of Islamic organisations claimed that ‘Islam sanctions 
equality between men and women’. 
  
In contrast with the Islamist organisations, women’s reform associations that mostly 
includes Islamic feminists and women activists, who hold reformist views, have 
attempted to keep their independence from the political structure and male parties and 
be more outspoken. They have argued that laws should be re-interpreted in a more 
women friendly way (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010). These feminists and women activists, 
                                                 
4 For more information see: Mohammad Ali Zandi. ‘Zeynab Society’ (in Persian). Baqir al-Ulum 
Research Institute. Retrieved 09/06/2018. 
5 These women are those who lost their husband during the Iran-Iraq war. According to the law, women 
whose husband is dead or divorced women cannot have custody of their children: above seven years for 
daughters and two years for sons. However, an Islamic organisation gained this right for these women. .  





who supported reformist views, also attained high ranking positions in NGOs during 
the second era (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010; Tahmasebi‐Birgani, 2010). For example, 
Khatami’s advisors on women’s affairs, NGOs, and also the Head of the Centre for 
Women and Family Affairs were women who advocated reformist views. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, while Khatami supported civil society and women 
could participate in NGOs, this pattern reversed during the third era because of the 
restrictive gender policies Ahmadi Nejad implemented (ibid). Due to the closure of 
women’s NGOs in Ahmadi Nejad’s time, women’s organisations continued their 
activities through virtual networks, websites and blogs (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010; 
Shirazi, 2012). The status of feminists and women activists has changed very little 
during Rouhani’s presidency. While some NGOs have reactivated during this time, 
they remain under the control of the state and receive constant threats (Tohidi, 2016). 
Therefore, feminists and women activists have mainly continued their activities 
though virtual networks. Importantly, despite the attempt of the state to limit web-
based activism, they have not yet fully controlled it (Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010; Shirazi, 
2012). Compared with other Iranian bloggers, women bloggers have been the leading 
bloggers in Iran. Additionally, the number of women internet users shows the highest 
internet penetration among Islamic societies in the Middle East (Shirazi, 2012). 
Having discussed the characteristics and strategies of Islamic feminists and women 
activists in Iran, I now move on to secular activists in Iran, and their approach to 
advocating women’s rights. 
 
Secular feminists  
Early forms of ‘secular feminism’ emerged in the late nineteenth century in Iran 
(Badran, 2001). In the aftermath of the regressive laws implemented after the Islamic 
Revolution, such as compulsory Hijab, some secular feminists left the country 
(Sedghi, 2007; Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010). Secular women in and outside the country 
have been struggling to attain Iranian women’s social and political rights. Ahmadi 
(2006: 34) assert, the importance of the role of secular women activists in Iran, with 
her argument that secular women’s ‘struggle has enormously contributed to the 




impose the veil as a barrier separating women physically from men, and deprive 
women of their rights as citizens, mothers, and wives’.  
 
 
Historically, secular national feminists have developed links with international 
feminism (Badran, 2001). This type of feminism draws on and is established by 
various discourses including humanitarian/human rights advocates, and of democracy 
(Badran, 2001; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). Secular-oriented 
feminism represents an alternative to feminist strategies based on Islamic sources. In 
fact, secular feminists view the problem of Iranian women’s rights as deriving from 
the relationship between Islam and politics. Unlike Islamic feminism, secular 
feminism is more concerned with the idea of the power structure of the Islamic state 
than with theology (Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008). As secular feminists advocate 
secularity, their idea is problematic in the views of political leaders who attempt to 
hold Islam as the foundation of laws. 
 
 
The main strategy of secular women has been to publicise human rights abuses such 
as the low position of women in the family court, and the stoning of women, and in 
this way they have criticised religion’s ability to deliver gender equality (Sedghi, 
2007; Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010). For example, Hoodfar and Sadr (2010: 898) state, 
‘they have continued their activism through informal gatherings, and have tried to 
strengthen networking with Iranian expatriates and the transnational women’s 
movement, to pressure the regime’. In terms of the activities of secular women within 
Iranian society, Sedghi (2007: 250) states that ‘few continued their activism by 
engaging in critical and feminist teachings and writings…or engaged in public 
debates. Some became alienated at home’. Additionally, secular feminists and women 
activists used the limited opening space in the reformist time and managed to set up 
some women’s NGOs; however, these organisations did not call themselves ‘feminist 
organisations’. Similar to Islamic feminists and women activists, since Ahmadi 
Nejad’s time, secular women have continued their activities primarily online 





While Iranian secular women have been struggling to improve women’s rights, their 
attempts, although important, have sadly been inadequate to change the patriarchal 
structure of Iran. As conservative political leaders hold significant power over key 
state institutions, secular women have encountered barriers to being active within the 
framework of Islam (Ahmadi, 2006). Given these limitations on the activities of 
secular women, some scholars (e.g. Ahmadi, 2006; Mir-Hosseini et al., 2015) have 
highlighted the role of Muslim women activists as insider forces who attempt to 
reconstruct gender and Islamic discourses and try to re-interpret traditional Islamic 
and legal sources. However, analysis of the literature about secular and Islamic 
feminists and women activists ( e.g. Ahmadi, 2006; Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010; Mir-
Hosseini et al., 2015) suggests that, secular women activists can contribute to 
women’s rights in different ways. Secular women can be considered an important 
factor due to their ideas about Iranian women, which act as a catalyst for further 
discussion in terms of women’s rights amongst religious individuals, including 
women activists. However, religious reformist women activists are influential due to 
the strategies through which they call for women rights within the religious 
framework. As the religious structure is crucial within the existing system, it seems 
that they can play an important role in terms of practice. For example, as Ahmadi 
(2006) notes, the engagement of Islamic feminists with Islamic sources, the clerical 
scholars, and also the popularity of some women’s rights activists’ journals, have all 
had an influence on the religious discourse and encouraged conservative women to 
publish journals related to women. This suggests how secular and religious reformist 
and conservative women influence each other. In the following section, I examine 
how secular and Islamic feminists and women activists work together.  
 
Affiliations between secular and Islamic feminists and women activists 
As discussed earlier, secular feminists during the reformist time began writing more 
openly in the women’s press that belonged to Islamic feminists and women activists. 
For example, Zanan,7 a magazine run by Islamic feminists and women activists, 
became a platform upon which both secular and Islamic feminists and women 
activists published their articles (Ahmadi, 2006). This enabled secular and religious 
                                                 




women activists to work together and engage in more direct communication. They 
have also been participating in women’s reform associations (Hoodfar and Sadr, 
2010). Notably as Hoodfar and Sadr (2010) argue the relationship between secular 
and Islamic feminists and women activists, who support reformist views, became 
stronger after the Green Movement. Due to the importance of this key event, I will 
briefly explain the Green Movement next.  
 
 
The Green Movement took place in the third era after Ahmadi Nejad became 
president in 2009 through presidential elections. A mass group of Iranian people and 
voters demonstrated in the street and called for the removal of Ahmadi Nejad from the 
presidency. As Ahmadi Nejad belonged to conservative groups, individuals including 
reformist and secular women, questioned conservatives with the slogan ‘where is my 
vote’? (Milani, 2010). The positions and alliances of reformist and conservative 
groups shifted after the 2009 elections. As a result of the 2009 election, coalition 
politics polarised into two different sides, reformists and conservatives, bringing 
about political paralysis in Iran (Kamrava, 2010). When Ahmadi Nejad won the 
election, many Iranian people protested by arguing that the votes were fraudulent, and 
called for Ahmadi Nejad’s removal from the presidency. Due to this protest, some 
dissidents (who advocated for the reformist leaders) faced torture in prisons and 
arbitrary arrest (Kamrava, 2010). It is notable that the reformist leaders of this 
movement were, at the time of writing this thesis, still being held in prison. This 
protest is recognised as the largest event since Islamic Revolution of Iran and is called 
the Green Movement. Green was the symbol of the campaign of the reformist 
candidate (Mir-Hossein Mousavi) for the 2009 presidential election.  
 
 
As Mir- Hosseini (2011) states the Green Movement turned into a grassroots 
movement for civil rights. As during the Green Movement secular women supported 
reformist politicians, the relationship between secular and Islamic feminists and 
women activists was fortified. Moreover, after Ahmadi Nejad’s presidency when 
women NGOs were closed, secular women along with religious reformist women 
started to use the digital public sphere as their platform. This strategy helps them to 




example, the Feminist School8 is a famous website on which both secular feminists 
and women activists published their articles.  
 
Most literature related to Iranian Islamic and secular feminists and women activists 
place emphasis on the solidarity and collaboration between secular and Islamic 
feminists and women activists ( e.g. Najmabadi, 1998; Badran, 2005; Ahmadi, 2006; 
Tohidi, 2016). In their study Mir-Hosseini et al. (2015) argued that the conversation 
of Islam and Islamic feminism in terms of re-interpreting the Quran paves the way to 
go beyond dichotomies such as human rights versus Islam and religious versus secular 
feminists. Another scholar, Tohidi (2016) pointed to the connection between Islamic 
and secular feminists and women activists in Iran and argued that while currently in 
Iran there is intense repression both at the state and societal levels alongside the 
ideological separation and distinction in strategies among women activists, these 
activists have often converged in practice to achieve their common aims. 
 
There are several overlapping reasons that partly explain why Iranian secular and 
Muslim feminists and women activists are able to work together. Firstly, the approach 
of Iranian Islamic women on re-reading religion has opened the door to secular debate 
and human rights, helping them to have a common aim. Secondly, the particular and 
flexible characteristics of Islamic women in Iran, which are different from other 
Islamic women in Islamic countries, influences their affiliation with secular women 
activists in Iran. Now, I explain these reasons in turn. 
 
Within existing studies on the relation between Islamic and secular women, some 
writers (e.g. Afshar, 1996; Mir-Hosseini and Yamani, 1996; Najmabadi, 1998) 
believe that Iranian Islamic feminists apply the strategy of interpretation of the Quran 
which frees them from being confined to Islamic discourse. For example, Ahmadi 
(2006: 50) argues:  
There is no doubt that Islamic feminists base their ideas and claims primarily 
on Islam and legitimize their activities with the help of the Islamic tradition. 
Yet, Islamic thought is not the only basis of Iranian Islamic feminists’ ideas 
                                                 




and demands. So, what we are witnessing in Iran is not an Islamic feminism 
that only works from within the frame of Islam to reinterpret sacred texts and 
bring them in line with Muslim women’s new demands in our time, but it is, 
as some studies show, a movement that attempts to constitute a new 
discourse of women, albeit on religious grounds, by working from both 
inside and outside the Islamic legal and theological discourses. 
 
Muslim women activists have applied both the theories and methodologies of the 
secular and Islamic schools (e.g. Badran, 2002; Ahmadi, 2006) as Iranian Muslim 
women activists and Islamic feminists ‘have opened up the domain of interpretation to 
nonbelievers and non-Muslims’ (Ahmadi, 2006: 45).  
 
Many researchers claim that both secular and religious reformist feminists and women 
activists call for human rights (e.g. Ahmadi, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). For example, Tohidi 
(2016) argues that under the totalitarian state ideology, the liberal and social 
democratic human rights framework for intellectuals including women’s rights 
activists, has come to be the common value for coalition building. In respect with the 
engagement of Muslim women with human rights Ali (2000) argues that while 
Islamic feminists and women activists do call for human rights, they do not express it 
explicitly. He states that Islamic feminists are unable to adopt a human rights 
framework, as within Muslim societies sovereignty rests with God alone, and secular 
laws are unacceptable. Instead, Islamic feminists and women activists must find a 
culturally appropriate equivalent of human rights in their own traditions and cultures 
(Ali, 2000). Engaging with human rights is one aspect of what this study is going to 
examine. It will be discussed in Chapter Four, how those women who consider the 
Muslim identity and faith as a part of politics engage with the question of human 
rights. Calling for a re-interpretation of Quran in line with human rights can be 
considered a key factor that helps secular and Islamic feminists and women activists 
to form affiliations. Notably, it is worth to mention here that the flexibility of Iranian 
Islamic feminists and women activists is also an important element influencing the 






Islamic feminists and women activists in Iran have been seen to be more willing and 
open to engage with a broader sense of politics and challenge further the nature of 
state (see for example Mir-Hosseini, 1996; Najmabadi, 1998). This characteristic and 
approach of Islamic feminists and women activists has had a positive influence on 
their affiliations with other types of feminists, including Western feminists and 
secular feminists in Iran. Many researchers who focus on women’s issues in Iran 
avoid highlighting the differences between Iranian feminists and women activists and 
Western feminism ( e.g.Mojab, 2001; Ahmadi, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). Instead, these 
studies have stressed the affiliation between Islamic Iranian women’s rights activists 
and feminists and Western feminists. For example, some scholars (e.g. Najmabadi, 
1998; Ahmadi, 2006) have argued that Iranian Muslim feminists and women’s rights 
activists have claimed, contrary to other Islamic feminists in other Muslim contexts, a 
connection with Western feminism. Ahmadi (2006: 33), focusing on the link between 
Iranian women activists and Western feminists, argued that: 
Islamic feminists in Iran are rethinking gender in Islam. Not only are Islamic 
feminists opening the doors of interpretation of sacred texts and debates on 
women’s issues to groups other than Muslims but they have also broken with 
the reactive gender conservatism and West phobia prevailing among 
fundamentalists, connected themselves with Western feminism, and woven 
new connections between Muslim women and Western feminism.  
 
However, it should be noted that these connections might not be expressed openly by 
Iranian women activists, because, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the 
gender policies of Iran put pressure on Iranian feminists and women activists to 
distance themselves from the West and Western feminists.  
 
Identity of Iranian feminists and women activists 
There are several global, political, historical and social aspects that might influence 
the specific identity of Iranian women. Firstly, globalisation has had a significant 
influence on Iranian women’s ideas about gender issues (Mir-Hosseini et al., 2015; 
Tohidi, 2016). While the ruling patriarchal authorities have attempted to keep Iran 




about the current leanings within global feminism, and more transnationally involved, 
particularly with U.N. conventions such as CEDAW. As Tohidi (2016: 76) argues: 
[a]nother set of factors, of increased influence in more recent years, has to do 
with increased processes of globalisation and the international currency of 
the discourses of human/women’s rights spreading through the United 
Nations (U.N.) and transnational feminist activism and new communication 
technology such as satellite television, the internet and social media. 
Increased globalisation has intensified a ‘glocal’ dialectic, meaning the 
interplay of the local-national factors with the global international factors. 
 
Ahmadi (2006) also argues that Iranian women activists, including Islamic feminists, 
have been influenced by the process of globalisation, through which feminists 
struggle for equality and justice. For example, Iranian women activists have attended 
a variety of conferences, mainly sponsored by the U.N., since 1975. Engaging with 
globalised modern realities has motivated many Iranian women activists to rethink 
gender relations in Iran (Ahmadi, 2006; Tohidi, 2016).  
 
Additionally, another aspect of globalisation is linked to the roles of Iranian 
researchers and writers who are based in Western countries. As Tohidi (2016) notes, 
since the Islamic Revolution (1979), thousands of voluntary or forced Iranian 
immigrants mostly left Iran due to political reasons and settled in North America or 
Western Europe. Most of these Iranians include many accomplished professionals and 
highly educated persons devoted to the cause of democracy and human rights in Iran. 
In Tohidi’s view, Iranian authors who live in Western countries play an important role 
in constructing the discussion around the ways that women’s rights in Iran can be 
improved.  
 
There is a dynamic of anti-West ideology that is an important political discourse and 
rhetoric within Iranian politics. However, because of the history of not being 
colonised, the strength of anti-West discourse amongst secular and Islamic feminists 
is not the same as other Islamic countries in different regions, with different histories. 
For example, in the Egyptian context, Badran (1996) explained how feminists 




front with men’s liberal nationalism during the independence struggle in Egypt. As 
Barlow and Akbarzadeh (2006) state, while the legitimacy of the Moroccan monarchy 
was derived from Islam, the state followed the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
suggestions on social spending and investment. However, by the early 1980s this 
program resulted in devastating economic stagnation alongside political oppression. 
Therefore, modernisation models that were Western-informed became faltering and 
the Islamic response to the failure of the modernisation, similar to other Middle 
Eastern countries, was to decline the secular model and call for a return to Islam. 
These experiences within Morocco, had a considerable influence on the approach of 
Moroccan Muslim feminists, as they are intertwined with their social, political and 
economic context. As Badran (2002) and Ahmadi (2006) argued, many other 
feminists in Muslim societies have had similar nationalistic feelings which are 
interwoven with their Muslim identities. They argue that in most Muslim societies 
there is an assumption that the West, through colonialism, has attempted to undermine 
Islam and the cultures of the Arab world and replace them with Western beliefs. This 
explains why in the Arab world feminists and feminism are often discredited as agents 
of Western colonialism. However, Iran’s case in some authors’ views, is different, as 
Iran was never under Western colonial rule. Ahmadi (2006: 51-52) states:  
Iranian people have not felt, therefore, any need to defend their ‘Persian 
identity’ against ‘Western attack.’ Still, Iranian national feelings have often 
stood against their Islamic identity. During those historical periods in which 
nationalism was emphasized, Islamic identity was weakened. Therefore, 
although the Islamic Revolution was indeed based on an anti-imperialistic 
driving force, many Iranians did not regard it as an anti-Western struggle to 
retain their national identity. Only religious fundamentalists regarded the 
Revolution as an attempt to preserve Islam from being undermined by 
Western values and ideas. In contrast, an important point of departure in 
Iranian Islamic feminists’ struggle for equality has been the very presence of 
Western values and ideas. 
 
Ahmadi (2006) claims that for Iranian women activists there is a link, in their real 
feeling, between themselves and Western feminists. Tohidi (2016) also argues that the 
affiliation of Iranian women activists with Western activists does not mean that 
feminists and women activists only follow Western feminists’ demands; in Tohidi’s 
(2016) views, all the international and national pulls and pushes resulted in the 




maintained their independence and home-grown roots. In this thesis I want to explore 
where the concept of West does come in and where it does not. In the data chapters I 
will discuss how for some participants it matters, while for some it does not.  
 
Feminists and women activists in Iran and seeking change  
After discussing the collaboration of secular and Islamic feminists and women 
activists, the next question one might ask concerns the nature of the achievements of 
Iranian feminists and women activists and how they call for gender equality and 
gender justice in Iran. 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the pathway of women’s activism and feminist 
movements in Iran is complicated. In spite of the ruling conservative Islamists, who 
maintain many forms of practical and legal discrimination against women, as Tohidi 
(2016) mentions, the Iranian women’s movement has in more recent years emerged as 
a lobbying, networking, framing, campaigning, collectively protesting, and mobilising 
force. The government’s arrest and repression of feminists and women activists is 
significant as it suggests the resistance of Iranian activists who continue to challenge 
the position of women in Iran. For example, there are many examples of women being 
arrested for standing against the compulsory Hijab. Women’s movements, in Tohidi’s 
view (2016: 80) lack formal representations, and instead are ‘segmentary’ (have 
several, sometimes competing, organisations and groupings), ‘polycentric’ (have 
multiple and sometimes competing leaders), ‘reticulate’ (are linked to each other 
through a loose network)’. This suggests the limitations that the women’s movement 
has faced and which influences their achievement of gender equality and 
improvement in the status of women in Iran. It is worth to mention here that this 
thesis is not a social movement theory and does not aim to establish whether in the 
past or the present there is a feminist/women movement or not. What this study 
explores is how participants with different beliefs give meaning to the variety of 





In terms of the achievements/successes of women activists in Iran, some of the 
literature (e.g. Afshar, 1996; Ahmadi, 2006; Afshar and Dennis, 2016; Tohidi, 2016) 
has argued that feminists and women activists have not achieved significant legal 
change. However, these authors emphasise that women activists are not disappointed 
and are still fighting against gender discrimination. For example, drawing on their 
analysis of the achievement of women activists in Iran, Ahmadi (2006) and Tohidi 
(2016) stressed that, while Iranian women activists have not markedly changed the 
legal discriminatory laws since the Islamic Revolution, they have had an active 
presence in public life. Despite the stress found in studies on the resistance of women 
activists in Iran, the ways in which feminists and women activists tackle their 
limitations have not been elaborated.  
 
Additionally, in terms of examining women activists’ achievements, most of the 
existing literature on feminists and women activists in Iran focuses particularly on 
legal change rather than cultural change (e.g. Afshar, 1996, Ahmadi, 2006; Mir-
Hosseini, 2012; Shirazi, 2012; Afshar and Dennis, 2016). One of the few examples is 
Afshar (1996) who asserted that Iranian women who participated in the political 
sphere have suffered from male expectations within the political realm, and needed to 
be cautious about the extent to which they advocate women’s rights to change 
discriminatory laws. Despite the attention paid by Afshar (1996) to debate around 
cultural change, she failed to elaborate this point further. Mojab (2001) also mentions 
cultural change; however, she claims that Iranian feminists and women activists 
struggle for formal equality and do not focus on cultural inequalities existing in 
culture. This idea suggests that legal equality is the primary concern of Islamic 
feminists rather than cultural equality. In contrast, in Chapters Five and Six, I will 
examine the importance of cultural inequality/change to participants to both reaching 
gender equality and democracy. The concept of cultural inequality adopted in this 
research relates to the cultural beliefs and values that discriminate women. These 
cultural norms normalise the existing gender roles and are an obstacle to women 
being viewed as equal to men. For example, the influence of cultural norms of the 
importance of women’s role in providing care within the home limits their 





In the Western context, in terms of the association between gender equality and 
cultural inequality, some authors argue that citizenship is not only about legal 
equality, but also cultural equality (e.g. Pakulski, 1997; Richardson, 1998). These 
scholars, in contrast with many Iranian researchers, consider both the formal inclusion 
of all members of society alongside the informal obstacles which sustain exclusion. 
These differences may be partly explained by the existence of many basic 
discriminatory laws in Iran that encourage the Iranian authors to focus on the legal 
system. In the same vein, the concept of gender equality and justice is much wider, 
and more detailed within the Western concept, compared with Iranian scholars.  
 
The debate of gender equality and gender justice  
In the Western context, there is a wealth of literature associated with the concept of 
gender equality and justice. For example, writers debate whether women’s equality 
should be reached through a focus on difference or sameness (Walby, 2005). In terms 
of equality based on sameness Brown (2006: 36) states: ‘Liberal equality is premised 
upon sameness; it consists in our being regarded as the same or seen in terms of our 
sameness by the state, and hence being treated in the same way by the law’. However, 
the concept of gender equality, how Iranian feminists and women activists define 
equality has not been explored among scholars whose work is concerned with Iranian 
feminists and women activists (e.g.Ahmadi, 2006; Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010; Tohidi, 
2016). While the existing literature about Iran applies gender equality in a general 
way, in Chapter Five, it will be discussed how gender equality is understood 
differently among participants to show that it is more complex than the existing 
literature implies. One of the key reasons that might justify the lack of competing 
meanings of gender equality among scholars may relate to the particular concept of 
justice existing within Islamic debate.  
 
The meaning of gender justice for traditionalist Muslims drives from a notion of 
justice existing in the Quran (Kadivar, 2013). A few non-Western researchers for 




Duderija (2017) note that the meaning of justice in a traditional way is based on 
discriminatory laws. In traditional Islam, gender justice means that everything is in its 
proper place and as men and women have their own essential places in the society and 
family, ‘justice consists of keeping them in these places and giving them rights 
accordingly’ (Mir-Hosseini et al., 2015: 36). This definition of justice justifies and 
reproduces the gender stereotype that men are stronger and therefore have superior 
rights (Eshkevari, 2013; Mir-Hosseini et al., 2013; Mir-Hosseini et al., 2015). This 
traditional meaning of ‘justice’ clearly leads to gender inequality in many areas, 
including the gender division of work in Iran. For example, Rezai-Rashti and 
Moghadam (2011:422) state, ‘only 3.5 million women have paid work in Iran 
compared with 23.5 million men’.  
 
In contrast with the definition of ‘justice’ in Islamic discourse, analysis of the studies 
about Iranian feminists and women activists illustrates that gender equality and 
gender justice for these researchers is mostly associated with human rights and gender 
neutral laws. As the particular meaning of ‘justice’ within traditional religious 
discourse has the potential to lead gender discrimination, Iranian authors might apply 
gender equality in line with human rights and gender neutral laws to distance 
themselves from the particular meaning of justice in religious discourse (Mir-Hosseini 
et al., 2015). As gender equality and women’s rights are strongly associated with 
democracy, in the next section I describe the literature relating to Iranian women, 
Islam, and democracy.  
 
Women, religion and democracy in Iran  
Despite some democratic features in Iran, women are denied basic political and social 
rights (Parsa, 2016). Most studies related to feminism and democracy in Iran have 
only been carried out in a small number of overlapping areas. Some researchers have 
mentioned the ways that Iranian women activists contribute to democratisation by 
improving women’s rights (e.g. Afshar, 1996; Moghadam, 2002; Mir-Hosseini and 
Tapper, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). These studies point to women’s efforts for gender 




strong association between women’s rights and a democratic system (e.g. 
Jahanshahrad, 2012; Moghadam and Haghighatjoo, 2016; Moghissi, 2016). Some 
scholars have engaged with the positive role of reformist leaders, mainly Khatami, 
who supported democracy and human rights on improvement of women’s rights in 
Iran (e.g. Mir-Hosseini, 2002; Hoodfar and Sadr, 2010). For example, they examine 
how, during the reformist time (second era), feminists and women activists enjoyed 
relative freedom of the press and expression and NGOs grew (e.g. Paidar, 2001; 
Rostami-Povey, 2013). However, considering the alleged important role of women 
activists in the process of democratisation, there is hardly any research on the concept 
of democracy as seen by feminists and women activists.  
 
As Iranian laws are based on Islam, in order to examine the conception of democracy 
among women activists in Iran, it is worth looking at the existing literature related to 
democracy and Islam. There is a wealth of literature on democracy in Muslim 
societies and the relative importance of religion is debated (e.g. Huntington 1993; 
Rowley and Smith, 2009; Collins and Owen, 2012; Potrafke, 2012). Due to the fact 
that this study explores the conception of democracy among feminists and women 
activists, reviewing the literature is significant in realising the models of democracies 
and their characteristics as proposed by these scholars. 
 
Some scholars such as Gellner (1983), Huntington (1993), Rowley and Smith (2009), 
Potrafke (2012) and Tezcür et al. (2012) argue that there is a significantly negative 
correlation between democracy and Islam. For example, from Rowley and Smith’s 
perspective (2009), Muslim countries are less likely to be democratic because public 
opinion in these countries is less favourable to freedom, due to the boundaries of 
religion. Rowley and Smith (2009: 296) state: ‘strict enforcement of homogeneity in 
one sphere, religion, is likely to be prejudicial to the development of free debate in 
another sphere, democratic politics’. Tezcür et al. (2012) considers Iran to be a 
country which has a negative relationship between religiosity and democracy, and a 




survey illustrated that Iranian individuals critical of the ruling ideology, and less 
religious, are demonstrated to be more supportive of democracy. 
 
However, other scholars such as Karatnycky (2002), Tessler (2002) and Collins and 
Owen (2012) refuse to accept these associations, arguing that the link between 
Muslim societies and democracy is more complicated. The negative association 
between oil and democracy in the Middle East has been highlighted by some scholars 
(See Ross, 2001; Karatnycky, 2002;  Herb, 2005; Ahmadov, 2014). For example, in 
his study, Karatnycky (2002), in spite of showing a democratic gap between non-
Islamic countries and Islamic countries, disagrees with the notion that Islam is 
inherently incompatible with democracy, and instead points out that there is a 
negative relationship between natural resource wealth, such as oil and gas, and 
democracy in the Arab core of the Islamic world. In this respect, Ross (2001), who is 
a prominent author discussing the association between oil resource and democracy, 
argues that there are several reasons for the negative effect of oil on democracy. 
Firstly, it relates to the state’s policies, as the state uses low tax rates alongside 
spending huge amounts of money to dampen forces for democracy. By keeping the 
finances hidden, autocratic states empower their governments and remain 
undemocratic (Ross, 2011). Secondly, there are internal and governmental forces that 
are created by the state in order to repress democratisation. Thirdly, in oil-rich 
societies, it is less likely that industry and service sectors will improve and thus the 
failure to move in to modernization has a negative impact on the process of 
democracy (Ross, 2001). Therefore, for researchers such as Ross, it is oil rather than 
religion which is playing the key role in limiting the scope of democracy in countries 
such as Iran.  
 
From a different angle, Collins and Owen (2012) critique the idea that Islam is 
incompatible with democracy. Instead, they distinguish between secular democracy 
and Islamic democracy, as the former has been ideally defined in Western liberal 
theory, and the latter is a religiously-oriented democracy advocated by many Muslim 
activists and theories. By regarding Islamic democracy as a type of democracy, they 




Therefore, Islamic democracy is more in line with the views of religious people, who 
see this kind of democracy as protecting their values. For example, in case of Iran, 
Islamic democracy, for religious individuals, is considered as a system through which 
the president and members of parliaments are elected by Iranian people. However, 
these representatives should submit the bills in framework of Islam. There are some 
institutions in Iran, such as The Guardian Council, whose role is to supervise that 
legislations passed by parliament are in accordance with the Quran.  
 
Collins and Owen (2012) argue that liberal theorists advocated secularism as essential 
to democracy and seek to remove religion from the public sphere and maintain 
neutrality towards all kinds of religions. These characterisations of secular democracy 
are critiqued by Muslim individuals in Islamic societies, leading them to regard 
Islamic democracy as preferable alternative to it. Collins and Owen (2012) discuss 
how religious people disagree with liberal democracy and they claim that this type of 
democracy is incompatible with religious laws.  
 
In the process of democracy, there are two distinct concerns: one is that the 
individual’s values are identified in the political culture, and the other is the 
democratic institutions and processes. There is a growing body of literature that 
recognises the importance of political cultures that include the beliefs and values of 
ordinary citizens (e.g.Harik, 1994; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Tessler, 2002; Tohidi, 
2016). For example, Rose et al. (1998) argue that democratic values such as pluralism 
and tolerance of diversity result in successful democracy. In another example, Tohidi 
(2016) emphasised the role of civil society organisations, particularly an effective 
grassroots women’s movement for improving women’s rights and building a secular 
and democratic political state. This study aims to examine the ways in which the 
women engage with key concepts in the political realm including democracy and 
rights and women’s working relationship to categories of political discourse about 
democracy, freedom and rights. While this study does not explore the possibility of 
democracy in Iran, it examines what these possibilities are in feminists’ and women 




about factors that foster democracy as well as barriers to democracy and their views 
about the roles of grassroots and political culture on the process of democratisation. 
 
Conclusion  
Reviewing the literature about Iranian feminists and women activists suggests that 
being feminist is controversial and contested in Iran. Despite the importance of being 
‘feminist’ in Iran, hardly any research examines the positions that Iranian feminists 
and women activists take in terms of ‘feminist’ and ‘feminism’. Moreover, as 
women’s social position in Iran is problematic in a number of ways, this study 
explores the ways that feminists and women activists prioritise women’s rights. In 
addition, as women suffer from many forms of discrimination, democracy may be 
considered a good way to tackle the imbalance and discrimination. This research is 
going to explore feminists’ and women activists’ views, in terms of whether 
democracy should be secular or Islamic and factors that both foster democracy and 
are barriers to it. Importantly, it is notable that, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
literature considers Islamic feminists as a group of only reformist women. Therefore, 
the similarities and differences between conservative women as a type of Islamic 
women activists have not yet been examined. In this study, however, Islamic 
feminists and women activists are associated with both conservative and reformist 
women activists.  
 
I take this forward into my own research by asking these questions: 
  What are the characteristics of feminists and women activists in Iran? 
 How do they prioritise women’s rights in Iran?  
 What are the notions of gender equality among feminists and women activists? 
 Does the conceptual space of democracy share the same meaning among 
feminists and women activists with different beliefs and strategies?  
 
The questions listed here are not just a product of the investigation of the literature. In 
an iterative process involving consideration of existing research, the development of 




evolved. Aspects of these dynamic processes will be further discussed in the next 










This research based on Iranian feminists’ and women activists’ characteristics and 
their perspectives on feminist and feminism, women’s rights and democracy, aims to 
bridge the gap in academic research by investigating a variety of types of feminist and 
women activist. This may influence academic understanding about Iranian women’s 
characteristics and their views on democracy, rights and a fair society. As was 
established in the previous chapter, my thesis positions the interviewees as women 
who work within difficult gender politics and take different strategies to improve 
women’s rights. Due to the complicated context that these feminists and women 
activists engage in, this study will contribute to the work of feminists and women 
activists of different beliefs and views, and policy makers in Iran, by examining their 
respective similarities, differences, and requirements. 
 
This chapter discusses the research design, sampling process, the designing of the 
research interview questions, ethical issues, the interview process, and the data 
analysis. It explains the reasons why I conducted my fieldwork in two major phases in 
Iran and the ways that I recruited participants during these phases. In addition, as I 
interviewed a variety of types of Iranian feminists and women activists, I explain my 
positionality in the interview process and data analysis.  
 
Researcher Positionality 
My motivation for conducting this research developed out of my position as a new 
mum who had started her PhD when her child was only twenty days old. My 
experience during pregnancy in the UK was an influential factor in choosing my 
topic. As a pregnant woman who had been accepted by the university and was very 




people made me feel excluded from certain parts of the society, such as attending the 
university after becoming a mother. I felt that both Iranian and British cultures limited 
my aspiration because of my new role. For example, when my midwife realised I was 
going to study for a PhD after having my baby, she warned me that ‘you need to look 
after your son’. This type of comment mostly associates the role of caring with me 
rather than both me and my husband, and it started me on a new phase of 
experiencing being woman. In addition, I faced further difficulties after starting the 
course, such as not being entitled to maternity leave due to being an international 
student who needed to start her course 20 days after giving birth, and a lack of access 
to childcare through the university. This situation meant I was faced with many 
challenges only because I was a mum who dreamed of continuing her education. 
These experiences inspired me to think about gender inequality and what democracy 
is in the view of people who may experience reduced access to the supposed 
‘benefits’ of democracy. For example, how do women define democracy?  
 
In addition, the research derives from Iranian women’s issues, as they are deprived of 
basic important rights, such as having custody of their children and the right to 
divorce. As some feminist scholars (Hartsock, 1983; Harding, 1986; Hesse-Biber and 
Yaiser, 2004) argue, structural differences between men and women have led to 
distinct beliefs and experience and views that create distinct knowledge. The different 
views and understandings of women in terms of women’s rights, gender equality and 
democracy are examined by this research. In addition, my position is based on the 
notion that women, as an oppressed group, have dual views; firstly, there is their view 
of their oppressors which they develop to survive, and secondly there is their personal 
view developed through experiences (Hesse-Biber and Yaiser, 2004). As Iran is at a 
crossroads in terms of democratisation, I was interested in exploring how feminists 
and women activists advocate a fair society, defend women’s rights, stand against 
discriminatory laws, and define democracy, and its possibilities. Many studies in 
Western contexts, such as Reinharz and Davidman (1992); Ribbens and Edwards 
(1997); Tobias (1997); Hesse-Biber and Yaiser (2004) assert that research conducted 
within feminist frameworks is attentive to issues of difference, social justice and 
questions the social power. I think that the views of Iranian feminists and women 




of the issues of equality, justice and a fair society, as they are the voice of different 
types of Iranian women with a continuum of beliefs. In addition, as these women are 
more likely to represent women’s needs from different backgrounds, their 
understanding of democracy and women’s rights could be influential in improving 
Iranian women’s status. Importantly, exploring how these activists share ideas about a 
fair society alongside women’s needs may be crucial to them in better understanding 
each other’s requirements, and the areas in which they could work together in future. 
In order to explore how the women understand democracy, I decided to take an 
explanatory study which would equip me with the broader understanding of women’s 
perspectives about democracy and women’s rights.  
 
I conducted qualitative research based on my concerns as rooted in my experience and 
my commitment to political change. Feminist researchers such as for example 
Marshall and Rossman (2014: 25) have argued that ‘in qualitative inquiry, initial 
curiosities for research often come from real-world observations, emerging from the 
interplay of the researcher’s direct experience, tacit theories, political commitments, 
interests in practice, and growing scholarly interests’. Many feminists who support 
qualitative research such as Smith (1987); Hesse-Biber and Yaiser (2004); Marshall 
and Young (2006), argue that examining women’s perceptions and experiences is 
significant and plays an important role in creating knowledge. Thus, to explore the 
conceptions of gender equality and democracy among Iranian feminists and women 
activists, this research as explanatory study focuses on women’s perceptions and 
views. The methodology in this study is concerned with a feminist research 
methodological approach, as several authors have emphasised (Harding, 1987; 
Ribbens and Edwards, 1997; Letherby, 2003; Marshall and Young , 2006) particularly 
the collaboration of participants and the researcher, and a reflexive interpretation. For 
instance, Nielsen (1990) suggests a feminist who conducts feminist research should be 
aware of both feminist consciousness and the impact of the dominant class in the 
society. The researcher, as an Iranian feminist, was aware of the importance of the 
feminist research methodological approach and applied its implications for the 





While being a female feminist researcher is often considered a key factor in 
interviewing other women on issues about inequality and discriminations (Nielsen, 
1990; Reinharz and Davidman, 1992), my identity is not confined to this 
characteristic. I have complex identities and play multiple roles, such as being a 
mother, an Iranian middle class citizen, and a secular person. It is significant to note 
that my position as an Iranian woman who has a child positioned me within the same 
sexual division of labour of women who have been oppressed within the same 
context; alongside other Iranian women. I had greater insight (compared with 
‘outsider’ researchers) as a researcher into the lives of other Iranian women 
(Hartsock, 1983; Hesse-Biber and Yaiser, 2004). These similarities enabled me to 
engage with, and have a deep understanding of, Iranian women’s views. However, at 
the same time being a secular woman, it was possible that I would be considered an 
‘outsider’ by some participants, in particular conservative women. 
 
I need to acknowledge that I sometimes felt I was in tension for conducting this 
research. This acknowledgment is important, as Marshall and Young (2006: 72) 
stated: ‘A self-reflexive understanding of one’s identity is a necessary part of 
understanding the impact of one’s presence and perspective on the research’. For 
instance, I found myself more sympathetic towards secular accounts, but I attempted 
to reduce these feelings by first being aware of them (Ribbens and Edwards, 1997) 
and second by recognising the importance of a fair representation of different voices 
in order to reach a better understanding of which concepts of gender equality and 
democracy each group were proposing. The practical strategies in terms of my 
research position within the research process will be discussed in the Fieldwork and 
Data Analysis Section. Ribbens and Edwards (1997:138) asserted that ‘if researchers 
are to implement their theoretical and methodological commitments to being reflexive 
about the research process, both in the data analysis stage and throughout the entire 
research endeavour, a practical method of doing this is vital’.  
 
In this explanatory study, semi-structured interviews as a qualitative data-gathering 
technique were used (Reinharz and Davidman, 1992). Applying semi-structured 




and understand issues (Bryman, 2015), in terms of what the women viewed as 
important in understanding gender, rights and democracy. Furthermore, semi-
structured interviews were valuable because they allowed for some structure, which 
can be useful in research on sensitive and difficult issues such as feminism and 
women’s rights, especially in the context of Iran where these topics may be difficult 
for participants to discuss. In addition, the flexibility in this type of interviewing 
(Bryman, 2015) allowed me not only to probe additional issues raised by women but 
also explore and understand the views of women from a range of perspectives. For 
example, as I interviewed religious and secular participants, the ways that I asked 
them questions were slightly different. For example, I asked more questions about the 
views of religious participants about the position of women in Islamic discourse and 
the ways that it can be improved (See Appendix B). Moreover, this method enabled 
me to have a free interaction with participants in order to explore women’s 
perceptions of gender and democracy. Patton (2002) emphasised the importance of 
‘empathy’ in interview, this involved me taking and understanding the Iranian 
women’s stance and position. To understand the participants more deeply, I focused 
on both verbal and nonverbal communication in interviews. As writers such as for 
example Reinharz and Davidman (1992) and Reeves and Boyette (1983) have 
stressed that observation allows the participants’ moods and gestures to express their 
frustrations to be revealed, when they cannot articulate their feelings.  
 
Participant sampling   
Being an Iranian woman familiar with the Iranian context facilitated planning the 
fieldwork in terms of factors such as security issues and access. Sampling was, 
however, not easy considering that during Ahmadi Nejad’s time (See Table 1, P: 11-
12), the majority of NGOs closed and the visible activities of Iranian women activists 
were limited (Chapter Two). During the first phase of my fieldwork (April-September 
2014) Ahmadi Nejad was still in office, while the second phase happened in the UK 
and the last was conducted (June-September 2015) after Rouhani (See Table 1, P: 11-
12) became president in Iran. In the first phase, I interviewed 11 women. However, 
during the last phase, accessing feminists and women activists was easier compared 




As discussed in this thesis, Iranian feminists and women activists are not a 
homogenous group and their different backgrounds and experience has an influence 
on their views in terms of the way they construct gender and democracy. To access 
these various types of women, I attempted to choose samples carefully to achieve 
information-rich cases. Sampling from a diverse range of feminists and women 
activists, and capturing the distinct perspectives of women’s rights and democracy, 
was performed to attain a broader exploration of the issues about gender equality and 
democracy among Iranian women activists. 
 
At the beginning of my work I intended exploring Islamic feminists and secular 
feminists to explore how a continuum of beliefs and strategies –religious and secular 
–might influence women’s views. These two main categories were based on 
reviewing the relevant literature (see Chapter Two). Therefore, I structured my 
sample in the first stage of my fieldwork according to Islamic and secular feminists.     
However, after my initial phase of fieldwork it became clear that this typology was 
unable to capture the identities of the participants I had spoken to. The interviewees 
all saw themselves as activists, while identifying themselves as: feminist, secular 
feminist, Islamic feminist, religious women rights’ activists, and conservative women. 
I realised these different identifications were important to explore further and include. 
This led me, for the second phase of fieldwork, to seek to recruit participants based on 
these different set of categories/identities, which I developed from the categorisations 
stated by interviewees.  The importance of self-definition has been emphasised by 
several scholars such as Reinharz and Davidman (1992: 6) who suggested solving the 
practical problem (how we identify people) by using self-definitions: 
… sometimes people who do not want to be labeled ‘feminist’ are given the 
label anyhow. Conversely, some people who want to be acknowledged as 
feminist are not. That these differences exist is fortunate because the lack of 
orthodoxy allows for freedom of thought and action. 
 
This approach to identification is significant, particularly in the Iranian context due to 
the sensitivity around the term feminism. To bridge the gap between the self-
identifications of participants and literature categories, I created my own categories 




Therefore, three categories were established to examine the women’s perspectives: 
secular women, religious reformist, and religious conservative women. 
 
At the beginning of my research, my focus was on interviewing religious and secular 
women with various characteristics, such as age, education, and employment. I 
applied different recruitment strategies to access a variety of Iranian women activists. 
As discussed in Chapter One and Two, activism is defined in a variety of ways but the 
definition that I work with focuses on women who engage with social change in a 
variety of degrees. I was looking for activists who focus on women’s position in 
society; however, with different analyses of the social field, and seeking different 
degrees of social change. Based on this definition of activist, firstly, looking at 
different websites9 and publications related to women’s issues, and also reading news 
about politicians known to be women’s rights activists, enabled me to access some 
respondents. Secondly, I attended a pre-symposium meeting in London where Iranian 
feminists gathered, and a conference in Iran on the topic of female circumcision. 
These two events helped me to arrange interviews with a few women. Thirdly, in 
some cases, participants were used as key informants to help snowballing. This type 
of sampling enhanced my opportunities to identify cases which were likely to be 
information-rich (Marshall and Rossman, 2014). In addition, this strategy was 
especially useful for accessing conservative women who could potentially have 
mistrusted a researcher from a ‘Western’ university. This was significant in the 
sampling process as it allowed me to have easier access and identify participants who 
would have been difficult for me to reach. Finally, through the trade union federation 
website,10 I was able to make contact via email with people who linked me to women 
activists connected with labour issues.  
 
Initially, I had planned on interviewing 30 participants including 15 religious and 15 
secular women. However, I came up with 47 participants whose self-definitions were 
                                                 
9 See: http://feministschool.com/english/ and http://www.learningpartnership.org/iran-
oms 




broader than the categories represented by the literature. Table 2 below shows the 
number of participants in accordance with their self-identities. 
Table 2: Number of participants based on their self-identity 
Category Accessed number 
Secular feminists11 15 
Islamic feminists 10 
Feminists 3 
Religious women rights activists 9 




Based on the approaches that participants apply to advocate women’s rights, I 
categorised these five self-defined groups of women into three categories. The 
following reasons explain how I created my own categories (See Figure 1, P: 53). 
First of all, I put women who called themselves feminists but who were not secular, 
Islamic feminists and religious women activists into the religious reformist women 
category. The reason for this categorisation is based on their approach being to 
improve women’s rights via the re-interpretation of the Quran and reforming religion. 
All of these women have the same approach to advocacy; however, with distinct self-
definitions. For example, three women activists were identified by other feminists and 
women activists as Islamic feminists, and also during the interview these three held 
religious reformist notions and strategies; however, they avoided identifying 
themselves as Islamic feminists, preferring instead to be called only ‘feminists’, as 
they argued that these labels generate barriers that discourage women from working 
together. Second, women who identified themselves as conservative women were 
categorised as religious conservative women. This was due to their different 
traditional approach to women’s rights. Third, self-defined secular feminists were 
categorised as secular feminists, because their approach to improve women rights was 
driven from the separation of religion and legal system/women’s rights (For further 
                                                 




information see Chapter Four). It is important to mention here that these categories 
are not solid which means that they are dynamic, complex and multidimensional 
concepts and in different time and place they are different.  For example, someone 
who self-identified as a secular feminist may still be influenced by religious values. 
Similarly, someone who primarily self- identified as an Islamic feminist or as a 



























Figure 1: Three different categories based in the self-definitions of participants and 
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Secular, religious reformist, and conservative women were also drawn from different 
backgrounds, such as journalists, academics, politicians, artists, lawyers and women 
who connected with labour issues. Despite having a sample of women from different 
backgrounds, being an Iranian woman who used to live in a similar context of a 
dominant patriarchal culture helped me to be aware of issues and problems that 
Iranian women face. May (2011), in his book on Social Research, suggested a similar 
idea in that the researcher should be aware of the social setting in order to understand 
its social dilemmas. The understanding of women’s issues was therefore significant 
and facilitated the process of sampling.  
 
Having women from a variety of backgrounds helped me to explore a possible range 
of views of Iranian feminists and women activists for a deeper analysis and 
understanding of issues that might be affecting them differently. The following points 
show the biographical aspects of participants:12 
- The number who had a PhD: 24 
- The numbers who had a Master’s degree: 14  
- The numbers who had an undergraduate degree: 7 
- The numbers who had a diploma: 2  
- The numbers who were academics: 25 
- The numbers who were lawyers: 4 
- The numbers of politicians and former politicians: 7 
- The numbers of women who worked in cultural industries such as publishers, 
journalists, bloggers and directors: 17 
- Others employments, including teachers and managers: 2 
- The number who were connected with labour issues: 5  
- Age range: 28 to 71 
 
Looking at these numbers illustrates that the women are from educated and middle 
class groups. However, this research did not just aim to interview a particular type of 
woman and I attempted to interview women from different class backgrounds. This 
                                                 




may be significant that there is a strong association between being a women activist in 
Iran and a specific class and educational status. This is also illustrated by Iranian 
author Tohidi (2016), who argues that the women’s movements have predominantly 
been created by the urban middle class in major cities of Iran. Under repressive and 
authoritarian Islamic regimes, which have blocked the effectiveness of the activities 
of women’s rights advocates, the women’s movement has a long way to go to include 
distinct classes in rural areas and small towns.  
 
As part of this research, I had a small advisory team which included secular and 
religious reformist experts, and later a conservative woman and an international 
secular expert. These advisors not only acted as key informants and linked me to 
feminists and women activists, but also they advised me about distinct ways to access 
information about Iranian women’s activities, their meetings and the beliefs and 
values of religious women. By connecting them through their public emails, I was 
provided with their telephone numbers. After talking together on the phone several 
times, we arranged individual meetings. Marshall and Rossman (2014) recommend 
that researchers have ‘critical friends’ to critique the study throughout the research 
process. My selection was based on the perception that these well-known women 
activists in Iran were aware of the debate about women’s issues that exist there. 
Therefore, they were selected as my key informants, which also helped me to gain 
access to other participants. 
 
The secular advisor was found from Iranian websites13 at the beginning of the 
fieldwork. Through accessing her public email, we started our communication and she 
provided me with her telephone number in order to further discuss my project. We 
met each other in her office several times and I received some information about the 
situations of feminists and women activists in Iran, including information about the 
nature of their activities during Ahmadi Nejad’s time. She provided me with some 
information about a variety of ways in which feminists and women activists gather 
                                                 






and work together. This secular advisor linked me to some feminists by sending them 
an email and introduced me to them.  
 
Through snowball sampling, the second adviser, who was a religious reformist 
woman, was identified in the second phase of the fieldwork. After starting our 
communication by her public email, I was invited to her house. This helped me not 
only to interview her, but we also established a good relationship. She was an expert 
in terms of reinterpretation of Quran in a more ‘woman friendly’ way.  Having her as 
my key informant helped me to access other religious reformist women and I also 
received advice about some particular ideas related to reforming women’s rights. For 
example, during the fieldwork, religious reformist participants applied particular 
terms or beliefs such as Ijtehad, the religious reformist advisor unpacked these terms 
for me. This helped me understand fully the idea of reform, this both influenced the 
quality of my interviews with religious reformist women and the process of the 
analysis of data. 
 
In addition, during the first stage of my fieldwork, I established a strong relationship 
with two more women. An international secular woman, who is based overseas and is 
involved in international politics/activism, and a conservative expert. As an 
international advisor, this woman had published many studies on religious and secular 
feminists in Iran, a number of which have been referenced in this research. She 
provided me with her telephone number through her public email, and we later 
communicated by phone. Her suggestions as an ‘outside’ researcher who worked with 
Iranian women activists has been important in conducting this research. For example, 
she shared some of her experiences related to interviewing feminists and women 
activism in Iran. She also advised me to interview some key feminists and women 
activists. Regarding the conservative expert, I identified her by snowball sampling. 
One of the participants introduced her to me and by sending her an email and 
introducing me to her we started our communication. She was familiar with 
conservative women and she not only acted as a key informant, but also helped me to 
understand certain issues facing conservative participants. For example, when I 




my conservative adviser opened up the link between ideas around women’s 
employment and conservative religious beliefs. 
 
Research interview schedule 
To design the interview schedule, I undertook intensive reading about feminism and 
democracy to explore the historical and theoretical setting of feminists and 
democracy. Moreover, throughout the process of refining the questions, I was careful 
to avoid leading the participants to the fullest extent possible by using strategies such 
as using open questions. The preliminary reading stage helped me to prepare the basis 
for themes around which the research questions were outlined.  
 
As Wengraf (2001) states, the research questions ‘govern’ the production of the 
interview schedule. However, research questions are based on the language of the 
research community and interview questions are formulated in the language of the 
participant. As this research included a variety of feminists and women activists, 
designing questions was based seeking to explore their beliefs,14 understandings, and 
perceptions of gender, rights and democracy. In order to understand different views 
and issues in a deeper and extensive manner, three drafts of the interview schedule 
were adjusted according to the recommendations of my supervisors.  
 
The fieldwork of this research was divided into three phases (this is fully explained in 
the section on Fieldwork, P: 63): the first phase took place in Iran, the second in the 
UK, and the third and final phase was back in Iran. For the first phase, the interview 
questions were designed to discover the background and characteristics of Iranian 
feminists and women activists and how they understand gender equality and 
democracy. After finishing my first phase, in which eleven women participants were 
interviewed, I came back to the UK in order to pre-analyse and refine the interview 
schedule. Based on the pre-analysis of the first phase of interviews and the themes 
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that emerged from them, a few questions were revised and I added a few probe 
questions to develop the understanding of women’s views further. For example, the 
research schedule designed for first phase of the fieldwork was based on the 
preliminary reading. In the first stage, the topic of my research was about the 
conceptions of democracy among secular and religious feminists. According to the 
literature I read, the two terms ‘feminists’ and ‘women’s rights activists’ were not 
differentiated. However, within the field, I realized that the concept of feminism is 
highly controversial in Iran. There were some women who personally believed in 
feminism but avoided labelling themselves as feminist, as this word is not accepted by 
all people in society. Also, some women activists might be labelled as feminist by 
other women but when I interviewed them they disagreed with this label and 
questioned the term feminism, regarding it as a Western concept (see Chapter Four). 
Therefore, I learned in the fieldwork that I should use this term with caution. I revised 
the interview schedule designed for the first stage and added a question on which 
label participants preferred: women activists or feminist (See Appendix A and B). 
Therefore, in other phases of the fieldwork, I attempted to be more cautious in terms 
of applying certain terms. Moreover, the first stage of the fieldwork provided me with 
information about a variety of women activists,15 such as conservative women in Iran, 
and helped me to prepare more probing questions to explore and understand distinct 
views deeply.  
 
I conducted five interviews with feminist/women’s rights activists in the UK as I 
discovered that an important meeting was happening in UK and I thought this meeting 
was a useful opportunity to interview some Iranian feminist/women activists based in 
the UK. Moreover, this stage provided me with the opportunity to check and improve 
the interview questions. I explored whether the opinion and voices of the Iranian 
feminists and women activists were different under distinct political circumstances 
(UK and Iran). In other words, this stage became an opportunity for me to assess the 
credibility of interview questions conducted in Iran, where women’s freedom of 
speech is limited. However, the analysis of data illustrated that there was no such 
                                                 
15 For example, I was unaware of some conservative female activists in Iran, as most articles that I read 
before the fieldwork did not address them. This neglect is more likely rooted in the viewpoints of the 
writers and the women, who were mostly reformist and secular, and do not consider conservative 




difference, and thus no interview questions were changed for the next phase; I also 
did not differentiate between women interviewed in the UK and in Iran when 
discussing the findings. 
 
In the third phase, a similar list of questions was used as in the second stage 
(Appendix B), which covered three broad areas: the background of women activists, 
their characteristics, and the meanings of gender equality and democracy for them.  
 
The first part of the interview schedule looked at the participants’ background (e.g. 
personal information, the way they were brought up,16 and how gender roles were 
distributed in their family. It also covered how they became a women activist, when 
they did so, and if there was a particular event, experience or person which led them 
to become involved in feminism. They were also asked what they wanted to achieve. 
The second part focused on: the participants’ characteristics of secular and religious 
reformists and religious conservative women activists, e.g. the importance of being a 
women activist; their views on the key goals for the women’s movement in Iran; and 
the ways they described the type of women activist they are, such as secular or 
religious or without a label, as well as the ways that they prioritise women’s rights in 
their activities. The third part aimed at exploring Iranian women activists’ views on 
gender and democracy: the meaning of democracy and its possibilities; the meaning 
of gender equality; the extent that Iranian women’s rights are in accordance with 
human rights; whether the interpretation of the Quran helps the democratic process; 
and, for religious women, how they balance the authority of God with the authority of 
the people.  
 
Information Form, Debriefing Sheet, and Consent Form 
The background information for respondents was provided with the information form 
(Appendix C) and the debriefing sheet (Appendix D), through which participants were 
                                                 





informed of the nature of my research, before signing the consent form (Appendix E) 
and agreeing to interviews. The information form provided the respondents with 
information about the purpose of the study, the length of the interviews, the ethical 
use of the data and their rights such as ending the interview and withdrawing their 
data at any time. This form enabled participants to understand the basic information 
about the study and helped them to think about the research and be prepared for the 
actual interview. The debriefing sheet contained more details about the aims of 
project and the ways that participants could keep in touch with the researcher to be 
informed about the progress of the study. Moreover, this sheet contained the contact 
details of the supervisors to access further information about the research. In some 
cases, I sent the information and debriefing sheets by email prior to the time of 
interview. However, in other cases, I gave the respondent ten to fifteen minutes to 
read through the information form, debriefing sheet, and consent form and whenever 
they needed it I went through the forms for clarity. The material was provided in 
English so that the ethics review could occur. I did not translate the material into 
Persian as the majority of participants were educated and understood basic English. In 
the few cases where the participants’ English language was poor, I interpreted all the 
information forms and debriefing sheets and consent form to double check that they 
fully understood the information. In all of the interviews, I carried with me a copy of 
the information form and debriefing sheet for the respondents and two copies of the 
consent form that needed to be signed by myself and the participants.  
 
In terms of the consent form, it was provided to the participants and they were asked 
to read through, and if they had any questions and concerns I was there to clarify for 
them. After reading though the consent form, the participants and I needed to sign the 
sheet if they agreed to the interview. This stage was sometimes problematic, as in 
several cases, respondents appeared to be uncomfortable with signing this form 
quickly and preferred to keep it in order to have more time to read through it again. 
This seems to have been due to the fact that consent forms are unfamiliar in Iran, and 
these participants were concerned about their signature. I explained to the respondents 
that the reason they need to sign was for a university ethics committee approval 
requirement. In these cases, the application of a consent form was challenging, so I 




form in different contexts such as Iran suggest that how Western rules and university 
regulation might not work in different contexts. This raises issues about the ways we 
have to adapt to achieve consent, for example taped consent. 
 
In my fieldwork, as a sociologist, I realised how signing a form that was intended to 
protect the participant’s rights could be misunderstood as a potential risk due to the 
cultural differences between the two (British and Iranian) cultures. For example, 
Marshall and Rossman (2014) assert that a consent form is a uniquely Western 
cultural concept and is based on the principles of individualism.  
 
Ethical issues 
Attending the workshops and sessions on ethics that the university provided for 
postgraduate students played an important role in being informed of the distinct 
dimensions that research might be ethically engaged with. In addition, as part of the 
university’s policy I completed the ethics form before starting the fieldwork, which 
helped me to understand a number of the ethical issues that my research dealt with. 
Completing the ethics forms encouraged me to think through the details of the type of 
research I was doing, the level of confidentiality and anonymity that it involved, and 
the strategies that I could use to comply with ethical research rules. As Bryman 
(2015:507) suggests, ‘if researchers are aware of the issues involved then they can 
make informed decisions about the implications of certain choices’. Consequently, I 
started my fieldwork with this valuable knowledge and, as this research contains 
political critique of the state, as a researcher I had to maintain a high level of 
anonymity and confidentiality. 
 
At the very beginning of the interviews I explained to the participants that they would 
not be personally identified. However, in most cases they asked me to mention their 
real name. It seemed to me that as they are political figures and well known women’s 
rights activists they had already expressed their positions and ideas in public through 
their activities, such as conferences, publications, and websites. Therefore, despite my 




they wished to be identified for their views. However, as a researcher who needs to 
stand for ethical and confidentiality rules, I avoid mentioning their real names in this 
thesis. Moreover, as only a few did not request to be identified, it would have been 
difficult for me to draw a binary between women who wished to mention their real 
name and participants who did not.  
 
Having elite participants in my research, I was aware of the fact that there were some 
confidential quotations that had a potential risk for family relations, the participant’s 
career, and public status. There were quotations that had the potential to create 
conflict in their family. For example, during the interview with one of my 
participants, who was a member of parliament, she talked about her private life and 
how she had many difficulties raising her children and studying at university without 
any help from her husband. She complained about her husband and was still living 
with him. I was aware of the fact that she may have become emotional as she narrated 
the reason she became a woman activist. I was cautious not to use quotations related 
to her private life, as through these she could be identified.  
 
In terms of anonymity, having well known participants made the process of 
anonymity challenging. As some of the background information might have led to the 
participants in question being identified, I decided not to include this information. For 
example, in one case the person’s background could have been associated with her 
notions and meaning of gender equality and democracy, but I avoided using her 
sensitive information. It was a conflictual process for me as I felt that I was unjust for 
not representing her views appropriately. In addition, as most of the participants of 
this research were public figures, they had had interviews in the news and written 
publications which could be used as secondary data to clarify their quotations and 
ideas; however, I avoided including these secondary data beside their quotations as 
they could be easily identified. After completing the ethical approval procedure, I 





Risk Assessment Form and Approval for Outside Study 
Despite careful preparation of the documentation and required materials of the 
university, the applications for approval of the risk assessment and fieldwork abroad, 
in both phases of my fieldwork in Iran took a considerable time. The university was 
concerned with the level of risk that my fieldwork posed to me, and due to their 
concerns about the first phase of data collection in Iran, I revised the information of 
the risk assessment form and information about how I would manage being a lone 
researcher three times to reassure the university that I had thoroughly planned my 
research. I also experienced difficulties with the insurance company used by the 
university, because they are American and therefore covered by the US policy on 
sanctions with Iran. Consequently, I sought insurance cover for six months from an 
Iranian company. While the university paid the cost of my insurance in this phase, I 
found the process very time consuming and sometimes I felt that political issues were 
affecting my study and would be problematic for my research. I do appreciate the 
concern of the university for me, but filling in the risk assessment form sometimes 
made me feel how I was unnecessarily limited when I had to explain the ways that I 
could ‘minimise’ some ‘potential’ conflict with certain strategies, such as being 
accompanied by my father or my husband when travelling from one location to 
another in Iran. Using these strategies to tackle potential risks, in order to satisfy the 
university, was in conflict with my personality as an Iranian citizen and woman used 
to driving her own car in Iran. Despite all the concerns of the university for the level 
of risk, I successfully finished the first phase of my fieldwork in Iran.  
 
However, surprisingly, the approval procedure was again controversial and complex 
for the next phase of travelling to Iran which was fairly similar to the first time. The 
university had the same concerns for the level of the risk that I might face in Iran, as 
well as with the insurance. As my supervisors helped me through these processes, we 
felt at times we were falling through the gaps between my school and the graduate 
school over who would ultimately make decisions, and who would cover the private 





As mentioned before, there were three phases of fieldwork, including two major parts 
that took place in Tehran, Iran and one in the UK. The decision to conduct the 
fieldwork in two main phases in Iran was related to the need to ensure that the first 
phase of the fieldwork could respond to the research questions. Analysing the first 
phase interviews of my fieldwork thus gave me a clearer focus and rationale for the 
research. The gap between the two main phases helped me to identify key themes in 
the data, and this was not only useful for what I examined in the next phase in Iran but 
also for my continued analysis. 
 
First phase: Getting settled in Iran and meeting the research advisors 
This first phase took place between April 2014 and September 2014. I provided 
myself with a quiet place to study in our house and sought childcare, as I had my one 
and half years old son in the field. I made sure that I had all the materials needed for 
the interviews, such as photocopied consent forms, information and debriefing sheets. 
I separately met two of my research advisors and sought their views about the 
interview schedules and their recommendations for reading secondary data, such as 
women’s magazines. Importantly, as these advisors were also my key informants, 
they linked me to other feminists and women activists for interviewing.  
 
Recruitment during the first phase 
As discussed in Chapter Two, during this time the majority of NGOs had closed and 
the policies of the state changed in terms of gender relations. Within this atmosphere, 
I applied two strategies to recruit the participants. Firstly, before I left the UK, 
through different websites and publications I obtained the emails of a few potential 
participants and kept in touch with them by email. They sent me their phone numbers 
to contact them during the fieldwork to discuss more about my research project and 
arrange a date for interview. Secondly, having key informants and using snowball 
sampling helped me to access less visible feminists and women activists in Iranian 
society during the first phase of fieldwork. I was introduced to the potential 




methods facilitated my entry into the network of feminists and women activists and 
their ‘private’ realm. Through using the two strategies, I created a list of all potential 
interviewees, and a few of the women were contacted to arrange interviews one/two 
weeks later. In rare cases, the interviews had to be rearranged. Surprisingly, I was not 
faced with many refusals or cancellations during this phase, except for one woman 
who was unable to attend an interview due to family issues. 
 
For recruiting feminists and women activists, I was aware of the ways that my 
multiple identities could influence the women’s decision to accept or reject my 
request for interview. Therefore, to encourage the participants to be interviewed, I 
positioned myself and my research such that we were all women activists fighting for 
a fair society and were all responsible for improving the condition of Iranian women, 
regardless of being religious, secular, powerless and powerful, and an outsider or 
insider of Iran. In addition, it is worth mentioning here that being a PhD candidate 
based outside Iran17 and whose thesis would be published in English, was considered 
an important factor in being accepted by the majority of women in this phase, 
particularly the interviewees who were in a high political position, such as those 
Members of Parliament who were religious reformist. Studying a PhD in a Western 
university gave my work status to them as my potential academic publication in 
English is considered as an opportunity to be heard ‘universally’.  
 
Iranian feminists and women activists in this phase were very supportive and helpful, 
providing me with an encouraging atmosphere in which to conduct my interviews. I 
interviewed eleven women at this stage in Iran, including six women who defined 
themselves as Islamic feminists, and five who identified themselves as secular 
feminists. As I aimed to pre-analyse the first phase data in order to focus on the major 
themes raised by the participants, I transcribed and translated the interviews alongside 
the pre-analysis in this phase.  
 
                                                 
17 Researching outside Iran in a place where state policies would not limit my work allowed me to talk 




Back to the UK, second phase recruitment 
In April I went to London as I realised that there is a conference was happening in 
there and I thought it would provide an opportunity to recruit women’s rights activists 
from Iran, living in the UK. In order to interview women at this stage in the UK, I 
attended a meeting related to the 26th IWSF (Annual International Conference of the 
Iranian Women’s Studies Foundation) Conference.18 As it was an important meeting 
in which the majority of feminists and women activists who live in London were 
supposed to gather, I thought it was a good opportunity to interview some feminists 
and women activists who live in UK. This gathering gave me the opportunity to 
identify and connect with a number of women to interview. Four participants, who 
identified themselves as secular feminists, agreed to be interviewed in the same week 
in London, and these were held in cafes around their home about two weeks 
afterwards. I was also introduced to a fifth participant, a self-defined secular feminist, 
in the UK through the media. She was an Iranian director who had made a film about 
an Iranian girl faced with many problems in a patriarchal society. I contacted with her 
by email and asked her if she considered herself a feminist or woman activist, and 
also if she was willing to be interviewed. After she accepted my request to be 
interviewed, we arranged a date. My similar identity with the participants, being a 
secular immigrant woman, and also studying a PhD in this phase, helped me to have a 
productive recruitment. Having analysed the interviews in phases one and two and 




The third and final phase of the fieldwork took place in Iran from 14th June 2015 to 8th 
September 2015. As I mentioned in the previous section, there were difficulties 
getting the required insurance again in this phase. While I dealt with the insurance 
issues, the process of settling down in this phase was less complicated (for me and my 
family) compared with the first phase. Being familiar with the context influenced the 
                                                 
18 See following link on the conference website in both Farsi and English: 
http://www.iwsf.org/iwsf2015 




ways in which the necessary needs were met. For example, tackling living facilities, 
accommodation, and childcare was easier and faster. In addition, I had all the 
materials (prepared in the first phase) needed for the fieldwork, such as copies of 
consent forms and the list of potential participants. With the logistic factors settled, I 
was then ready for the final phase of the fieldwork. 
 
In this phase, I applied a different approach to recruit women. Firstly, having the first 
phase of the fieldwork was helpful to identify a few women through my key 
informants and snowballing, which generated a list of women with their public emails 
and office’s numbers. Secondly, as the third phase of the fieldwork was conducted 
during when a reformist government was in place (2013-present) women activists had 
become more visible in the public sphere (see Chapter Two). Therefore, they were 
holding conferences through which I could connect with more women. As I became 
familiar with the women’s network during the first phase of fieldwork, this familiarity 
helped me to be aware of these events and conferences more easily. A few of the 
women were identified through one such conference. Thirdly, some were identified 
before I travelled to Iran for the third phase through the website, ‘feminist school’19, 
by searching on the Internet, Facebook, and the articles and books I had read as part 
of my research, as well as the films of which they were director. Fourthly, people in 
the trade union federation20 put me in touch with Iranian trade unions and 
consequently a few women activists.  
 
This third phase is considered a significant phase as I identified a number of 
conservative women to interview. While my position as an academic woman studying 
outside Iran was an influential factor in recruiting women in phases one and two of 
the fieldwork, and also of reformist and secular women in phase three, this 
positionality could have had a negative impact on the conservative women. This 
related to my association to the ‘West’ and ‘Western notions’ (see Chapter Two, 
Chapter Four). The majority of conservative women who were contacted did not want 
to be interviewed, especially with someone from a ‘Western’ university with a topic 
                                                 
19 http://www.feministschool.com/ is used by Iranian women activists to share their ideas. 




on gender equality and democracy (see Chapters Four and Five). In order to 
encourage conservative women to be interviewed, I had a long conversation with 
them over the phone before our meeting and explained the benefit of my research for 
Iranian women. Moreover, it was stressed that they are an important part of society 
whose voices need to be heard. I explained that although I am not conservative, I am a 
neutral person who attempts to understand the priorities of women’s rights and 
concept of a fair society from different views even though they might not believe in 
democracy; by this I meant that I was interested in exploring what type of state they 
believe in, if democracy is not their ideal model. I successfully encouraged ten out of 
thirteen conservative women I contacted to be interviewed. 
 
In this phase, only one secular woman who was a public figure rejected an interview, 
arguing that she was not keen to be involved in political issues. Thirty-one women 
activists were recruited in total in this phase, as follows: 
- Ten self-defined conservative women  
- Four self-defined Islamic feminists 
- Nine self-defined religious women rights activists 
- Three self-defined feminists  
- Five self-defined secular women   
 
Conducting interviews 
The ways that I conducted interviews were similar, except that all of the interviews in 
the first phase took place in the participant’s home or office. However, in phase three 
I conducted some interviews in public places, such as parks and cafes. This difference 
can be justified by the change in the political context. As discussed in Chapter Two 
and Four, during Ahmadi Nejad’s time most of feminists and women activists were 
invisible in the public sphere. Instead, they gathered privately. However, women have 
been enjoying more freedom during Rouhani’s presidency. 
 
Before starting the first phase of fieldwork, I consulted, by phone, a number of friends 




different challenges I might face. These comments helped me to plan for different 
situations. Moreover, I had twice tested the research schedule to assess language, 
leading questions, timing and the harmony of the questions. Within the fieldwork, in 
order to pre-test the interview schedule, I conducted three pilot interviews and 
transcribed them into both Persian and English. The pilot stage, which took place at 
the beginning of the first stage of my fieldwork in Iran, prepared me for conducting 
interviews, and through which I experienced the atmosphere of the interview and the 
ways I needed to deal with issues which might arise during them. This also enabled 
me to practise the essential strategies which are important in addressing the issues 
between the multiple positionality of the researcher and others. For example, my 
research participants were mostly professional women, such as writers, artists, 
directors, and members of parliament. During my pilot stage, I found it very difficult 
to interrupt the interviewee because of their high position and the power structure. 
Consequently, the first and second pilot interviews lasted 2-3 hours because I was too 
shy to stop them. However, the third pilot took two hours, as practising the first two 
pilots enabled me to be more confident to lead the interviews, and so I attempted to 
interrupt whenever needed. I appreciate my PhD not only for research purposes, but 
also for developing my personality and skills. 
 
For the pilots I interviewed three women from different backgrounds to reflect a mini 
version of my full scale study. The first pilot was conducted with a secular woman, 
who was a lecturer at a university. The second woman was a reformist religious 
lawyer who believed in a secular state. The third interview was a lecturer at a 
university teaching on a women studies module. She was a religious reformist woman 
who believed in the Islamic government. These women were drawn from distinct 
categories, in order to assess different themes in the interview schedule and I also 
included them in the data analysis. After translating the pilot interviews into English, 
the transcriptions were sent to my supervisors for observations, checking the quality 
of the interviews, and evaluating whether the interview questions were able to 
respond to the aims of the study. Having assessed these interviews, my supervisors 
suggested that I revise the interview questions to make them more probing. For 
example, I added more probing questions such as how women activists bring human 




- Which kinds of laws did they prefer? Laws based on human rights or laws based on 
the Quran. Why?    
 
The interviews ranged from 90 minutes to two hours. Knowing that the interviewees 
were busy women, this length of interview was surprising. This suggest to what extent 
they were keen to talk and engage in being interviewed. As I mentioned earlier, it is 
more likely that this happened due to my positionality as an academic woman who 
publishes her work in English language, they felt that their ideas would be  shared 
more widely21. The interviews were digitally recorded and at the same time I made 
some notes on either important points that I aimed to ask the participants later, or 
reactions which could not be recorded, such as nodding the head, body language, and 
facial expressions. In addition, I added some notes to record basic information such as 
where the interviews took place and who participated. These notes were important for 
me as they permitted me to return to my observation during the analysis stage (Patton, 
2002) and led me to have a better interpretation of the women’s accounts, especially 
in cases where they avoided talking and only their body language illustrated their 
position. For example, some of the secular women had a very strong position on the 
term ‘Islamic democracy’, and when I asked them whether they believed in this term 
or not, they did not elaborate their views and their facial expressions showed to what 
extent they disagreed with this term. Making notes about some issues drew my 
attention to concepts and themes that appeared within the interviews. For example, 
making notes about women’s views on the term feminism and the way that they 
attached or detached themselves from this term was an important theme that I learned 
from the interviews, and was not included in my original interview schedule. 
Therefore, after this topic had been repeated several times by participants, I included 
it in my interview questions to explore their positions and notions relating to 
feminism.  
 
In order to arrange interviews with participants, I contacted them by email, or more 
often on the telephone. Talking on the phone gave me an opportunity to establish a 
                                                 




good relationship with participants prior to the interviews. Moreover, I pointed out 
that all their voices were important for my research, alongside appreciating their 
activities as they are all fighting to achieve to a more egalitarian society in different 
ways.  
 
The majority of interviews were one to one, but in two cases participants were 
accompanied. One of the participants came with her friend22. I felt that having the 
second person in the interview discouraged her from elaborating on her background, 
such as the ways that gender roles are distributed in their home. The other interview 
took place in the participant’s house, and at the end of the interview the interviewee’s 
husband arrived and sat in the same room listening to us. I felt that the woman was 
uncomfortable and she answered the questions with short sentences that contradicted 
what she had said before. This woman, who identified herself as a conservative 
activist, mentioned that she did not prefer any specific label, either reformist or 
conservative, due to the political issues. However, she believed in the reformists’ 
arguments about interpreting the Quran in accordance with the current issues in 
society. Interviewing her, particularly with her husband in attendance, was a good 
example for me to realise how some women, more likely religious participants, are 
under pressure to not express themselves freely, because of both public and private 
controlling factors.  
 
In order to establish a safe and encouraging atmosphere, I had to take specific 
strategies to deal with this issue. For this, I attempted to present myself in a similar 
style as the women who I aimed to interview. For example, when I interviewed 
conservative participants I wore a Hijab to build trust. In this case, I hoped that I 
would not be perceived as ‘the other,’ indeed this seemed to make the interview more 
comfortable and thus more informative.  
 
In one case, when I interviewed one conservative woman, I covered myself very 
strictly. The research participant started asking me who funded my research, how long 
                                                 




I had lived in the UK, and what the purpose of the study was. This indicated that she 
was suspicious of me and my research and did not trust me at the beginning of the 
interview. However, she seemed more comfortable when I explained how I was 
passionate about women’s issues in Iran and expressed my research concerns about 
women’s issues without any boundaries, such as ‘East’, ‘West’, ‘Muslim’, ‘Non-
Muslim’ and ‘Secular’ or ‘Non-secular. I was surprised that after five minutes the 
interviewee suggested I should be more relaxed about covering myself, and she 
mentioned that she had already googled my name and realized that I do not wear the 
Hijab. Then I explained the importance of being trusted and creating a respectful 
environment for the interview, which was why I had tried to present myself in a strict 
Hijab. Also, it is an example of how I positioned my research in such a way to 
welcome all women who attempt to advocate women’s rights.  
 
Moreover, interviewing highly experienced participants was sometimes challenging, 
as we had a different power relationship. Most of them treated me better than my 
expectations. In my view, it could be due to my positionality, as they appreciated my 
efforts in studying a PhD in gender studies, a different country, a different language 
and having a young child. However, there were few cases, in which the interview was 
not conducted smoothly, the characteristic of the interviewee and tense atmosphere of 
the interview led me to feel too uncomfortable to interrupt and scrutinise them.   
 
In terms of interviewing secular and religious reformist women, despite the above 
mentioned advantages of my positionality, there were cases that I felt interviewees 
might want to share issues that they assumed I wanted to hear. However, in terms of 
interviewing conservative women, several participants were very cautious about my 
positionality as they were unsure about my association with the ‘West’ and ‘Western 
culture’. 
 
It is important to mention that while conducting interviews, especially with reformists 
and secular women, I received many encouraging comments from participants and 




value of my research. For example, one of the members of parliament who was also a 
senior figure in government hugged me after the interview and proudly said, ‘People 
like you are the future of our society’. This meant a great deal to me because I felt she 
was transferring a huge responsibility onto my shoulder, and gave me a sense of pride 
that brought tears to my eyes. I was empowered by such a comment to continue my 
research with even more commitment.  
 
Fieldwork supervision 
During the data collection in Iran, I communicated with my supervisors23 both weekly 
and monthly. I sent them an email about the fieldwork every week and we had a 
Skype supervision every month. The report of the week included the number of 
women I had interviewed and how the interviews were conducted, and later we 
discussed the important issues on Skype. These communications made me feel I was 
supported and supervised all the time, which was influential in keeping on track. In 
addition, I had their observations and comments by sending them the transcribed 
interviews, which led me to add more probing questions, or in some cases ask 
questions in a different way. For example, I received useful suggestions from them for 
interviewing conservative women. As discussed earlier, I explained to conservative 
women that it was important for my research to explore what kind of state they 
believed in if they did not believe in democracy. These recommendations from my 
supervisors enabled me to motivate participants to feel included in my research and 
encouraged them to contribute to this study by expressing their views.  
 
Transcribing and translating 
All of the interviews that took place in Iran (42 women) were conducted in Persian, 
while the five interviews in the UK were undertaken in English. The eleven 
interviews conducted in the first phase of the fieldwork were transcribed in both 
Persian and English. The translated transcriptions were sent to my supervisors to be 
observe and assess the quality of the interviews. After analysing the first phase of 
interviews and with a clear focus and rationale for what I was exploring in my 
                                                 




research, it was decided not to translate the rest of the interviews in the third 
fieldwork phase, in agreement with my supervisors. Instead, only those parts of the 
Persian text that I aimed to include in my thesis were translated. I had three reasons 
for not translating the interviews in phase three. First, the process of translating took 
me a long time and it was tiring. This was specially due to the long length of 
interviews. Second, transcribing only into Persian enabled me to be closer to the 
participant’s meanings. Third, the time saving helped me to focus on translating the 
selected parts. Having these reasons, I transcribed all of the interviews in phase three 
only into Persian. 
 
The process of translation is a challenging one. As Van Nes et al. (2010:313) argue 
‘interpretation of meaning is the core of qualitative research. As translation is also an 
interpretive act, meaning may get lost in the translation process’. Due to the 
sensitivity of this process and also as English is not my first language, I asked my 
English/Persian bilingual friend to help me translate the selected parts that I aimed to 
use in the thesis.  
 
Her role as a second translator24 who was born in the UK and is fluent in both Persian 
and English helped me to ensure that the meaning interpreted in the findings matched 
the meaning expressed by the interviewees as closely as possible (Polkinghorne, 
2007; Van Nes et al., 2010). As I had already analysed the transcriptions in Persian 
and was aware of the sections (themes) they would have allocated, the translations of 
the selected text were in accordance with contextual and cultural meanings. This 
influenced the validity and reliability of this research (Twinn, 1997; Squires, 2009; 
Van Nes et al., 2010). As the translations of quotations might pose particular 
challenges, such as changing the voice of participants (Van Nes et al., 2010) when 
translating the Persian quotations, I noted the context of the quotations and also any 
gestures, silent pauses, and mood used by participants. In addition, due to the fact that 
another person was involved in the process of translating, in order to tackle ethical 
                                                 




issues such as confidentiality and anonymity, I anonymised the sections which were 
translated before they were seen by the person helping me.  
 
Some terms in the quotations in Persian are referred to in the glossary, where their 
meanings had no equivalent in English due to being related to the Iranian context or 
Islamic concepts. Had I translated these concepts into the nearest English words, there 
was a potential risk for them to be understood differently in English (Van Nes et al., 
2010). Therefore, I avoided translating these words and instead used a glossary to 
explain the meaning of the word in one or two sentences.  
 
Data analysis25 
As Marshall and Rossman (2014) suggest, in order to identify truths, the researcher 
needs to be aware of strategies to store data and work systematically. Supervisions, 
reading through literature, and attending workshops on data analysis provided me 
with the required knowledge to analyse my data.  
 
Bryman (2015) points out that qualitative data, which are very rapidly generated and 
collected by interviews, are unstructured textual material, and therefore analysis is not 
straightforward. Organization and analysis of the unstructured transcriptions of 47 
interviews that ranged from 90 minutes to two hours was difficult and time 
consuming. Bryman (2015) argues that early stage analysis might help the researcher 
to alleviate the feeling of being swamped by the data. During the data collection, I 
started transcribing the interviews in Persian and reviewing my fieldwork notes to 
sharpen my understanding of the data. I read through the transcriptions. This stage 
aimed at developing the coding categories and start the formal coding in a systematic 
way (Patton, 2002). Moreover, I paused my interviews after conducting eleven 
interviews, which helped me to identify and code the significant remarks across 
interviews. This process also enabled me to be directed by the participants’ views 
(See Appendix F). As I worked up the coding themes, I mapped them onto the sub-
                                                 




headings that now appear (just the main sub-headings) in the data chapters. In other 
words, the ways in which the three data chapters were divided and sub-divided into 
the themes of the chapters emerged from the process of analysis. For example, 
Chapter Four became about the characteristics of religious and secular feminists and 
women activists. As discussed in this chapter, interviewing five women in UK and 
their analysis alongside the data analysis of the first stage of my fieldwork helped me 
to check the accuracy of interview questions and the data collected in Iran. The 
analysis of data illustrated that there was not differences between women in UK and 
Iran (see Chapter Two).  
 
After data collection in the final phase of the fieldwork, reading through my 
transcriptions, frequently alongside listening to the recording of the interviews, helped 
me to identify the themes in my data. However, the process of identifying the themes 
and coding them was easier after the third phase, as most of them had been recognised 
before (after the first phase of data collection). I made some marginal notes about the 
similar concepts, which were highlighted using coloured highlighting pens. The 
process of coding built a foundation for my interpretive phase, in which the creative 
frameworks of interpretation were constructed, the meaning was determined, 
comparisons were made, and conclusions extracted (Patton, 2002). After coding the 
data, I started to realise the connections between codes. For example, due to being 
considered Western, the term feminism was not permitted by some women because it 
was stigmatised in the Iranian context, and because of the way that these women 
constructed the term feminism.  
 
At this point, I attempted to connect codes and concepts and general theoretical ideas 
in order to focus on those that were key to my research questions. I found this stage a 
time consuming and tiring process, as I needed to deal with too many codes. This 
stage was followed by cutting and pasting codes and transcripts. I cut the same codes 
and paste them into a file. In order to identify the origin of each chunk of text, I 
mentioned the name of the person interviewed and in some cases I added the body 
language and facial expression provided by my fieldwork notes. In addition, to deal 




asking what my research codes had in common. This strategy enabled me to combine 
the existing codes into higher-order codes. Therefore, at the end of this stage, I had a 
word document for each theme which included the relevant quotations, sometimes a 
quotation would be coded in more than one way, and allocated to more than one 
folder.  
 
In order to deal with the issue of losing the context of what was said related to each 
quotation within each folder, I used a process similar to what Bryman (2015) called 
‘problems with coding’, by listening to each interview as much as possible. This 
process was effective as I could remember the meaning and the context attached to 
each quotation. Moreover, in cases where I had made notes about the body language 
that the participants used, this helped me to be closer and more familiar with the data.  
 
As I was dealing with competing voices (secular, religious reformists and 
conservative women) during the analysis process, in order to represent all the 
respondents’ views fairly, I repeated the various mantras about ‘not getting 
emotionally involved’ and not ‘taking sides’ (Ribbens and Edwards, 1997). Based on 
my own position as a secular woman, at the beginning of the process of data analysis 
my challenge was to practise not being biased with the data, and so I attempted to be 
sensitive to the criticisms that some researchers attribute to qualitative data. For 
example, Draper (2004) and Marshall and Rossman (2014) argue about the 
subjectivity of qualitative data and the roles that the researcher’s own interests might 
play in this type of research. To improve understanding of the women’s view of the 
concept of gender equality and democracy, I repeatedly read through transcripts and 
listened to the participants’ voices. I also applied the experiences of other writers in 
the same position as me (Mahmood, 2011). Importantly, my supervisors made me 
aware of my positionality by their comments and helped me to cope with my personal 
interests by using different forms of analysis and different vocabulary. As a 
researcher, I was aware of my privileged position and therefore I attempted to ensure 
that the voices of my participants were heard and represented appropriately. One of 
the strategies applied in my research to keep my respondents’ voices alive was to 




during this process to ensure that meanings were negotiated and the analysis was 
more collaborative (Ribbens and Edwards, 1997). 
 
Conclusion 
The methodology and methods used for data collection were elaborated in this 
chapter. As discussed, the process of data collection took place during both 
conservative and reformist governments, and I explained the different approaches 
used for sampling and gaining access to women activists. Moreover, I discussed why 
and how I used semi-structured one to one interviews to collect data in this research. I 
reflected how some university ethical approval requirements such as a consent form 
might not be applicable in other contexts such as Iran. My position as a woman 
researcher was beneficial for data collection, understanding of women’s issues and 
their experiences. In addition, different challenges that I faced in the process of data 
collection were explained in this chapter, such as conducting interviews during the 
conservative time, insurance, risk assessment, international fieldwork approval, 
recruiting conservative women, translation, and my positionality throughout all 
research stages. I also addressed helpful ways to tackle these issues, for example, the 
ways that I managed my multiple complex identity in order to have a fair data 
analysis. The themes identified in this process will be explored in the following three 
data chapters, beginning with the next chapter in which I discuss how Iranian women 











CHAPTER FOUR: Political Identity and a More Egalitarian Society 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Two, since the Islamic Revolution of Iran, priority has been 
given to Islamic traditions, and there has been a reversal of the modernisation 
processes adopted in previous periods. Under Khomeini’s presidency (1979-1989), 
the first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the state suspended family 
protection laws. For example, there is no limitation on polygamy for men, and they 
may also easily divorce their wives with simple declarations, while retaining custody 
of their children. Moreover, the Majlis reserves severe punishment solely for women, 
and this includes flogging and stoning for crimes ranging from adultery to the breach 
of Islamic dress code (Esfandiari, 2010). However, after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, 
reformist clerics called for change in many areas (Mir-Hosseini, 2002). The debate on 
whether sharia injunctions should reflect contemporary society –rather than the 
different time and place in which the Quran was created –grew after Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s death in 1989. This debate led to calls for reformism known as ‘dynamic 
jurisprudence’ (Razavi, 2006: 1228), formed in opposition to ‘traditional 
jurisprudence’ (ibid). This debate among politicians and religious leaders suggests 
that Islamic laws and the interpretations of the Quran should be in accordance with 
real and contemporary issues of social policy and practice. The orthodox and 
traditional interpretations of the Quran were critiqued by reformists as they were 
assumed to be inapplicable to contemporary society.  
 
Reformists’ values flourished after Khomeini’s death and, as Ramazani (1993: 418) 
noted, Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) ‘was promising reform measures to improve 
the status of women’. During Rafsanjani’s presidency, women were provided with 
more opportunities to go to school and university (Esfandiari, 2010). Women’s status 
continued to improve considerably through the reformist process during the time of 
Khatami, the Shi’a theologian and reformist president between 1997 and 2005. 
However, this improvement did not last long since, as Tohidi (2016: 82) asserts, after 




women’s status have been blocked by the ruling hard-liners who still have the upper 
hand over’ the state’. Moreover, conservative leaders consider feminist and feminism 
to be problematic terms due to their link to ‘western influence’ (Tohidi, 2016). This 
socio-political context in which women activists have experienced many limitations 
has led them to take different positions about feminists and feminism.  
 
The participants’ accounts reflect the multi-faceted viewpoints women have about 
feminists and feminism. These views are important as they link to the ways that 
participants attempt to reach a more egalitarian society and, more importantly, to their 
voice and self-definition in terms of being a feminist within the context of Iran. While 
some research has been conducted on Muslim and secular feminists, there is very little 
research on whether ‘feminists’ or ‘Islamic feminists’ or ‘secular feminists’ (e.g. 
Povey, 2001; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008 Ahmadi, 2006; Mir-Hosseini, 2006, 
Tohidi,2016) accept the labels that research often attributes to these women. In this 
chapter, I analyse the women’s views about the terms ‘feminists’ and ‘feminism’ and 
explain their reasons for whether they reject or accept the term feminist as a label for 
themselves. Additionally, several studies have highlighted the similar views between 
secular and religious reformist women in terms of human rights (e.g.Ahmadi, 2006; 
Tohidi, 2016). However, this study assesses these views in detail among secular and 
religious reformists, as well as conservative women activists. Examining the 
characteristics and views of conservative women is significant as research to date has 
tended to focus on secular and religious reformist women rather than conservative 
women activists. 
 
This thesis explores my data according to the three categories of secular feminists, 
religious reformist women and religious conservative women. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, these three categories are an important research finding and an 
outcome of the analysis of the first stage of the fieldwork. Based on different ways 
that the participants identified themselves, I developed my three categories and as 
well as being descriptive, and structuring my sample during the second stage of 




of feminist and women activism in Iran is both a significant contribution to 
knowledge and a means of analysing the data in this study.   
 
It is worth mentioning here that there is a language difference between ‘feminism’ 
and ‘women’s rights activism’ in Iran. The term ‘feminism’ is used untranslated in 
public discourse, for example the phrase ‘I am a feminist’ would be said in Persian as 
‘man feminist hastam’. On the other hand, the term ‘I am a women’s rights activist’ 
can be said in Persian as ‘man faale hoghoghe zan hastam’. This language differences 
is significant to understanding why feminism is avoided by some participants and 
perceived as Western, instead they prefer to apply the term ‘women’s rights activism’ 
which is a Persian language term and considered an indigenous term.     
 
This chapter outlines the research respondents’ views on the extent to which Iranian 
women activists accept the terms ‘feminist’ and ‘feminism’, and how their positions 
on this influence their views about the ways in which they are seeking a more 
egalitarian society. The chapter is divided into two main sections. First, I explore 
three major stands taken by women activists in relation to the terms feminist and 
feminism. According to the women’s views, most conservative women critiqued both 
feminists and feminism and raised particular issues that they perceived were 
associated with Iranian women who defined themselves as feminist and the idea of 
feminism. While this group questioned both feminists and feminism, some religious 
reformist women said that, despite personally believing in feminism, they preferred 
not to be labelled as feminist. A third group, including the majority of secular women 
and some religious reformist women, believed in feminism and labelled themselves as 
either secular feminists or Islamic feminists. In this section, I analyse what is shaping 
the understanding of female activists about what the terms feminist and feminism 
mean and why these women take different positions about it. Section Two examines 
the different strategies that the participants applied in seeking to attain a fair society, 
such as agreeing or disagreeing with adopting human rights in Iranian society. The 
analysis of the women’s accounts illustrates that there is a link between their views 





Positioning women activists in Iran 
This section analyses the range of views the participants expressed about their 
political identities. As discussed earlier, there are three different positions about the 
identity of participants. First, I will describe how and why the majority of 
conservative women questioned feminists and feminism. I analyse this group of 
participants first as the underlying factors behind their arguments provide a better 
picture of the complexity of the Iranian context, which is helpful in understanding the 
challenges that the two other groups face in Iran.  
 
Criticising feminists and feminism 
All conservative participants disconnected themselves from both feminists and 
feminism and critique the terms because of their perceived associations with specific 
problematic issues and also the way these terms are constructed among themselves. 
These participants raised a variety of reasons for critiques of feminists and feminism. 
In fact, these women applied the language of feminists but their language is clearly 
embedded in a critique of feminism. The major issue raised by these women was the 
association of feminists with the ‘West’, secularism, and the rights of women over 
their own body. Moreover, another issue they mentioned was the assumption that 
feminists believe women are weaker human beings. These points will now be 
considered in turn. 
 
Analysis of the interviews demonstrated that most conservative participants critiqued 
local Iranian feminists as they perceived them as being linked to the ‘West’. These 
women believed that the term ‘feminist’ belongs to Western culture and their 
solutions might not be matched with Iranian women’s needs. These participants 
argued that a ‘Western product’ does not fit Iranian society. In their view, Iranian 
women’s issues are different and, therefore, Iranian/Western feminists’ issues are not 
applicable to them. For example, Yasi, a self-identified conservative woman, argued 
that: 




women’s issues in Iran […] It upsets me that feminists feel they can decide 
on behalf of other women, and make decisions without asking other females’ 
opinions. This is irritating to me as I have never liked others making 
decisions for me. Perhaps one of the reasons I entered the women activists 
field is to tell feminists that they should consider the women in remote areas 
of Iran and not just themselves and those around them.  
 
Similarly, Parveneh, who views herself as a conservative woman, argued that all 
voices need to be heard: 
We do not have local feminists in Iran. Iranian feminists follow either liberal 
or socialist feminists. Religious women activists also do not have a particular 
method to defend women’s rights…Iran differs in terms of culture and 
geography from the West. Therefore, we must look at the needs and demands 
of all Iranian women, and all of their voices must be heard, just as post-
modernist notions imply. I do not agree with looking at issues universally.  
 
In Yasi’s view, local Iranian feminists should not make decisions for other women in 
different places and she raised the issue of the limitation of Iranian feminist ideas in 
local application. For her, these feminists not only relate to Western but urban culture, 
and therefore their issues are different from women who live in remote rural areas in 
Iran. For Parveneh, there are no local feminists in Iran and a ‘universal voice’ is not 
applicable for Iranian women’s needs. These accounts illustrate how these two 
women consider feminism as not particular to Iran. Their critique of the linkage 
between Iranian feminists and Western feminists influences them to detach 
themselves from feminists due to their views being seen as ‘universalist’ and therefore 
not applicable in Iran. While there is hardly any research which explores the 
characteristics of conservative women activists in Iran, some studies (e.g. Barlow and 
Akbarzadeh, 2006; Tohidi, 2016) argue that conservative political leaders view the 
associations between Iranian feminist and Western feminism as a problematic issue. 
This suggests, similar to conservative politicians, that conservative women activists 
question the link between feminists and the West. However, in the next chapter I will 
challenge this perception by showing how Iranian feminists are not simply advocating 
Western ideas. One reason which partly explains why most conservative women view 
similarity between local and Western feminists and disagree with adopting it in Iran is 





Most conservative participants questioned Iranian feminism as a secular concept. The 
connection between feminism and secularism is problematic for them as, they argued, 
secularism does not sit well with their religious values. This argument resulted in their 
further distancing themselves from Iranian feminists, including religious women who 
advocated feminist ideas. For example, Parveneh critiqued religious reformist women 
for being similar to secular feminists advocating secularism. She labelled the 
reformist women’s rights activists as feminists for (to her) appearing to support 
secularity: 
Usually, feminists in Iran are secular. In terms of Muslim women 
(reformists) who are female activists, they keep their religious beliefs in their 
private sphere. The outlook of these women and those of secular feminists 
are similar. Perhaps they would not label themselves as feminists, but their 
outlook is not in accordance with Islam. These women are secular feminists 
who are Muslim.  
 
The above quotation suggests that, due to the fact that secularism is in contrast with 
the faith of conservative women, the association between local feminists and 
secularism, constructed by most conservative women, seems to play an important role 
in their view of ‘feminist’ as a problematic term in Iran. Moreover, as will be 
discussed later in this chapter, in religious reformists’ view, religion was seen as 
needing to be interpreted in a more flexible way in accordance with human rights. 
This view is problematised by the majority of conservative women as they perceived 
this opinion as supporting secularism, due to its compatibility with human rights. As 
there are some red lines for conservative men/women, such as disagreeing with the 
argument that women should have ownership over their own bodies; this creates 
limitations to how much they can support human rights. Therefore, the term feminism 
is seen as a threat by conservative women due to its association with secularity.  
 
In Iran today, the secular idea that supports freeing women from traditional religious 
values and partly having freedom in their lifestyle choices, as well as ownership of 
their body, and choosing what to wear for example, is controversial. In the 
conservative leaders’ view, these notions are inconsistent with the Islamic duty of the 
promotion of virtue and prohibition of vice, which is one of the essentials of the 




example, the Hijab, social corruption and immorality in society is propagated (Mir-
Hosseini, 2002). This is significant as it shows how the issue of morality is highly 
contested in Iran. All conservative participants in this study perceived that feminists 
advocate the rights of women over their own bodies, and being able to make choices 
over such issues as abortion, sexual relationships outside of marriage, and the right to 
choose whether to wear the Hijab. All conservatives argue that these rights contradict 
the faith of traditional religious people, and hence they questioned the appropriateness 
of feminists and feminism. For example, Pari, a self-defined conservative woman, 
explained the contradictions between feminism and Islam. In her view, women cannot 
choose whether to wear the Hijab in Iran, but must wear it as they live in an Islamic 
country: 
Islam and feminism do not agree with each other. Feminists talk about rights 
concerning women’s bodies, whereas in Islam we do not have this. Feminists 
do whatever they want but in Islam it is different…We live in an Islamic 
society so women must wear the Hijab as wearing it is an obligation in this 
country.  
 
Similarly, Saba, who sees herself as a conservative, critiqued feminists for advocating 
rights related to the body and argued that in Iranian society these are not ‘women’s 
issues’: 
The Iranian society is an Islamic one. People still participate in traditional, 
religious ceremonies. However, in this context, feminists raise the issues of 
freedom of sexual relationships and abortion. Feminists must attempt to 
provide separate and particular public places for women only to be free to 
take part in different activities such as badminton and volleyball. Feminists 
don’t proceed towards the improvement of women’s situation. 
 
The above quotation illustrates a conservative understanding of religion, which is in 
contrast to individual rights supported by feminists. In addition, Saba’s quotation 
suggests the importance of morality for her, to the extent that she called for separate 
public spaces for men and women for certain activities. This idea is supported by 
most conservative participants. In the next chapter, I will discuss how this idea 
influenced conservative interviewees to advocate particular jobs for women to 





A few conservative women also problematise feminists as they argued that feminists 
consider women as weaker human beings. For example, Touran, a self-defined 
conservative woman, discussed her construction of feminists. She believed that 
feminists perceive women as weaker individuals in society:  
I think being a woman does not mean that you differentiate yourself from 
society, as feminists do. Feminist activists see women as the weaker 
individuals in society.  
 
She continued: 
I do not believe this is true and I believe a man and woman are a body 
alongside each other. I do not doubt that women are strong beings because 
they can become pregnant and carry that child for nine months, then raise 
that child, which is the hardest job in the world.  
 
As discussed, the analysis of the interviews suggests that there is, for conservatives, 
an association of feminists with the West, secularity, and individual rights, which 
might explain why conservative women distanced themselves from the feminist label. 
It is important to mention that while conservative female activists questioned 
feminists, analysis of the interviews illustrates that growing numbers of feminists in 
Iran, particularly after Khatami’s time, has motivated the majority of conservative 
participants to enter and work in the field of women’s rights. Parveneh, as a self-
defined conservative woman, explained that feminists have been beneficial as they 
have encouraged religious individuals to think about women’s issues in the 
framework of Islam:  
When I was a university student, during the presidency of Khatami, there 
were some issues regarding women which caused me to get involved in the 
women’s issues field. There were some issues regarding women which made 
us consider what our solution and roles could be. These encouraged us to 
become active in this field. There are some needs that feminists raise and we 
do not concur with their solutions to them… In my opinion, being a female 
activist means expressing women’s needs, not other [Western] women’s 
needs. One of my friends wrote an online blog about the influence Islam and 
feminism have on each other. I think feminists and Islamic feminists have 
triggered religious people into thinking about women’s issues.  
 
This implies that while a few women, mostly conservatives, questioned feminists, the 




and contribute to women’s issues. Similarly, Ahmadi (2006) in her study Islamic 
feminism in Iran: Feminism in a new Islamic context mentioned the same point. She 
argued that due to the involvement of Islamic feminists with Islamic texts and the 
input of clerical scholars, conservative women were inspired to publish journals 
related to women. This suggests that the ways in which conservative women criticise 
feminists and their issues led them to develop forms of local activism. As discussed in 
this section, all conservative women distanced themselves from feminist women as 
they associate feminists with certain problematic issues. Having discussed the women 
who questioned feminists, in the next section I explain how some women prefer not to 
be labelled in public as feminists, either secular or Muslim. 
 
Avoiding being labelled as feminist 
Analysis of the women’s accounts illustrated that some religious reformist 
participants, despite their personal beliefs, avoided being labelled as either feminists 
or Islamic feminists. They believed these labels, which can be self-applied or applied 
by others, might cause some limitations that would either hinder their activities or be 
dangerous for them. These women talked about the local constraints that feminists 
have been faced with in Iran. The majority of reformist women had been engaged 
with politics and they talked specifically about the constraints that exist within the 
political sphere. They argued that the label ‘feminist’ leads to being stigmatised. In 
addition, a few of the religious reformist women who preferred not to be labelled as 
feminists talked about the fear of being sent to prison. The participants raised the 
issue of restrictions, such as limitations within the political arena, stigma, difficult 
gender politics, and prison, as home-grown responses of Iranian politics by political 
leaders who see ‘feminism’ as being imported to Iran. 
 
A considerable number of women, who despite their beliefs avoided being labelled as 
feminists, had political experience and defined themselves as religious women rights 
activists. These reformist religious women played a significant role in the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution (1979), and emphasised that they became women activists when 




started defending women’s rights. Religious reformist women rights26 activists 
emerged in the late twentieth century in Iran (Ahmadi, 2006; Badran, 2005). They 
questioned the traditional and male interpretation of the Quran, as applied by 
conservative religious leaders, which has been practised since the Islamic revolution 
and caused discriminatory legal codes in Iran. Analysis of these women’s accounts 
suggests how the sense of pain around women’s issues after the Islamic revolution 
was significant enough for them to become women’s rights activists. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, they had signed up for the revolution with the sense that change in the 
political system would improve women’s status. However, over time they said that 
they realised that women’s situation had worsened and therefore they started dealing 
with women’s issues differently. For example, Maria, a self-defined religious women 
rights activist, illustrated how she was motivated by women’s issues such as women’s 
access to political power in order to become a female activist. She explained how 
after the Revolution Iran was highly gendered: 
I became a women’s rights activist because the political participation of 
women was very important to me. In fact, our (reformists) main aim was to 
reach democracy because we saw the society after the revolution as a 
dictatorship in which the society was highly gendered. 
 
As reformist women disagreed with the conservatives’ perspective, which is based on 
a traditional interpretation of Quran, most religious reformist participants talked about 
how they supported Khatami as a religious reformist leader to improve women’s 
rights. Since reformist leaders such as Khatami believe in reforming society and have 
a more flexible interpretation of the Quran, these participants advocated for reformists 
to come to power. For example, Maria went on to discuss how reformist Muslim 
women, who played an important role in the Islamic revolution, demanded changes in 
the political system through the religious-political leader, Khatami, the President of 
Iran: 
We started the Islamic revolution but after a while we realised that the 
direction was changing so we had to do something to reform the country. 
Women played an important role in Mr. Khatami becoming president and, 
therefore, we had high expectations from him to include women in the 
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In important research by Rostami Povey (2001: 48), she argues that by the late 1980s 
existing religious women rights activists ‘gradually changed their position in relation 
to their men-folk and to the state that they had given their support to in the previous 
period’. Although her research emphasised the changing loyalty of religious women’s 
rights activists to the state, particularly conservative politicians, she did not examine 
in detail the strategies that religious women applied to defend women’s rights. 
Analysis of women’s accounts in this study illustrates that while they changed their 
loyalty to the state, they supported Khatami as a reformist politician as a strategy to 
advocate women’s rights. Having a reformist politician allowed them to discuss 
women’s rights with these leaders using the language of reform. In addition, engaging 
with a reformist approach enabled religious reformist women to advocate women’s 
rights.  
 
The analysis of the interviews and the existing literature about the progress of women 
during Khatami’s time illustrates that improvements for women were noticeable 
during this time. The number of Iranian women in parliament increased from four in 
the first term to thirteen in the sixth parliament of the Khatami period (Shojaee, 2005). 
The majority of women participants who did not label themselves as feminist, despite 
their feelings, were women politicians during Khatami’s time. While these women 
could access the political sphere during Khatami’s time, they experienced a 
patriarchal structure in this arena. These participants described how they needed to be 
cautious to avoid being excluded, and two different factors especially impacted on the 
limitation these women activists faced in the political domain. Firstly, even during 
Khatami’s time, the role of conservative males in parliament and within the state was 
important (see also Chapter Two). Secondly, while Khatami’s policies placed fewer 
limitations on women’s rights activism, there were some male reformists politicians 
who, despite their support for reforming society and religion, might not have been in 
full agreement with feminists and women’s rights activists. For, example, some of the 
women politicians explained how they applied the ideology of reformism in order to 




Reformist women have been attempting to convince reformist men to view 
women’s rights in a reformist process. This is an attempt to change their 
view regarding women. We tried to educate them and argued that they did 
not realise the gender issues and are blind towards them. During the 
reformists’ time, we had courses for men regarding gender issues so they 
could understand and appreciate them. However, there were a few of the men 
that didn’t require this, such as my husband, who is a feminist.  
 
This quotation suggests that while the male reformists’ view was more open to engage 
with gender questions, in the view of the reformist women who were politicians, most 
of these men did not advocate women’s rights. This is also illustrated by a small 
number of studies which note the positive influence of the Islamic revolution on 
Muslim women particularly. For example, Mir-Hosseini, in both her earlier (1996) 
and recent studies (2015), argued that the Islamic Revolution was influential in 
creating indigenous local women activists, particularly after Khatami’s presidency. 
The approach of these women was to work in the patriarchal structure, within which 
they needed to negotiate with reformist politicians about women’s rights. They were 
unable to discuss these issues with conservative politicians (Chapter Two). The 
discouraging atmosphere particularly among conservative politician within the 
political arena, which was their work place, might partly explain why these women 
avoided calling themselves feminists, or even sometimes women’s rights activists. 
The comments of these women illustrate how, in their view, the realpolitik of what is 
possible in Iran was incompatible with explicitly advocating feminist ideas. For 
example, Nahal, as a self-defined religious women’s rights activist, and who 
personally believed in Muslim feminism and was an MP during the reformist time, 
talked about her experiences of how in parliament her voice could be undermined if 
she supported women’s issues. She explained how discussing women’s issues in the 
political arena stigmatised her, and therefore she had to be more cautious and realistic:  
When you speak out about women’s issues you are excluded. I am known in 
my own field. People respect my views and opinions, as an educated expert. 
However, once I mention women’s issues, I am segregated and I am instantly 
asked, ‘you too, are talking about women’s issues?’ Men, in particular, are 
not accepting of a woman such as myself, who is well known academically, 






This account shows how being undermined and stigmatised, due to being labelled 
either women’s rights activist or feminist, may have an impact on women who 
personally believe in feminism; because of this, they not only distance themselves 
from the label of feminist both in political and public arenas, they also restrict their 
demands and needs.  
 
The majority of women who were politicians talked about how the terms feminist and 
feminism are stigmatised by male conservative political leaders, and the fear of being 
stigmatised within the political arena clearly was an important concern for them. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, religious conservative leaders have historically stigmatised 
feminists as Western in Iran. In addition, as discussed earlier in this chapter, 
conservative respondents questioned feminism as a Western concept, which might 
suggest this creates stigma to some degree. In terms of stigmatisation by male 
conservative political leaders, joining the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) for example has been rejected by these 
leaders, as they believe that CEDAW is incompatible with Islamic society (discussed 
further in Chapter Six). Therefore, in this context, Iranian feminists who attempt to 
advocate women’s rights are often accused of importing a foreign ideology (Ahmadi, 
2006). Some religious reformist women and even one conservative participant who 
had been engaged with politics, talked about how this stigmatisation influences their 
activities. For example, Sara viewed herself as a religious women’s rights activist, but 
avoided being labelled a feminist because the word in the context of Iran might be 
interpreted as ‘a Western thought’; therefore, she called herself a women’s rights 
activist rather than a feminist activist: 
Studying in law and also facing some problems of marriage caused me to 
become a feminist activist. Well, I need to say if we use the word feminist 
here we would be told that if you are feminist you are linked to Western 
thoughts. Therefore, we use the term women’s rights activist. 
 
Zahra, the only self-defined conservative woman who talked about the way she 
engaged with the stigma around feminists, went further with explanations on how the 
term feminist is regarded as a controversial concept due to the stigma attached to it as 




One of the reasons for our revolution was that the Shah and Imam27 
Khomeini followed different policies. As we were anti-Western, we chose 
Imam Khomeini. As feminism is linked to Western concepts, it has negative 
connotations. Whenever we touch on the issues of women, the problems 
become doubled…We had a meeting with the ex-President (Khamenei) years 
ago, whereby we discussed women’s issues in terms of economics, politics, 
society, and culture. We asked him whether he agrees that women are 
sometimes oppressed at home, and he said that behind closed doors, there are 
some issues that must be addressed. We were surprised and thought that if 
we had said what he said, we would be labelled as feminists, which is not 
good in the Islamic government.  
 
Zahra explained how before the Islamic revolution she (and other conservatives) 
disagreed with the West and, as discussed in Chapter Two, this disagreement 
stemmed from an anti-colonisation stance. She believed that feminism was a Western 
concept from which it was important to remain distant. The anti-west ideology was 
important to her, but raised problems for how she can engage with women’s rights. 
She expressed how ‘we were surprised’, suggesting that hearing about women’s 
issues from a conservative political leader was unusual, as a woman who talked this 
way would be labelled a feminist and stigmatised. Zahra further explained that when 
she became a women’s rights activist, she needed to be cautious not to be labelled as a 
feminist activist: 
I am a Muslim woman. When I became a female activist and realised the 
extent of women’s issues, I thought I have to do something. However, we 
were labelled as feminists by men and religious friends when we tried to give 
our argument. Being called a feminist means that you shouldn’t say anything 
as you are reflecting the needs of Western women.  
 
In Zahra’s account, the fear of this stigma is important to the extent that she preferred 
to be silent regarding some women’s issues. This fear is significant as it suggests that 
the fear of stigma for women, particularly women in politics, led them to monitor 
themselves and in some instances to be silent. This suggests the effects of stigma are 
to govern and control women’s activism in such a way that it can close down local 
activism. 
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In Chapter Five, it is discussed that the priority of these politically experienced 
religious women activists is not equal rights and gender equality. The majority of 
these women, despite their beliefs in equal rights, applied the term justice to avoid 
echoing other Iranian feminists’ demands. This illustrates how their position within 
the political arena influences the way they express themselves and advocate for 
women’s rights. Nahal, a religious ex-MP, believed in equality between men and 
women but could not express this belief. Instead she applied the term ‘justice’. Nahal 
explained about the resistance of political leaders to feminists’ demands:  
The view of the Quran, on women, is a humane and equal one. Fortunately, 
from the perspective of religious leaders, women are seen as equal humans. 
However, in their view as the starting point of the equality movement 
between men and women [supported by feminists] started from the west, and 
came with some undesirable issues such as freedom of sexual relationship 
[out of marriage], there is a resistance to such a movement in Iran as they 
feared that the same issues may arise. Therefore, within the political arena 
we should say that we defend justice. 
 
This shows how these women, despite their personal beliefs, believe they need to 
detach themselves not only from the feminist label, but also some feminist demands. 
Moreover, she clarifies how within the political sphere the notion that ‘equality’ is 
supported by ‘feminists’ is stigmatised by political leaders. As in these leaders’ views, 
Nahal argued, feminist is associated with the ‘West’ and certain problematic issues 
such as ‘freedom of sexual relationship [out of marriage]’. This would suggest that 
what Western feminism is associated with can be used against some religious 
reformists women, and led them to distance themselves from the label of feminist and 
constrained how they expressed women’s needs. 
 
Another reason why a few religious reformist women, who had not engaged with 
politics, rejected the label of feminist is rooted in their fear of the realpolitik of Iran. 
These participants distanced themselves from being labelled (either by themselves or 
others) as feminist because they feared being sent to prison due to taking part in 
feminist activities. As discussed earlier, the Islamic government in Iran considers 




which might challenge the power structure of the government. Importantly, the 
limitation and restrictions for women activists have been varied during reformist and 
conservative times. The two different understandings of Islam by conservatives and 
reformists have led to the adoption of different positions regarding feminist activities 
(Chapter Two). While reformist leaders have been more flexible with feminist 
activities, conservative politicians are opposed to these activities and limit them. In 
the conservative view, men and women have different roles and responsibilities due to 
their God-given differences in terms of both psychology and biology. This 
conservative conviction derives from their inflexible interpretation of Islam, and 
means they consider feminists people who challenge the legitimacy of the gender 
policy within the Islamic state.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, different understandings of religion among religious 
leaders and people in power in Iran have created a system that contains disagreements 
in terms of adopting united policies on women’s rights. For example, Rouhani, a 
moderate president of Iran (2003-till now), agreed that Iran can join the Leading 
Education 2030 of UNESCO.28 However, The Supreme Leader of Iran declared that 
this programme is against the principles of Islam and is therefore not accepted in Iran. 
One of the aims of this programme is gender equality, which in the conservatives’ 
view is against Islam’s principles29. Within this context there are no fixed regulations 
and laws that forbid activities in which feminists defend gender equality (due to the 
disagreements among political and religious leaders); however, there are many 
examples that show the danger that feminists face in Iran. For example, eight people 
were accused and arrested due to ‘advertising feminism and standing against the state’ 
in a book shop in Andimeshk30 during Rouhani’s presidency. In another example 
from Povey (2001), she explained how feminists spent two months in prison after 
attending a conference on ‘Iran After the Elections’ in Berlin. They were accused by 
the state of criticising religious domination of the civil law in Iran, when they argued 
                                                 
28 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is a universal and aspirational agenda to eliminate 
poverty through sustainable development by 2030. It has seventeen goals and the international 
community recognises that education is crucial for the success of these goals. Gender equality is one of 
its seventeen aims. 
29 See the following website: http://english.khamenei.ir/news/4796/Iran-won-t-submit-to-agendas-like-
UNESCO-2030-Ayatollah-Khamenei 




that the role of religion in civil law is a threat to Iranian women’s rights and gender 
equality. These examples illustrate how feminist activities can be seen as a ‘non-
Islamic’ activity that challenges the power structure of the Islamic state. In this study, 
a few religious reformists rejected being labelled as a feminist and reflected on how 
the activities of feminists in the public sphere would be questioned by the state. These 
women insisted that they are religious women’s rights activists rather than feminists 
and they spoke of how being labelled as a feminist could threaten them. This view 
was expressed by Donya, who avoided being labelled a feminist due to the current 
political system. As a writer and academic, Donya stated that she should be cautious 
about her activities and move within certain boundaries:  
Feminist ideas are irrational; those who are feminists in Iran run into trouble 
with the government and political sphere…My work is about the historical 
studies of women; I cannot do anything else but I have always tried to help 
within my own ability without overstepping the boundaries. This enabled me 
to help without getting in trouble with politics.  
 
Similarly, Mahsa, a poet and a self-identified religious women’s rights activist, talked 
about the dangerous situation facing Iranian feminists:  
As women’s rights activists we must be cautious; we must neither paint 
extreme caricatures to risk imprisonment, and nor should we stay silent. We 
must defend women’s rights slowly and consistently with caution. We must 
be very careful in our writing and speaking to avoid being imprisoned for 
political reasons. At the same time, we should raise people’s awareness.  
 
The above quotations demonstrate how boundaries defined by the state can limit 
women’s activities and suggest how these boundaries influence women, encouraging 
them to be careful and distance themselves from the label of being ‘feminist’. Also, as 
both Donya and Mahsa are public figures, they are more likely afraid to be in the 
government’s eye in comparison to women with a less public profile. Both Donya and 
Mahsa labelled themselves as women’s rights activists, which is more acceptable 
compared with the label of ‘feminist’ from a conservatives’ viewpoint. It will be 
discussed later how Iranian secular feminist activists argue that women’s problems 
derive from Islamic laws, calling for a separation of politics and Islam. By contrast, 
women’s rights activists in Iran are able to claim that their activities do not oppose 




that they do not pose a direct challenge to Islamic values uphold by the state.  
 
For some of the religious reformist women who were interviewed, being labelled 
feminist is problematic due to the limited context for gender politics of Iran, and 
therefore these participants distanced themselves from this term. However, their 
detachment from the term feminist has been ignored in a number of studies (e.g. 
Povey, 2001; Ahmadi, 2006; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008) and the differences 
between being women’s rights activists and feminists have not been considered. 
Ahmadi (2006), in her study of Islamic feminism in Iran, acknowledged that she 
labelled Muslim Women Islamic feminists, whether they identify themselves as 
Islamic feminists or not. In contrast my study explores how and why women question 
feminism and point to the specific issues related to them. This is important in order to 
analyse the different reasons for the rejection of the terms of feminist and feminism. 
While most conservative and some religious reformist women avoided being labelled 
feminist, in the next section I discuss the position of women who do identify 
themselves as secular and Islamic feminists.  
 
Defining oneself as a feminist 
Despite the risks discussed above, the majority of participants, mostly secular and 
religious reformist women, did label themselves as feminist. In this research, all 
secular women defined themselves as secular feminists; however, some religious 
reformist women preferred to be called an ‘Islamic feminist’ rather than a ‘secular 
feminist’, arguing that they defend women’s rights within the framework of Islam. 
Analysis of the interviews illustrates that all women who called themselves secular 
feminists defended secularity, while Islamic feminists argued that religion with 
different interpretations should be based on the legal codes of the civil state. As 
discussed earlier, the terms feminist and feminism are problematic, particularly from 
the conservative leaders’ viewpoint, and the stigma of being labelled as such is also 
experienced by Islamic feminists, but to a lesser extent.  
 




labelling oneself a ‘feminist’. For example, as discussed further in Chapter Five, they 
avoided prioritising the right to choose to wear the Hijab and gay rights, due to the 
sensitivity of politics around these issues. Another strategy that these women talked 
about relates to their attempt to reduce the risks involved in feminist activities by 
changing their visibility at different times. As discussed throughout this thesis, 
reformist religious leaders are more flexible than conservatives in terms of women’s 
rights. Therefore, the risk that the feminists faced varied during the reformist and 
conservative era. Most of the women talked about how during the reformist time they 
were more active and visible in the public sphere, but during the conservative period 
they avoided being observed in the public sphere. For example, Neda, a self-defined 
feminist, and the founder and publisher of magazines related to women’s issues, 
talked about the time that she re-opened the women’s journal, during Rouhani’s time 
(See Table 1, P: 11-12), which had been closed during Ahmadi Nejad’s presidency. 
Neda stated:  
I come back after Rouhani and start publishing women’s journal with all 
economic problems after six years from closing of it.  
 
With difficulty and hesitation, she responded to the question of why the journal was 
closed:  
Because we presented women’s problems as we are doing now. We were 
told by the system that you demonstrate women’s position in a bad way, but 
it is not true. We wrote about positive points and introduced successful 
women as well. I think the notion in which men say we are living in this way 
and you should not ruin it made us close it six years ago. 
 
In the same vein, Rounak, a self-defined Islamic feminist, echoed the same point: 
You cannot say that women did not have feminist activities during Ahmadi 
Nejad’s time. In fact, they did but they were underground. They became 
visible again in Rouhani’s presidency. Who knows they might go to 
underground in future again. It depends on the political situation. 
 
The above quotations suggest that most women managed the visibility of feminist 
activities during both conservative and reformist time as a strategy to reduce the risk 




participants used virtual space for their feminist activities, studies such as Hoodfar 
and Sadr (2010), Shirazi (2012), and Abbasgholizadeh (2014) suggest that Iranian 
feminists deal with the risk that threatened them during the conservative time by 
taking their activities into cyberspace. They argue that feminists in Iran have 
demonstrated how to utilise virtual space for women’s movements under authoritarian 
regimes, in the context of the repression of civil society and restricted public spaces.  
 
Notably, appearing in public spaces during the reformist time does not mean that 
feminists were not under pressure and could entirely protect themselves from politics 
of gender. As discussed earlier, some examples show how feminists were arrested 
even in the reformist era. This suggests that while Iranian feminists applied some 
strategies to protect themselves, they were still taking risks to fight for their 
commitment to feminism. Similarly, several authors (Moghissi, 1999; Ahmadi, 2006; 
Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008) have argued that while feminist activities can be 
ideologically unacceptable in the eyes of the state, the reality of women’s lives is not 
in accordance with what the state prescribes and is much less limited than the Islamic 
government demands. Iranian women, whether secular or Muslim, have ‘spared no 
effort to win back, inch by inch, the grounds which they lost through ‘re-Islamisation’ 
policies in Iran’ (Moghissi, 1999: 11). These women, as Ahmadi (2006) argues, put 
their lives, families and careers in danger to advocate for women’s rights. 
 
Analysis of the background of the participants illustrates that the majority of women 
who called themselves feminists (28 women), either secular or Muslim, were 
educated academics or journalists whose work related to women’s issues. Importantly, 
they were involved in a variety of feminist meetings organised by their networks. 
These participants construct the term feminism as a set of ideas that enables them to 
defend equality between men and women and improve Iranian women’s position. 
Additionally, the majority of respondents who labelled themselves as either feminist 
or Islamic feminist were of the view that the ideas of feminism improved their 
conditions in different ways. According to these participants’ accounts, the body of 
feminist ideas was influential in reaching awareness of women’s rights and gender 




suffered from financial problems, believed that she faced issues in her family life due 
to her lack of knowledge regarding her rights. She stated that feminist views helped 
her to become aware of these issues:  
After being introduced to feminism, I became familiar with women’s rights 
and I realised the oppression I had faced. The house I lived in was paid for 
mostly by myself but it was in my husband’s name. After 24 years of 
marriage, I have nothing. I did not even pick my children’s names. However, 
if I had been familiar with feminism at that time, I would never have allowed 
this.  
 
Similarly, Monica, a self-defining secular academic feminist who was socialist, 
argued that feminist ideas enabled her to live free from gender norms in society. Also, 
as a socialist, she explained how her commitment to socialism could sometimes limit 
her as a woman, yet the idea of feminism supported her to feel freer:  
I understood that some of my problems could be solved through the 
knowledge I have read about feminism. In England, I could go to the cinema 
on Saturday nights without any problem, whereas I could not do it in Iran 
because of feeling insecure going to the cinema at night. I could go to a gay 
club with someone. I needed to be connected with something like a feminist 
group… in an Iranian cinema we were told by left-Marxists that if a boy 
wanted to touch your hand you should hold his hand and tell him your hand 
is not different from mine, and therefore watch your film. But I did not like 
to do that; I wanted to watch the film comfortably on my own. 
 
She went on to say: 
I remembered in Italy feminists lay down on the grass in the street and it was 
one of my dreams to do it. One of the reasons that I participated in the 
Islamic Revolution of Iran was to reach the dream that you could go outside 
with the same clothes as you wear at home, and also that you could lie down 
on the grass in the street and no one would bother you.  
 
Monica, as one of the advocators of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, argued 
that she had participated in the revolution as she was seeking freedom for women. 
However, later she changed her strategy and became a secular feminist to defend 
women’s rights. As discussed earlier, some women politicians detached themselves 
from the label of feminism and argued that they participated in the Islamic Revolution 




suggests how the sense of pain around women’s issues motivated participants to take 
different strategies based on their background, such as being secular, religious or a 
politician, to defend women’s rights.  
 
The term feminism, for the majority of women who preferred to be labelled as either 
feminist or Islamic feminist, is typically constructed as a set of ideas that enables 
them to improve not only their own situation but also that of other Iranian women. 
Feminist views for Haleh, Parastoo and Sousan meant having a better lifestyle, the 
empowerment of women, and positive feelings due to helping other women. For 
Haleh, as a self-defined secular feminist, feminism is a tool for thinking that gives 
women and men the possibility to have a better life where they both can live in a 
society with justice:  
For me, the idea of feminism was a means to recognise my society. With 
feminism, I wanted there to be justice, for men and women to have a better 
life together and to alter the inequalities concerning rights, politics, and 
economics.  
 
In Parastoo’s ideas, feminism is a tool through which women would be empowered to 
stand against discrimination and violence. Parastoo identified herself as a secular 
feminist who had worked in NGOs that attempted to empower women, but which had 
closed and re-opened several times, due to the political issues. She talked about her 
experiences and different examples in the past that motivated her to become a 
feminist to combat discrimination: 
The reason I became a feminist was to fight discrimination and violence. 
Discrimination is a huge term, maybe it is better to say removal of violence 
as it is more compatible with my spirit. One of the reasons I am more 
concerned about violence is my mother and sister. Also, in our 
neighbourhood I witnessed at least two deaths of my friends due to violence. 
One of my friends was thrown down the stairs by her husband when she got 
pregnant at sixteen years old. Another, a friend of mine and my sister, she 
committed self-immolation.  
 
Moreover, Sousan, who viewed herself as a secular feminist, was also a journalist 
who had the opportunity to live in the Netherlands several years ago, but returned to 




believed that being a feminist enables her to have a better and more positive feeling 
about herself; through feminist activities she can help oppressed women:   
I feel better about myself being a feminist and I feel as though I am useful. 
There is oppression and there are some people who are unaware of their 
rights. This is the reason why I am living in Iran, to change this country and 
this gives me a feeling of satisfaction.  
 
The respondents’ accounts suggest how participants who identified as feminists 
considered the Iranian context for defending women’s rights. As I will discuss in the 
next chapter, feminist participants attempted to prioritise some rights that can be 
applicable in Iran. Their positions and priorities challenges the view that considers 
feminists as only Western. 
 
Within the group of the women who viewed themselves as feminists, there were a few 
who, despite calling themselves feminists, said they preferred to call themselves 
Islamic feminists (10 women) when they were asked whether they considered 
themselves secular or Islamic feminists. Their preference was justified in terms of 
advocating women’s rights within the framework of Islam. As religion plays an 
important role in Iranian political and legal systems, calling oneself a secular or 
Islamic feminist has an influence on the strategies that these women employ to defend 
women’s rights.  
 
The association between the secular feminists and secularity will be discussed in the 
next section, but the reason I mention it here is that advocating secularism is highly 
controversial in the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Pointing to this now 
permits a view of the wider picture in order to understand the positions of Iranian 
feminists explained in this section. As the study of Barlow and Akbarzadeh (2008) 
suggests, Iranian secular-oriented feminism views Iranian women’s problems as a 
result of the merging of politics and Islam in Iran. Solving women’s problems, from 






According to the analysis of interviews, secular and Islamic feminists in Iran share 
some similar aims (Najmabadi, 1998, Ahmadi 2006, Tohidi, 2016); however, they 
have different sources for advocating women’s rights. All of the participants defining 
themselves as secular feminists avoided using Islamic sources to fight for women’s 
rights and interests, while self-defined Islamic feminists used the framework of Islam. 
For example, Shabnam, who viewed herself as an Islamic feminist, said that: 
They are a group of feminists who call themselves secular because another 
group calls itself Muslim. However, secular feminists are religious 
unconsciously. But I believe that secular feminists want women’s rights to be 
in the framework of human rights not in Islam or the Quran’s framework.  
 
Likewise, the literature (e.g. Mir-Hosseini, 1996, Badran, 2002, Ahmadi, 2006, 
Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2006, Tohidi, 2016, Mir-Hosseini, 2015) show that secular 
and Islamic feminists have different sources and strategies to improve women’s 
rights. In terms of Islamic feminists, the analysis of the women’s accounts in this 
study illustrates that some religious reformist women called themselves Islamic 
feminists. Most of these women believed that there was compatibility between their 
two ‘faiths’: being Muslim and being feminist. This suggests that for these women 
applying the reinterpretation of the Quran played a key role in reconciling their beliefs 
in feminism and Islam and also allowed religious reformist participants to advocate 
women’s rights and identify themselves as feminists. For example, for Lida, who 
viewed herself as an Islamic feminist, a different reading of Islam enabled her to 
connect her two commitments: 
While I was studying, I began working and I was passionate about learning 
about women’s issues in law and Fiqh and educating the public about these 
issues. When I became familiar with different interpretations of Islam, I was 
pleased to find that Islam is not set in stone, as I had always been told. 
Therefore, through my journalism, I was very excited to inform people about 
what I had found out.  
 
Similarly, some Iranian authors such as Ahmadi (2006) and Mir-Hosseini (2015) have 
argued that Islamic feminists attempt to reconstruct Islamic and gender discourse. 
This reconstruction is significant in shaping their identity as both a Muslim woman 
and a feminist. As Islamic feminists’ approach to gender is through a religious 




the state compared with feminists who advocate secularism. As Ahmadi (2006) 
argues, despite the importance of secular women activists in Iran, who contributed to 
the contest against religious leaders’ efforts to deprive Iranian women of their rights, 
their struggle has been neither broad nor adequate enough to change the religious 
structure and discriminatory laws. In her view, these activists who are both religious 
and feminist have more space to pursue feminist goals. In fact, secular feminists face 
barriers within the framework of an Islamic state, where the conservatives hold a very 
powerful position in certain state institutions. However, religious reformist women, 
including Islamic feminists, played a role in being an inside force that has attempted 
to reconstruct Islamic and gender discourses. As discussed throughout this thesis, it is 
notable that this does not mean that Islamic feminists can freely defend women’s 
rights. 
 
Analysis of the women’s accounts revealed that a small number of religious reformist 
women (three participants) preferred to be labelled as neither secular nor Islamic 
feminists, but rather they called themselves as feminists only, with no specific 
position related to secularism or Islam. However, these women are recognised by 
other women activists31 as Islamic feminists and additionally during the interview 
they defended the idea that the Quran should be interpreted in a more egalitarian way. 
These women are journalists, founders and publishers of famous magazines, and they 
need to work with both secular feminists and Islamic feminists. Their networks and 
jobs might partly explain why they preferred not to be associated with a particular 
category. In Neda’s view, not only is affiliation among women activists important, but 
also, to negotiate women’s needs with the parliament within the Islamic framework, 
activists should avoid labelling themselves as secular:  
I think these divisions (secular and religious feminists) not only do not help, 
but disperse women’s rights activists. There were some feminists who 
divided women to secular and religious, but after a while they realised they 
were wrong. These feminists have even attempted to be closer to the 
government as they found there is no other option for us except having a 
                                                 
31 As I used snowball sampling, my gate keepers/participants labelled these women as 
either secular or religious feminists and connected me to them. However, during 





discussion with the government […] If we imagine feminism as a train, we 
should not put people off who pray and read the Quran, instead we can get 
more people into the train. 
 
As discussed in this section, most conservative participants raised issues related to 
feminists and feminism, which explains why in their view it does not work in the 
Iranian context. They spoke about how feminist issues are associated with Western 
women and are not applicable in Iran. Also, the connection between feminism and 
secularism in their view is problematic in an Islamic country. They discussed the 
particularity of certain situations of Iran that are incompatible with the way that 
feminists advocate women’s rights. Their hesitancy around rights advocated by 
feminists encouraged them to be local and particular activists and discouraged them 
from appealing to broader sisterhood rights. In addition, the critique of feminists and 
feminism raised by conservative women revealed a stigma that has a negative impact 
on their solidarity with Iranian feminists. Importantly, some religious reformists, 
some of whom were politicians and some not, avoided using the language of 
feminism despite their real beliefs and identities. Women who were politicians talked 
about their fears of being stigmatised within the political sphere and a few religious 
reformists raised the fear of prison. In contrast to these participants, the majority of 
interviewees, most of whom were secular and religious reformists, labelled 
themselves as feminists or Islamic feminists. However, their activities were limited 
due to existing difficulties in gender politics in Iran. As discussed in this section, 
women take different positions in terms of using the label of feminist. These positions 
are significant as it seems that they play an important role in their activities and the 
ways that they express themselves. In the next section, I will explore how these 
positions influence women’s ideas about the changes they sought to reach a more 
egalitarian society.  
 
Change linked to moving into a more egalitarian society 
This section examines women’s views about the changes needed to reach a fairer 
society. As discussed in the previous section, women’s positions in relation to the 
terms feminist and feminism are different. This section explores how these positions 




of the data shows that three main suggestions were raised by women activists: a 
secular state, reinterpreting the Quran, and an Islamic government. In fact, the 
participants proposed different arguments that are primarily about the principles of a 
fair society: human rights and rights in the framework of religion. I will first examine 
feminists’ views about a secular state and human rights as its components. 
 
Secular women and calling for a secular state 
Almost all secular participants (15 women) believed that the state and religion should 
be separated. These women argued that legal codes need to be in accordance with 
human rights rather than the Islamic framework. They perceived human rights as a 
better framework than religion, which maintains a cultural bias toward men. In other 
words, the majority of the women (if not all) who called themselves a secular feminist 
believed that a more egalitarian society would be achieved if women’s rights and 
legal codes are separated from religion and in accordance with human rights. They do 
not give legitimacy to religion to form laws because they argue that women’s rights 
were overlooked in all religions, as illustrated by Parastoo, a self-defined secular 
feminist activist:  
I prefer laws according to human rights… I am not so familiar with the 
Quran, but I think since all religions have been created in a patriarchal 
period, they are all somehow patriarchal. All religious books which have 
been written and also all things which are against women in the Quran have 
their roots in Judaism and it seems Islam is not a unique religion. 
 
Parastoo believes that patriarchy influenced religion, and therefore women’s rights are 
not considered within them. Similarly, Gita, a self-identified secular feminist, 
mentioned that although women have a choice about some responsibilities, they are 
stripped of women’s rights in the Quran. She also pointed to human rights as a logical 
and reasonable criteria for women’s rights: 
In all religions man has been addressed and generally human is regarded as 
man especially in languages where male and female are distinguished. Even 
though Quran’s Ahkam gave dignity for women such as stating that a woman 
is not supposed to bring up child or do housework and if she does she can be 
paid for this by her husband . But, everything is based on this philosophy that 




feminists] believe it is better to talk more about human rights which is logical 
and reasonable. 
 
The importance of human rights as a way of advancing Iranian women’s rights was 
also echoed by Haleh, who saw herself as a secular feminist and advocated human 
rights as the best basis for achieving women’s rights: 
I believe that one of the best resources for women’s rights is human rights. In 
the Islamic state my priority might not be to defend homosexual rights, 
despite my personal beliefs, as I prefer to defend issues concerning a broader 
spectrum of people, which are at lower risk. 
 
The above quotes illustrate how all secular participants avoided defining women’s 
rights within the framework of religion, preferring human rights instead. Human 
rights for these secular participants were considered as protection for women’s rights. 
Also, Haleh’s view about the possibility of homosexual rights in the Iranian context 
suggests that whereas secular feminists believe in human rights, they are still 
particular about what will be prioritised. The ideas of all secular participants appear to 
suggest that in the Iranian context human rights would work better, rather than claims 
to recognise rights in the framework of Islam. Similarly, many researchers have 
argued that both secular and religious reformist women/feminist activists advocate 
human rights (e.g.Ahmadi, 2006; Tohidi, 2016), but in different ways. In the next 
section, I will explore how participants with religious-based views seek change in 
order to advocate women’s rights. 
 
Reformist women and more egalitarian interpretation of religion 
Analysis of participants’ accounts demonstrated that all the religious reformist women 
in this research, including all those who identified themselves as feminist/Islamic 
feminist and as religious women’s rights activists, argued that women’s rights should 
be reinterpreted in the framework of religion. Importantly, these women also 
supported human rights, but to a different extent. These participants support the idea 
of reinterpreting the Quran in accordance with the consideration of women’s views 
and contextualisation of Islamic resources. These women pointed to the temporality of 




Analysis of the data revealed two different approaches to the reinterpretation of the 
Quran. While a few of the religious reformist women argued that women need the 
right to interpretation, most religious reformists argued that male religious leaders 
should reinterpret the Quran in a more women friendly way. For example, Hadis, a 
religious reformist feminist, echoed the idea that women should have the right to 
reinterpret the Quran. She reported that the testimony of two women is equal to that of 
a man. For her, this was only meaningful at the time the Quran appeared, and she 
mentioned how an ‘updated interpretation of Islam, religion and the Quran by both 
men and women’ can have an influence on democracy: 
The Quran is a text which has its own meaning in its own context... there are 
matters in the Quran which are based on that time and place, for example the 
Quran does not say that the testimony of two women is equal to the 
testimony of one man, it is not possible for all periods. It has been true in its 
context, in its own time and place, but you cannot generalise it to all times 
and places…democracy can be possible through an updated interpretation of 
Islam, religion and the Quran by both men and women. Women must be 
involved in verses related to them. Women must [be] present in legislating 
laws related to them. Men cannot determine for women what they are 
allowed to do and what they are not. 
 
The above extract illustrates how a few religious reformists argued that women should 
have the right to reinterpret the Quran and this right should not only be limited to 
men. However, most religious reformists did not take this view and stated that 
religious leaders should reinterpret the Quran. As most religious leaders are male,32 
these women did not question that male position as the only interpreter of Islam. 
Instead, they urged these male leaders to re-read the Quran in more egalitarian ways. 
For example, Simin, a participant who defined herself as a religious women’s rights 
activist, believed that Mojtahedin (religious leaders), who are ‘experts in Islam’, 
should reinterpret the Quran. For Simin, the ‘True meaning of Islam’ from her point 
of view should be introduced by Mojtahedin who do Ijtihad, which is about the 
making of an independent verdict within Islamic law by personal effort. She 
questioned the current understanding of Islam and called for the interpretation of 
                                                 
32 The lack of women in the role of interpreting Islam in Iran comes from the male religious leaders’ 
views that there are some biological differences between men and women that leads them to have 
distinct roles. Being a leader, particularly in the religious sphere, is therefore only attributed to men in 




Islam to be changed and updated to a version that is free of any discrimination: 
The Quran mentions that we must follow Islam depending on the current 
state of society. In my opinion, if this has not happened up to now, this is the 
Mojtahedin’s fault. In the Quran, we have some principles that must be 
updated and interpreted according to today’s society. I think the religion of 
Islam is one that is fair and equal. Unfortunately, the Islamic Republic is far 
from the religion of Islam. It is the responsibility of experts in Islam to 
intervene and make sure that the Islamic Republic is in accordance with the 
Islamic principles, which is based on justice and equality, whereby there is 
no discrimination. 
 
She went on to say: 
Now, there are different interpretations of Islam, such as that of the 
conservatives in Iran, ISIS, the Taliban or Al Qaeda. However, these are just 
different interpretations because Islam cannot be so varied. Moreover, in my 
opinion, this is tainting Islam because these groups introduce Islam as a 
religion of injustice. Therefore, the Mojtahedin must portray the true 
meaning of Islam.  
 
The above quotations suggest how most religious reformist women in this study 
believed that a more equitable reading of Islam by male religious leaders would lead 
to greater equality. As discussed in Chapter Two, Ijtehad as a religious interpretation 
might be considered as a tool by which reformists are able to have different 
understandings of religion. The majority of religious reformist women’s rights 
activists applied the notion that Ijtehad enables religious leaders to reinterpret and 
have different understandings of Islamic texts. The advocacy of the reinterpretation of 
the Quran by religious leaders comes from preventing women from interpreting 
religion. Some of the religious reformist participants talked about their limitations in 
this. For example, Nahal, an interviewee who viewed herself as a religious women’s 
rights activist, explained how women activists are constrained in the reinterpretation 
of the Quran due to the notion that women do not have the legal authority in Islam to 
reinterpret the Quran. Nahal, as an ex-MP, suggested that women activists should 
refer to reformists’ expertise in order to change the traditional reading of Islam: 
We must interpret the Quran according to the present day. There are Ulama 
who support this idea. As a female activist, if we fight for the reinterpretation 
of the Quran, this is a sort of illegal act because we will be told that this is 





This notion partly explained why the majority of religious reformist women supported 
reformist leaders, such as Khatami (See Table 1, P: 11-12). Applying the strategy of 
the reinterpretation of Islam has also been illustrated by other researchers examining 
Iranian women activists (Badran, 2002; Ahmadi, 2006; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 
2008; Mohammadi, 2013). These authors focus on the engagement of women activists 
in the process of the re-interpretation of the Quran. However, these studies have failed 
to explain the limitations that Muslim women face in their involvement with this 
process.  
 
While the strategies of reformist leaders have been beneficial for religious reformist 
women activists who call for reform and a reinterpretation of women’s rights, some of 
these men might not support women’s rights. As discussed earlier, there are reformist 
male politicians who do not support women’s demands. However, some religious 
reformist women explained how they challenged their thought and strategies, asking 
them to be reformists on women’s issues as well. In Maria’s view, reformists are 
questioned by women activists because of their conservative strategies in relation to 
women’s rights: 
Some reformist men’s views are very similar to that of conservative men. 
However, we argue with these reformist men as to why they have reformist 
views regarding socio-political issues, but when it comes to women’s issues 
they have conservative views. By raising these discussions these men 
became more aware of the gender issues, and this awareness is acquired. For 
example, looking at a female miner you realise that women have the same 
abilities as men.  
 
This quotation illustrates the views of some of the religious reformist participants who 
shared the same strategy of reinterpreting the Quran and working with male reformist 
politicians in order to improve and reform Iranian women’s rights. In other words, 
having a similar language paved the way for women activists to negotiate with 
reformist religious leaders to advocate women’s rights. Similarly, Mohammadi (2013: 
15), in his study on the process of reform in Iran, declared: 
Iranian reformists introduce the change in religious practices as a victory for 




privileges in politics and in the clergy. The reformist groups who are 
questioning sharia and its compatibility with the everyday life of Iranians try 
to present new and different readings of Islam and sharia. 
 
This implies that advocating women’s rights in a religious framework enables 
religious reformist women to have more power in the system, especially in the 
political sphere, compared with secular feminists. While the religious reformist 
women advocate reinterpretation of the Quran in a more women friendly way, there 
are two overlapping views in terms of using human rights as a source of women’s 
rights in Iran. Some of the religious reformists who viewed themselves as religious 
women’s rights activists, despite their agreement with human rights in theory, 
preferred to work within an Islamic framework in practice to protect certain values 
that might not be a priority of human rights. However, for other religious reformist 
participants, who self-identified themselves as feminist/Islamic feminist, the 
interpretation of the Quran should be based on human rights. Some argued that there 
is a limitation on applying human rights in Iran, and there are boundaries (see Chapter 
Six) related to religion that could be threatened by human rights. For example, Simin, 
a self-defined religious women’s rights activist, stated that she did not advocate gay 
rights, and claimed that although religious reformists are in favour of Islamic 
government and human rights, in terms of making laws and women rights, they prefer 
Islam: 
In term of women rights in the framework of human rights, I believe Islam 
itself is rich and it includes many true principles, so we do not need to 
engage with international conventions. If we practise real Islam, we will be 
far ahead of those conventions. My thesis was a comparative work between 
the International Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, and Iran and Islamic law. I did not see any difference. Nothing was 
found that proves the Convention includes something that does not exist in 
Islam. My research compared five cases. We have equality in Islam and if 
somewhere you find inequality it is the responsibility of the Mojtahed (the 
priest) to update interpretations and ensure equality. Unfortunately, it has not 
happened yet, so we do not have real Islam…I prefer Islam in Iran; however, 
it does not mean that I do not believe in human rights or other international 
conventions.  
 
Azin, a self-defined religious women’s rights activist, went further and talked about 




framework of Islam as the concept of ‘family’ is more protected within that: 
I agree with human rights but I am more interested in laws according to 
Islamic rights that are based on the Quran and do not have extremist 
interpretations and are also in accordance with today’s human’s needs. I 
think this is closer to human nature. No one can feel satisfactory without 
family.  
 
In terms of family rights, she went on to say: 
I am sure Islamic rights do not ignore families. Family is the main resource 
of satisfaction and peace in our society so that women’s rights should be 
based on the regulation of family. Looking for equality without paying 
attention to family values may lead individuals to be lonely, sad and have 
lost connection within themselves.  
 
The above quotations illustrate how some religious reformists, including participants 
identified as women’s rights activists, consider human rights in the cultural and 
religious context in seeking to advance women’s rights. It seems that there are some 
boundaries related to their commitment to their religious faith, which influences their 
preference for the particularity of religion. However, their agreement with human 
rights suggests their flexibilities in terms of rights compared with conservative 
participants.  
 
Despite the preference of some religious reformist women for women’s rights in 
framework of Islam, other religious reformist participants, including self-identified 
feminist/Islamic feminists, called for human rights. For these participants, women 
have an ‘honoured status’ in Islam, but they preferred to reinterpret the Quran in 
accordance with human rights, within which all people across the world enjoy 
equality. Fereshteh, who called herself a feminist and during the interview defended 
religious reformist women, emphasised the high status of women in the Quran and 
reinterpreting the Quran based on human rights:  
I consider women’s status in the Quran to be an honoured status. If we 
presume that Mary is a touchstone. The Quran has confirmed Mary, so we 
cannot say she did not exist or is imaginary. It is very important that a 
woman without a husband creates a prophet, and, if you pay attention, there 
are famous women in all religions. Khadija was a powerful woman and 




wife, is the same. If you look at religions carefully, they all are matriarchal. 
Fatimah was a woman and she had no brother, Mohammad had just one 
daughter. The family of Islam comes from a woman… I believe in human 
rights but we should reinterpret the Quran based on human rights. I even do 
not believe in Islamic human rights. When I say Catholic human rights, then 
I am against others rights. Therefore, it appears a contradiction in relation to 
the human rights convention, which means all humans are equal with each 
other without considering their age, race, religion and gender. Thus, if I say 
Catholic is superior, there will be a contradiction.  
 
The above extract suggests how, for Fereshteh, human rights work better than rights 
in the framework of religion. However, she preferred to achieve this by the 
reinterpretation of the Quran. In fact, she believed that religion should remain in the 
private sphere. This shows that the advocacy of human rights links to these religious 
reformists’ understanding of rights and religion. In terms of calling for human rights, 
similarly, many scholars note that both secular and religious reformist women and 
feminist activists advocate human rights (e.g.Ahmadi, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). However, 
this study goes further and examined to what extent Muslim feminists and women 
activists support human rights. The arguments of some religious reformists seem to be 
more about the practice of politics, and the pragmatism needed to work within Iran, to 
achieve human rights. These women share the same aim with secular feminists, but 
through pragmatic arguments they questioned secular feminists and argued that their 
strategies might not be applicable in Iran. Likewise, Ali (2000) argues that while 
Islamic feminists and women activists advocate human rights, they are unable to 
express it explicitly. He states that these women must find a culturally appropriate 
equivalent of human rights in their own traditions and cultures.  
 
The analysis of the women’s accounts suggests that all of the religious reformist 
participants are pragmatists who adopt different strategies based on what is possible in 
the Iranian context. For example, Maria, who viewed herself as a religious women’s 
rights activist, believed that the Quran should be reinterpreted in a more egalitarian 
way and argued that secular feminists have not been very realistic in terms of 
women’s rights in Iran:  
I believe in human rights… I feel that [secular] feminists have not acted very 




the same strategies to issues present in the West, whereas Western societies 
differ to that of Iran. We should attempt to solve our problems based on the 
conditions of Iranian society. In the West, people such as lecturers are greatly 
looked up to, whereas here in Iran, the influential group in society consists of 
religious leaders and members of women’s religious groups. 
 
According to her account, it seems that avoiding the language of ‘secularity’ and 
‘feminism’ helps her to be connected with some influential people in the society, such 
as the clergy and religious women’s groups.33 In a similar vein, some scholars argue 
that the identity of ‘Islamic feminists’ as non-secular feminists seems to act as proof 
of their loyalty to religion within a religious community (e.g. Moghadam, 2002; Mir-
Hosseini, 2006; Mir-Hosseini et al., 2015; Tohidi, 2016). Therefore, the position of 
‘Muslim’s women’ as insiders is influential to generate networking and lobbying with 
religious people in order to lobby for women’s rights. This reflects how religious 
reformist women can be empowered by the term ‘Muslim’ in order to defend 
women’s rights, and how their strategy of reinterpreting the Quran in a more women 
friendly way can be considered as an indigenous solution in the Iranian context. 
Tohidi (2016) argued how women’s rights advocates have often felt compelled to 
show that their quest for women’s emancipation comes from their indigenous ideas. 
Tohidi (2016: 78) stated that these women:  
have been carefully navigating between identity politics, a cultural pressure 
for ‘authenticity,’ and the quest for national independence on the one hand, 
and the aspiration for individual rights and universal values such as equality, 
human rights, freedom of choice, and democracy, on the other. 
 
However, data analysis in this study suggests that religious reformist women take 
different strategies to prove themselves as indigenous activists. Some apply the 
interpretation of the Quran based on human rights, while for others it is not only the 
interpretation of the Quran but also their preference and loyalty to the religious faith 
rather than human rights.   
                                                 
33
 In Iran, several times a month religious women get together to practise religion. Such a gathering 
allows religious women activists to educate Iranian religious women about women’s rights. With the 





The interpretations of religion and secular feminists 
In spite of the ideas of the religious reformist women who claimed that secular 
feminists’ strategies are not applicable in Iran, the majority of secular feminists stated, 
seemingly with some reluctance, that the interpretation of the Quran can help 
women’s rights in Iran34. They thought this interpretation might be helpful in 
particular ways. In other words, they do not advocate women’s rights in an Islamic 
framework, but some argued that the interpretation might be influential in 
communicating with politicians and challenging patriarchal structures. These secular 
women mentioned that women need to negotiate with politicians using religious 
language to change discriminatory laws. For example, Sousan, a self-defined secular 
feminist, despite her beliefs in secularity and the separation of religion from politics, 
stated that to remove discriminatory laws, women might need to talk to politicians 
using the language of religion: 
I believe that the interpretation of the Quran has helped the process of 
democratisation. There are some instances in which we must negotiate with 
politicians and communicate with them on their own terms, from a religious 
perspective. Women’s rights activists who are able to do so are surely able to 
be influential. 
 
As already discussed, while all religious reformists believed in the interpretation of 
the Quran to achieve a more egalitarian society, they had two different views to 
advocate women’s rights. For some, the reinterpretation of the Quran would be a 
means through which women’s rights in the framework of Islam could be improved. 
These women agreed with human rights to the degree that their particular religious 
values are protected. This justifies their preference for a religious framework rather 
than human rights. However, other reformist religious women understood human 
rights as protection, and these women used the interpretation of the Quran as a 
strategy to re-define women’s rights in accordance with human rights. The position of 
being insiders within the system is significant to the extent that religious reformists’ 
strategy was supported by secular feminists, even if this support was somewhat 
reluctant. The analysis of participants’ accounts also illustrates that while the 
                                                 




interpretation of the Quran for all religious reformist women is to consider it a way to 
reach a fair society, religious conservative women, whose understanding of Islam is 
less flexible than reformist women, disagreed with the reinterpretation of religion.  
 
Conservative women and the Islamic state without reinterpretation of the Quran 
All of the conservative women resisted change in the law and supported Islamic laws. 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, these conservative participants critiqued 
feminists and, for most of them, the association between feminists and secularism was 
problematic. This was due to the conservatives’ view that supports a strong link 
between the legal system and religion. Additionally, all the conservative interviewees 
in this study argued that the interpretation of the Quran should be fixed. For example, 
Zahra, a self-defined conservative participant, stated that the way that the Muslim 
prophet (Mohammad) and his family (Ahlebeyt) and The Supreme Leader (Valie 
Faghih) practised Islam should be the standard for all Muslims: 
The Quran should not be interpreted by us, it must always be considered 
alongside Ahlebeyt, which explains the meaning of the Quran. Ahlebeyt 
recognised the Quran better than anyone else. This means that only Ali and 
those of Aemmeh, who had more knowledge about the Quran, can interpret 
the meaning and we must simply follow them. Everybody makes their own 
interpretations, for example ISIS claim that they are Muslim on their own 
understanding of Islam. On the other hand, other individuals believe that 
Islam must go forward with peace. There must be a standard that can be 
referred to, we say this standard is Ahlebeyt.  
 
Then she went on to say: 
Conservatives and reformists are both Shia Muslim, however, we 
conservatives believe that since Ahlebeyt is no longer here, we should follow 
Valie Faghih instead. Reformists do not have the same view and do not 
support him. 
 
Saba, who viewed herself as a conservative woman, made the same point: 
The Quran interprets itself, with verses that explain other verses. It has a 
systematic way of interpreting itself; each verse should not be interpreted 
alone because, when put together, this is when the true meaning can be 






Zahra reflected on how ordinary people must follow the prophet, his family, and The 
Supreme Leader as the best standard to understand exactly what the Quran means. 
Also, in Saba’s view, the Quran interprets itself so there is no need for human beings 
to interpret it. These accounts suggest how the different interpretations of the Quran 
advocated by reformists, which are more compatible with current issues in society and 
human rights, are discouraged by conservatives. Contrary to conservative ideas, the 
role of The Supreme Leader within the system is questioned by both male reformist 
leaders and religious reformist participants (see Chapters Two and Six). The religious 
reformist participants believed that religious leaders and in some cases women 
themselves can reinterpret the Quran according to current issues in Iran. These 
contradictions between religious reformists and conservative participants’ views 
might explain conservatives’ arguments (discussed earlier) that reformist religious 
women are similar to secular feminists. Perhaps the origin of this notion comes from 
their belief that only their own understanding of Islam is the true understanding. Mir-
Hosseini (2002) divides religious clerics into reformists and conservatives, declaring 
that reformists, unlike the conservatives, support democracy. Conservatives disagreed 
with the idea that people can have freedom in their lifestyle choices and, for example, 
choose what to wear. Although her study was about male conservative religious 
leaders, this research found that conservative female participants also called for an 
Islamic state without reinterpretation of the Quran, but in a different way. Analysis of 
the participants’ accounts shows that while both male conservative and female 
conservative participants advocated a society governed by Islam in a traditional way, 
female conservative participants looked for a type of society in which women’s rights 
can be improved. In this case, conservative women were not fully in agreement with 
male conservative religious leaders. These women attempted to find a way that 
enabled them to include women in the current society and public sphere. For example, 
Pari, who identified herself as a conservative woman, sought a new strategy, which 
considers women’s ‘place in society’ but in the framework of Islam, not ‘Western 
style’: 
Interpretations from the Quran are always fixed. We should not be thinking 
about how to change the interpretation, but rather how to include social 
issues so that women have their own place in society. Whilst taking religion 




bound to religious principles. We should make a systematic theory for this. 
We have not had such a theory up to now; we have been copying Western 
styles, placing religion beside it. However, I believe that religion should 
dominate and according to this a different policy should be made.  
 
The above quotation appears to suggest a way of dealing with tensions between 
defending the rights of women and upholding one’s faith to a certain understanding of 
Islam. This tension leads these conservative women into different positions to male 
conservatives. For example, Pari, an older conservative woman, explained the 
limitations of two dominant views related to women’s issues. Firstly, she criticised 
feminism, as in her view it advocated women’s freedom without any religious and 
moral framework. Secondly, she questioned the viewpoint that avoids giving women 
a position in society and assumes that women should stay at home and look after their 
husband. In addition, she believed that these two notions are very absolute notions 
and, therefore, the women’s issue needs a methodology that is based on religion:  
We had an Islamic Revolution, which was political but we need a cultural 
revolution. For it to be successful, we need a new strategy based on religion 
but it must have relativity to provide us with a better lifestyle. We had two 
different viewpoints in society. One sees a woman as detached from society 
and assumes her as a flower, who must sit in the house and look after her 
husband. The other [feminism] sees women as free individuals, who are not 
tied down by religious beliefs. The latter is more practical and is therefore 
more common in society, but it distances us from our original belief.  
 
Anoosh, a young woman who viewed herself as a conservative participant, reinforced 
this argument that feminism is not compatible with religious beliefs. She expressed 
that she became a women’s rights activist to solve women’s problems within the 
Islamic framework:  
In our country, those involved with women’s issues know themselves as 
Islamic feminists; however, they are feminists and are incompatible with 
Islam. On the other hand, there are a group of male religious individuals, 
who are rigid and far from reality. They do not understand women’s issues 
and therefore they have no solution. When I became a female activist, I 
wanted to find a solution from a religious perspective. 
  




The conservative problem is that we do not have any model based on our 
religious beliefs and family. There are theories and models based on gender 
equality in the world; however, we do not have any yet. Therefore, we only 
rely on trial and error. 
 
The above quotations seem to illustrate the commitment that the ten conservative 
women participants have as female activists, to consider women’s issues in a religious 
context. These participants, of both new and older generations, are seeking a new 
strategy, which is different to male conservative men and feminists, to solve women’s 
needs. In addition, Pari, who was one of the women who had an important role in the 
Islamic revolution and called for a new strategy to reach a ‘better lifestyle’, argued 
that the country needs to have a cultural revolution. Similarly, as discussed earlier, 
there were some religious reformist women and secular feminists who also had a 
similar role during the Islamic revolution but were dissatisfied with the situation of 
women after Islamic revolution.  
 
The respondents’ accounts in this study suggest that religion is hugely influential in 
the way that conservative women defend women’s rights. All conservatives held the 
view that Islam is the best resource to codify women’s rights, rather than human 
rights. They assumed Islam has its own human rights in which rights were perfectly 
formed, while human rights written by humans may have limitations. For example, 
Saba, a self-defined conservative participant, argued: 
The secular human rights foundation is humanist, while human’s rights 
according to Islam is based on God. We went to Thousand Islands in Ottawa. 
In this area each union’s representatives have their own island. These 
deputies write laws. While Islam focuses on poor people. There is a huge 
difference between the rights which are written by people and God. All the 
women’s rights in the Quran are written in order to break the patriarchy’s 
structure. For instance, in the prophet’s time, if a man died, his wife was 
inherited by others. Therefore, God wrote rights of inheritance and broke the 
patriarchy’s rules… According to human rights in the Quran, the more you 
control your ego, the closer you will be to God.  
 
Saba’s account suggests that religion is a perfect source of women’s rights rather than 
human rights. In addition, most conservatives viewed human rights as particular to the 




who saw herself as is a conservative woman, justified the conservative preference for 
laws defined in accordance with Islam. She argued that rights in a framework of Islam 
are more in favour of women in Iran compared with human rights:  
There are certainly some similarities between those rights that we define 
ourselves in an Islamic framework and human rights. However, we think that 
Islam defines rights in a deeper and better way. Human rights are shallower 
and based on liberalism and individualism. It is defined according to 
utilitarianism and the capitalist system. Human rights are embedded in Islam. 
Islam considers all humans as equal, irrespective of their colour, race and 
gender…so we can begin to interact with the West and say that we believe 
one step above to what you assume for women’s rights. 
 
The above quotation suggests how conservative participants oppose human rights 
because of their perceived link with the West and liberalism. As discussed earlier, 
they critiqued Western feminists for the same reasons.  
 
The voice and characteristics of conservative women activists have been ignored by 
the literature on women activists in Iran. Only a very few studies have merely 
mentioned the existence of conservative women activists in Iran (e.g. Afary, 1997; 
Mojab, 2001; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2006); however, they failed to examine the 
characteristics of these women, including their views about a fair society and human 
rights. Human rights thus seem to be a key factor for all secular, reformist and 
conservative women in proposing a more egalitarian society. While secular 
participants called for a secular society based on human rights, conservative women 
were opposed to it as they associated human rights with the West and liberalism. 
Religious reformist women had varied responses to the extent they committed to 
human rights based on their own religious values. Moreover, as indigenous activists, 
they needed to prove their loyalty to the state and so this position influenced the way 
that they called for human rights. 
 
Conclusion  
Iran has complex gender politics which influences the way women defend women’s 




terms ‘feminist’, ‘feminism’ and ‘West’ limited the activities and needs of secular, 
religious reformists and religious conservative women who attempt to improve 
women’s rights. Despite the importance of the term feminism within this limited 
context for gender politics, previous studies on Iranian feminists have not dealt with 
the reactions of women activists in Iran using these terms (e.g. Povey, 2001; Ahmadi, 
2006; Mir-Hosseini, 2006; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008; Tohidi, 2016). However, 
data analysis in this chapter highlighted how this stigma and politics of gender has led 
women to take different positions that have an influence on their solidarity. For 
example, while there is a tension amongst conservative women in defending women’s 
rights, their position as women who oppose the West, secularism, feminists and 
human rights limits their scope for advocating women’s rights and means that they 
could not align themselves with secular and Islamic feminists.  
 
Iranian gender politics use the terms ‘West’ and ‘feminist’ to stigmatise women who 
attempt to improve women’s rights. This puts pressure on women to prove they are 
‘insiders,’ who also advocate women’s rights (Moghadam, 2002; Ahmadi, 2006; Mir-
Hosseini, 2015; Tohidi, 2016). As discussed, the religious reformist women are the 
only pragmatist group who worked on different strategies to balance being indigenous 
and improving women’s rights. These women, contrary to conservative women, share 
the same aim (human rights), to varying degrees, with secular women. In the next 





CHAPTER FIVE: Differing Priorities for Women’s Rights in Iran 
 
Introduction  
As already discussed, in contemporary Iran, reformist religious leaders are more open 
to the consideration of women’s rights, but conservative leaders oppose the 
formulation of a more egalitarian reading of Islamic laws, in a very rigid way. 
Hofmann (2004) argues there is resistance amongst conservative clerics to reformist 
goals. They see reforms as an attempt to establish political liberalisation within the 
framework of an Islamic constitution. Such conservative clerics are dominant in The 
Guardian Council and the Special Court for Clerics. Contrary to conservative leaders 
who focus more on the aspect of ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’, reformist leaders highlight 
the importance of civilian ‘rights’ in Islam. Therefore, reformist individuals challenge 
the strong conservative concentration on the notions of ‘duty’ as constructed in 
Islamic jurisprudence. This is a conflict which is considered a threat to Islam by 
conservatives, and prompts them to control reformist efforts through their institutions 
(Mir-Hosseini, 2002). For example, bills related to gender issues, such as joining the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), directed at advocating women’s rights were passed by the Sixth 
parliament; however, The Guardian Council rejected all of them on the grounds they 
were un-Islamic (Mohammadi, 2013). As Mohammadi (2013: 14) declared, ‘The 
Guardian Council claimed that these drafts are against the decrees of the leader. 
These progressive drafts could eliminate lots of discrimination against women. [but] 
they were rejected as they were not in accordance with authoritarian understandings 
of religion.’  
 
Within this difficult context for gender politics, as discussed in Chapter Four, women 
take a variety of positions regarding the term feminist and achieving a more 
egalitarian society. Having laid out the participants’ positions, this chapter explores 
the way that participants prioritise women’s rights in Iran. While some studies detail 
Islamic and secular feminists in Iran (Ahmadi , 2006 ; Mir‐Hosseini, 2006), there is 




reformist and conservative women, prioritise women’s rights in Iran. This chapter 
describes the respondents’ views on how and why they give priorities to certain 
women’s rights and then discusses how they justify their priorities. Moreover, there is 
hardly any research that focuses on the concern of Iranian feminists and women 
activists on cultural inequality. Only a very few studies, for example Mojab (2001), 
claim that Iranian feminists and women’s rights activists struggle for formal equality 
and do not focus on informal inequalities existing in culture. However, this chapter 
explores participants’ views on cultural inequality, alongside legal discrimination. 
 
The chapter is divided into three major sections. Section one examines how and why 
the secular and religious reformist participants believe in gender equality and gender 
justice. The second section explores how and why secular and religious reformist 
women give priority to certain rights such as court testimony, polygamy, employment 
and the age of marriage for women. The third section examines how and why most 
conservative women prioritise rights in accordance with the Quran and disagree with 
gender equality. In all sections, I will discuss a range of topics that different 
categories of women engaged with. I will talk about, for each category of women, the 
issues that they saw as the most important issues for them. 
 
Gender equality and gender justice 
Most of the participants, including secular and some religious reformist women who 
mostly viewed themselves as Islamic feminists, called for gender equality and argued 
that there are gender differences between men and women. However, the majority 
believed that these ‘differences’ are due to socialisation and cultural expectation, and 
only a few argued that gender differences are due to biological differences between 
men and women.  
 
Most of these participants, asserted that gender differences are socially produced and 
therefore not a justification for differences in access to rights. These women believed 
in equality between men and women. For example, Gita, who identified herself as a 
secular feminist, believed that gender difference is not innate but defined and acquired 




Gender equality means that female physiological differences should not be 
the cause of social and legal deprivation. It means you should not be 
deprived of social, political, and legal rights due to your sex. Rather, you 
should enjoy equal rights…gender differences are definitely acquired. If you 
seek evidence, it is clear that being a woman is different in various 
communities. Sixty years ago girls had to talk less, and not laugh loudly. We 
regularly observe that the criterion for being a good woman or girl is 
changing; it has not been stable. When something is not stable it obviously is 
not innate.  
 
Similarly, Monica, a self-identified secular feminist, made the same point: 
Equality means that laws are enforced in the same way for all people…I 
think gender differences are not a matter of nature but culture. My nephew 
has grown up in a family that did not have the Hijab. He learned at nursery 
that women should wear the Hijab. When he saw me in the cemetery with a 
scarf on my head he was surprised and said ‘Is my Aunty a woman?!’ 
 
The above quotations illustrate how most of these participants believed that gender 
differences are not dictated by sexed body and therefore men and women need to 
access equal rights and opportunities. The advocacy of equal rights by these women 
was also supported by some other participants, including women who viewed 
themselves as feminist, both secular and Muslim; however, for this smaller group it 
was on the basis of the argument that there is biological difference between men and 
women. For example, Neda, a self-defined feminist whose argument for equal rights 
is based on Islam, argued that although there are some biological differences between 
men and women, they should enjoy equal rights:  
Gender equality means men and women are considered fully equal legally, 
socially and culturally. I accept the biological differences of a man and 
woman, but I think these differences should not cause discrimination. 
 
All the religious reformist participants who advocated gender equality talked about 
how gender equality can be supported in Islam. For, example, Neda, saw 




If we change our reading of the Quran, Islam is not in contrast with gender 
equality. For example, Soroush35 introduces sharia’ Ghabz va Bast36 theory. 
He believes the interpretation of the Quran and our understanding of 
religious ordinances should be based on the time we live in. He says that we 
can change religion based on current issues. In Shi’a, it is said that according 
to time and place you can have different interpretations. I think it is a good 
way for people who are in favour of religion, as in this way they can keep 
and save the religion and advocate equality between men and women. 
 
Neda’s idea of interpreting the Quran according to the current time and place appears 
to suggest that a different understanding of religion helps religious reformist women 
to reach an agreement with secular women concerning legal and cultural equality 
between men and women. While most secular and some religious reformist 
participants, who mostly viewed themselves as feminists, advocate gender equality, 
some of the religious reformist women who defined themselves as religious women 
rights activists believed in ‘gender justice’. These participants believed that men and 
women are different and they did not advocate equality. Instead, they use the term 
‘justice’. These interviewees were mainly women who had political experience and 
avoided labelling themselves as feminists despite their beliefs (Chapter Four). 
Analysis of the data shows that while these women used the term ‘gender justice’, 
they did not discuss any particular kind of gender justice. This suggests that the term 
justice is applied by these women to distinguish themselves from secular/Islamic 
feminists. Their use of different language allows them, first, to highlight their beliefs 
in religious values and/or particular roles associated with women, such as being a 
mother, and, second, to show their differences regarding feminist priorities.  
 
All of the women seeking ‘gender justice’ valued particular roles associated with 
women, for example the role of a mother in the family. The use of the term justice for 
these participants is more associated with their emphasis on valuing the roles and 
responsibilities of women as mothers. For example, Setareh, who viewed herself as a 
religious women’s rights activist, illustrated this. She was a senior in government, and 
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gave an example of how mothers play more important roles for children compared to 
fathers: 
Justice means individuals should be served in accordance with their nature 
and differences. You’ll see how some differences between men and women 
eventually created different characteristics. For example, we like our baby to 
sleep with us. Babies also feel more relaxed with their mothers. They do not 
have the same feeling with their fathers. Gender differences are innate. The 
world has accepted it. For example, women are given maternity leave as they 
need it. Some countries have given paternity leave to men as well. Men are 
not given a break to rest; they are given it to help their wives to rest. It is an 
accepted thing and all societies recognise it. 
 
The above quotation illustrates the views of some reformist religious women, who 
avoid being labelled as feminist, and highlights their perspective on the role of a 
woman as a mother, emphasising that for them there are essential differences between 
men and women. However, later I will discuss how, despite the roles that they 
associate with women as mothers, what they are advocating is gender equality. In 
addition, analysis of the data shows that there is another important reason why they 
use the term of justice rather than equality. This term enables the same religious 
reformist women who viewed themselves as religious women’s rights activists to 
express their differences publicly with secular/Islamic feminists. As most women’s 
rights activists had political experience, applying the gender justice term related to the 
stigma associated with feminist/feminism in the political realm.  
 
As discussed earlier, the terms feminists and feminism are stigmatised within the 
political sphere, and participants with political experience attempted to distance 
themselves from them. Moreover, as these women need to prove their loyalty publicly 
to their own nation and religion, particularly to conservative political leaders, they 
preferred to use distinct language from feminists. Some of the religious reformist 
women with political experience echoed this idea, and talked about the reason that 
they use the term gender justice rather than gender equality. These participants argued 
that they applied this term to demonstrate that equal rights are in their view associated 
with feminists’ demands, and are not their priority. For example, Nahal, a self-defined 
religious women’s rights activist, who was a former Member of Parliament, said that 




accepted in both public and political spheres and consequently to be more active, 
especially in the political arena. She mentioned that even using this term was 
problematic in the seventh parliament during the conservative time:  
Because I believe in equal rights for all human beings, equality is acceptable 
to me. However, our society misconceives the word ‘equality’. We prefer to 
use the word ‘justice’ instead of ‘equality’. Justice is more compatible with 
our people’s beliefs. I think for people who intend to make social change it is 
very important to connect with the masses of people, their interests and their 
concerns. Justice is a concept that can be accepted more easily in our society. 
You might know that the seventh parliament even deleted the word 
‘justice’… there are some, both innate and acquired, differences between 
men and women. The word ‘feminist’ is interpreted as ‘radical feminist’ in 
Iran, and therefore being both a feminist and advocating for equality is 
resisted because of this notion. 
 
A few non-Western scholars for example, Kadivar (2013), Mir-Hosseini et al. (2013), 
Mir-Hosseini et al. (2015) and Duderija (2017) mention that in Islamic discourse 
gender justice means that everything is in its proper place, and that men and women 
have their own essential places in the society and family. These authors note that this 
meaning of justice in traditional Islamic discourse is the root of discriminatory laws. 
However, analysis of the data illustrated that some religious reformist women used 
this term to refer to their religious beliefs and to some particular roles that they 
associate with women, such as being a mother, and importantly to their strategy to 
defend women’s rights. In other words, the term justice, accepted by religious 
individuals, emphasizes their religious identity and also legitimizes their activities to 
improve women’s status. Analysis of the data showed that there are no significant 
differences between the views of these religious reformist women, who advocated 
gender justice, and those women who saw themselves as feminists, and who 
advocated gender equality. This becomes clearer in the following section, when I 
explore how these women prioritised women’s rights. 
 
Secular and religious reformist women and prioritising women rights 
All of the participants, including secular and some religious reformist women who 
called for equal rights between men and women, prioritised certain rights, such as 




only insisted on equal rights and emphasised working on some rights at the same 
time. For example, all of the women who advocated equal rights, argued that the court 
testimony of a woman should be equivalent with a man and they demanded this equal 
right. They advocated this right because, in the Iranian legal framework, the testimony 
of a man is equivalent with two women’s (as previously discussed in Chapter Two). 
For example, Sima, the only self-defined secular woman who believed in biological 
differences between men and women but advocated equality, pointed to the specific 
characteristics of women as being likely ‘to be more pedantic and particular than 
men’ and argued that the testimony of women and men should be equal:  
In my opinion women should have the same rights as men. In the interest of 
testimony, women tend to be more pedantic and particular than men and this 
may increase the validity of their testimony. Therefore, if we do not want to 
say that women’s testimony is stronger than men’s, we can say it is just as 
valid.  
 
Sara, a self-defined Islamic feminist, also sought the same rights in terms of 
testimony. She argued that this law is old-fashioned and should be re-interpreted in a 
different way to appeal to today’s generation. She demanded that this law be reformed 
to reflect the current time: 
This is one discriminatory law which exists in our penal codes that should be 
reinterpreted. Reformist leaders should take this law into consideration. My 
interpretation is that women had less activity in society at the time of the 
emergence of Islam, so they were partly unaware of events and affairs. For 
this reason, their testimony could not be regarded as a criterion, but women 
work alongside men at this time and even have complete knowledge of their 
contemporary events due to their various roles. Therefore, it is not fair that 
their testimony is invalid, while in some cases a man’s testimony must be 
added to the woman’s testimony to make it valid, even in cases which are 
especially related to women!  
 
Simin, who viewed herself as Islamic feminist, expressed a similar view:  
This is an issue that must be brought to the attention of the Fuqaha. 
According to the Quran, in the subject of midwifery, women’s testimony is 
considered to be valid, whereas in economic matters it is not valid. The 
reason for this may be that, in the past, women did not involve themselves in 
economic issues but had been more concerned with child birth. This shows 
that women did not interfere in matters in which they had no experience. In 




economic, social, law and university affairs. Since women are more educated 
and aware, Fuqaha must modernise their interpretation of the Quran.  
 
The above accounts highlight how religious reformist women shared similar ideas 
with secular women that the gendered binary between public and private sectors are 
less visible in today’s society compared to the Quran’s time and, therefore, this law on 
testimony is no longer applicable. For these women, the gendering of public and 
private spheres in the past led to this law; however, this separation no longer exists. 
This is one example of how Islamic feminists attempt to call for human rights, using 
the ability to re-interpret the Quran as a justification. 
 
Similarly, the majority of participants, including all secular and some religious 
reformist women who called for equal rights, were against polygamy. According to 
the Iranian constitution, a man is able to have four wives at the same time, but the 
same does not apply to women. While this law is unpopular in practice and not 
socially considered an important issue, the women argued that this law should be 
changed so that a man can only marry one woman. For example, Haleh, a self-
identified secular feminist, illustrated this by discussing that, although not all women 
experience polygamy, some are suffering from this issue and women activists need to 
advocate for these women’s needs: 
There is not a lot of polygamy in Iran; some female activists may argue that 
there is only a very small percentage of women who are in this situation, so 
why should it be our main priority? I, as a middle class woman, am not 
affected by this issue; however, a woman in Sistan Baloochestan37, who lives 
within a different culture, is suffering more so. Therefore, the law should 
protect her but this is not the case; women are used whilst they are young and 
beautiful and when a woman no longer has these traits, she is replaced. 
  
Haleh’s quotation shows the extent of class and geographical variation between 
women’s lives in terms of the degree to which they are affected by polygamy. In a 
similar way, religious reformist women talked about their struggle with this law and 
                                                 





their effort to remove it. Neda, a self-defined feminist, explained how women activists 
have attempted to convince the parliament that this law should be reformed: 
We always disagreed with this law. We went to parliament with different 
groups of [Muslim] feminists. We objected there and had a debate with some 
members of parliament to convince them that this law causes many problems 
in society. When we were speaking with members of parliament, this issue 
was discussed in parliament. On that day, Larijani38 announced that the bill 
should not be approved for a while. 
 
Although Neda’s account suggests that religious reformist women were not successful 
in changing the law, it illustrates how some women questioned the injustice of the 
current interpretation of the Quran and its application to civil codes and had the 
opportunity to renegotiate with political leaders over gendered codes. Religious 
reformist women believed that they could act as insiders whose strategy of 
pragmatism could work better than secular feminists within the Iranian context. This 
idea is echoed by some Iranian feminists’ work, such as Mir-Hosseini (2006) and 
Ahmadi (2006), which emphasises the importance of the activities of indigenous and 
local feminists. 
 
Another right that the majority of participants supported in this study, including 
women who advocated gender equality, is the equal right for men and women to be 
employed. As Rezai-Rashti and Moghadam (2011: 422) explain, ‘According to the 
138539/2006 Iranian census (Islamic Republic of Iran 1997), only 3.5 million Iranian 
women were members of the salaried labour force, compared with 23.5 million men.’ 
Participants raised particular issues related to employment, such as the importance of 
women’s paid work in the democratic process, the lack of policies to help women find 
employment, and the link between being financially independent and a reduced risk of 
domestic violence. 
 
All of the women in this study whose priority was equal rights including gender 
justice between men and women emphasised the significance of paid work for 
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women. For these participants, the presence of women in the public sphere rather than 
traditionally staying at home is influential to democracy. For example, for Lida, who 
identified herself as an Islamic feminist, the attendance of women in the public sphere 
had a strong association with the democratic process: 
I think that women activists can help the democratic process if they attempt 
seriously to promote awareness of women’s issues and improvement of their 
situation, and also by encouraging women to work and be more active in 
society. 
 
Lida’s account highlights the importance of employment for women to the extent that 
she sees that it leads to greater democratisation in Iran. In today’s Iran, although 
women benefit from the education system, they face difficulties such as child care and 
unpaid work in the home, to their ability work outside. Some of the participants who 
defined themselves as secular and Islamic feminists viewed access to child care and 
responsibilities for domestic labour as obstacles for women to being employed. For 
instance, Haleh, a self-identified secular feminist, spoke about how the structure of 
employment in Iranian society is patriarchal. She also reflected how a woman’s 
ability to seek opportunities in society are greatly limited by motherhood being seen 
as a woman’s prime identity. From her point of view ‘there is a labour division of the 
genders’, which includes considering women responsible for children and domestic 
labour. She went on to say: 
Women depend on men economically, as less than ten percent of the country’s 
wealth belongs to women, which shows that women have a lower status 
compared to men... There is a labour division of the genders in our society. 
For example, one of the challenges women face in employment is having 
children, as the period in which they give birth is often the same period in 
which they can be most active in society. State schools close at twelve pm; 
what kind of job finishes at this time? There is no such thing. Most of the 
nurseries are private and extremely expensive so the majority of women 
cannot access them. It is vital that good nurseries are available to mothers at a 
reasonable price, but this does not exist. The society should be more structured 
to be women friendly. There are implicit discriminations in society which 
prevent women from becoming employed. 
 
In Haleh’s view, the patriarchal structure of Iranian society encourages women to 
remain in the private sphere of the home rather than enter the public sphere of work. 




the state to allow them to be more economically active in society. The importance of 
employment for some interviewees was not just economic. For example, some who 
defined themselves as feminists talked about how being a paid employee empowers 
women in the private realm. These women associated being financially independent 
with a reduced risk of suffering from domestic violence. For instance, Monica, who 
identified herself as a secular feminist, commented:  
A man at first says you do not have to work, therefore do not work. As a 
woman is not strong enough to believe working is her right, she thinks 
working is a misery and accepts her husband’s wish. Then the man takes 
another step and says that you should not speak with your sister’s husband and 
you should wear a scarf on your head … after a while you see it is a violent 
cycle that gets worse. But it all started from somewhere that you became 
hesitant not to get a job and consequently lost your right to have one. Women 
should be trained at home or at school to defend themselves and be able to live 
independently. 
 
A similar view was expressed by Sara, a self-defined Islamic feminist:  
For example, if a woman is educated and she is a doctor, after marriage her 
husband tells her not to work. Many women usually accept this…they are 
dependent financially on their husband. Later, as they do not have a job, 
although they do not have good living conditions with their husband, they 
have to stay home and tolerate their husband’s violent behaviour.  
 
Similarly, Alice, who viewed herself as a secular feminist and worked in a part of Iran 
where many women commit suicide because of the pressures within their homes, 
explained how women activists in these areas try to empower women by teaching 
them sewing, to allow them to stand against violence at home: 
In the rural areas, we teach women how to sew and gradually convince them 
that they don’t have to do housework, farming, or stable work while also being 
physically abused. We tell them that now they no longer have to put up with 
this situation as they can sew, and therefore they can work for themselves. If 
they are in danger of committing suicide by burning themselves then they need 
to leave.  
 
All the women who called for equal rights also talked about another law through 
which women are violated. As shown in Chapter Two, the age of marriage was raised 




advocated equal rights argued that the age of marriage should be at least eighteen. 
They reflected that although marriages under eighteen generally do not happen in 
Tehran, this does occur elsewhere in Iran. These participants insisted that this law, 
which is associated with problematic cultural practices, should be changed: 
I have researched the issue of marriage below the age of eighteen. It was 
distressing to see a thirteen-year-old girl marrying a fifteen-year-old boy. 
Some parts of Iran are much more advanced, where the girls are educated. 
However, other parts are very much behind and, therefore, it is very important 
that female activists fight for the rights of women outside of Tehran who do 
not have a voice. (Lida, a self- identified Islamic feminist)  
 
A thirteen-year-old girl is still a child and still plays with her dolls. Although 
in our society this practice is not common, it does take place in some areas 
because Iran is a multi-cultural country. For this reason, it is essential to 
change this law to beyond eighteen years old in order to develop the society 
and its needs, as our law is behind compared to the dominant culture. (Haleh, 
who saw herself as a secular feminist) 
 
Analysis of the participants’ accounts showed that most women who viewed 
themselves as secular or Islamic feminists have similar views on equal rights for 
women and men in law, but with different approaches. Some of the religious reformist 
women who identified themselves as Islamic feminists defended women’s rights from 
within religious discourse. This strategy enables them to negotiate women’s rights 
with religious leaders, but in a more limited way compared with other religious 
reformist women who distanced themselves from the feminist label. 
  
Gender justice, women’s rights and religious reformist women                                                                                                                                                                                                
Other religious reformists who thought of themselves as religious women’s rights 
activists talked about gender justice and, similar to secular and Islamic feminists, 
advocated and prioritised women’s rights, as discussed above. For example, some of 
the religious reformists, who viewed themselves as religious women’s rights activists, 
despite their emphasis on particular gendered roles associated with women, such as 
being mothers, advocated for the employment of women. For example, Akram argued 
that the role of women in the family, particularly as a mother, is important; however, 




There are some differences between men and women but these differences 
should not cause discrimination. Instead, based on their abilities they should 
enjoy rights based on special programmes, which means gender justice. For 
example, women’s roles and responsibilities within the family are very 
significant for conservative women. They are not flexible about these roles to 
the extent that they do not advocate women’s rights and freedom. For us, the 
roles of women particularly as a mother are important, but we do not view 
these roles in contrast with women’s roles in public.  
 
In comparison to secular or Islamic feminists who advocate equality, religious 
reformist women believed that laws relating to issues such as polygamy and the age of 
marriage for women should only be changed in a limited way. For example, in terms 
of polygamy, some argued that this law should be limited to exceptional 
circumstances. For these religious reformist women who did not call themselves 
feminists, gender equality might not work in some remote areas in Iran due to the 
complexity of their situation. These participants believed that this law is being 
practised by some families in rural areas, and they argued that there are some 
exceptions in society and therefore this law cannot be removed. Similar to secular and 
some religious reformist participants who identified themselves as feminists and 
called for equality, these self-identified religious women’s rights activists view 
polygamy as a cultural practice, but unlike the former they believed that as a cultural 
practice this law should be protected and limited rather than removed. Importantly, 
they expressed their disagreement with the policy of conservative leaders who 
attempted to promote polygamy. For example, Akram, who disagreed with polygamy, 
stated: 
Polygamy is not the need of our society. However, we cannot forbid this law 
completely as there are some exceptions. I do not agree with polygamy but I 
believe that it should not be so easy for a man to have more than one wife. 
However, the conservative party has tried to make it a more acceptable 
concept as they believe it is juridical and prevents immorality. I do not agree 
with the view of the conservative party. 
 
She went on to explain that the Quran limits the number of wives that a man can have 
and ordered that a man must treat each of his wives equally, and he should be just 
with all his wives: 
In our constitution, in terms of polygamy there are some restrictions for men; a 




woman. In the Quran’s time, as men had no restrictions, the Quran limited the 
number of wives they could have to a maximum of four. However, the 
conditions are that he must be just with all four women, which is impossible so 
a man must only have one wife. ‘Just’ in the Quran is not meant only as 
economically just; rather, it is also meant emotionally. 
 
This quotation illustrates the view of some religious reformist women, as self-defined 
religious women’s rights activists, who advocated gender justice and the defence of 
some rights in a more limited way. They took religious culture into consideration and 
preferred to limit this law rather than forbid it. Similarly, a few of these women who 
called for gender justice in terms of the age of marriage for women believed that the 
age of marriage for girls should not necessarily be eighteen. As discussed earlier, the 
age of marriage in the legal code is thirteen and these women argued that this law 
should not be changed but be restricted. They justified their view based on the 
argument that outside of Tehran, in rural areas, there are some families who believe 
that this law is religiously legitimised.40 In addition, as these religious families cannot 
accept sexual relationships outside marriage, they support this law because it reduces 
the risk that a teenage daughter may have sex outside of marriage and consequently 
suffer social condemnation. A few of these religious reformist women mentioned that 
they preferred to limit these marriages by arguing that only girls who reach mental 
and physical maturity before eighteen years should be able to marry. The extract 
below exemplifies this: 
As a head teacher, I have learned that in some ethnic groups in rural areas, 
when a girl reaches the age of thirteen or fourteen, they have sexual needs. We 
insisted that girls under the age of eighteen who are to be wed must be 
assessed by a midwife and psychologist to determine whether they have 
reached mental and sexual maturity. (Setareh, a self-defined religious 
women’s right activist) 
 
In summary, some religious reformist women, who did not label themselves feminist 
despite their beliefs, took the religious context into consideration and gave priority to 
equal rights in a more limited way. They applied the term ‘gender justice’ due to the 
particularity of the Iranian context. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter Four, they 
advocated rights in the framework of religion rather than human rights. They justified 
                                                 




their preference by arguing that there are some important religious beliefs and values, 
and for these women these rights can be protected by Islamic rather than human 
rights.  
The approach of some religious reformist women when talking about gender justice 
was that a few rights, such as polygamy and the age of marriage for women, should be 
more restricted. As these women take into considerations factors such as religious 
values and the political atmosphere in advocating women’s rights, their position in 
turn gave them an opportunity to lobby political leaders. These women have the 
potential to be more productive in contributing to increasing the number of women in 
the government compared with other participants. Analysis of the women’s accounts 
showed that these women attempted to improve women’s representation in 
government by negotiating with political figures. These meetings and negotiations are 
significant as the participants who viewed themselves as secular feminists were rarely 
able to link political leaders to women’s issues. In addition, other religious reformist 
women who called themselves Islamic feminists had limited opportunities to meet 
political leaders in person, such as the prime minister, and thus to raise the topic of 
women’s needs. Moreover, conservative participants were less likely to discuss the 
participation of women in the political realm, as this right is incompatible with the 
gender roles they associated with women. This suggests that some religious reformist 
women who had political experience played an important role in raising women’s 
issues with political leaders, particularly increasing the number of women in the 
government. Most of these religious women’s rights activists explained how they 
sought to increase the number of women in the political sphere. For example, Elnaz, 
who saw herself as a religious women’s rights activist, emphasised in the interview 
that participation in politics is an important right for women:  
Women activists should negotiate women’s issues with political leaders… 
For example, after Rouhani became prime minister we met some of his 
ministers and asked them to appoint a percentage of women in governmental 
jobs, such as a woman’s ambassador...We, a group of women activists, went 
to speak to the ministers of the country to ask them to include women in 
politics; it doesn’t matter whether they are conservative or reformist, it only 





Highlighting the number of women in politics was also echoed by Maria, a self-
defined religious women’s right activist. According to her, women should be allowed 
to take part in different parts of society, but particularly in the political sphere. She 
said: 
We have worked on the empowerment of women in the political sector and 
we have attempted to increase women’s participation in politics. There was 
no limitation for my work and I was criticised by many who questioned my 
logic. However, I told these people that women must be empowered in all 
sectors of society.  
 
Most of the self-identified religious women’s rights activists, who had been engaged 
with politics, viewed the political participation of women as the way to achieve equal 
rights. They suggested that women’s involvements in politics enabled them to be 
critical and achieve women’s legal rights. For example, Simin, a former MP argued: 
Women must have access to political arenas; they should be involved in 
parliament. Therefore, we could defend women’s rights, such as the right of 
divorce and protection from domestic violence. However, if I am fighting for 
divorce, how can I help if I’m not a member of parliament? Being in 
parliament would enable me to advocate women’s rights.  
 
For most participants, the political participation of women would contribute to 
women’s rights, but some religious reformist women who had political experience 
described how women politicians were faced with some limitations due to the Islamic 
framework. For example, according to the law, there are restrictions on women 
travelling abroad, as women require their husband’s consent to leave the country. 
Nahal, a former MP, referred to this regulation and explained how the political 
involvement of women is influenced by these laws: 
There are some limitations for women in Iran who want to become 
ambassadors; one of the government’s concerns is that, upon leaving the 
country, a woman must ask her husband for permission. Therefore, the 
government is reluctant to undermine the man’s authority.  
 
The above quotation appears to suggest a clash of cultural and political/legal 
citizenship for women politicians. As discussed in Chapter Four, some religious 




feminism as, they argued, this label is stigmatised, particularly in the political realm. 
While these women experienced cultural limitations within politics, it seems that 
having political experience and distancing themselves from the language of feminism 
enabled them, firstly, to partly be accepted in the Islamic political realm and, 
secondly, to help negotiate women’s rights with male reformists leaders, such as the 
right of women to be in the political realm.  
 
Secular feminists and religious reformist women: calling for cultural change 
Most of the secular women and religious reformist women, whether they called for 
gender justice or gender equality, shared the idea that legal change is insufficient to 
improve women’s rights in a complex society like Iran. Instead, they argued that 
cultural change is also necessary to reach gender equality and gender justice. For 
example, Sima, who viewed herself as a secular feminist, argued that equality means 
addressing equality in law, culture and language. For her, equality in culture is even 
more important than legal equality: 
For me, equality is now very important and, most importantly, a culture of 
gender equality. In many cases maybe our legislation has changed, but the 
culture of patriarchy fostered by our men and women, consciously or 
unconsciously, still applies. Changing the culture in such matters is much 
more important than changing the laws. What is the point of a law which is 
not practised by people? …equality means there is no difference in law, 
culture, and language between men and women. It means there is no 
difference between men and women. 
 
All participants except conservative women talked about cultural issues related to the 
existence of the unequal legal code related to divorce. Article 133 states that a man 
can divorce his wife whenever he wishes, but only a woman with a specific situation 
is eligible to have a divorce. For example, there are some particular circumstances 
that Iranian courts consider for granting a divorce to women: the castration of the 
husband, madness, contracted infectious disease, prison sentences longer than five 
years, and polygamy without the first wife’s consent. Notably, there are also some 
terms and conditions in the marriage certificate within the Iranian constitution. 
According to these terms, if women and men agreed to sign them at the time of 




However, the majority of participants emphasise that these terms and conditions 
cannot help. In their view, in the patriarchal society of Iran, achieving these rights is 
very difficult for women. For example, Azin, a self-defined Islamic feminist, said that 
it is not accepted in Iranian culture that women gain this right and there is a need for 
cultural change: 
But these terms and conditions have their own problems; firstly, all women 
do not know about these conditions. Secondly, it is not nice in our culture to 
argue about signing the conditions before marriage as some men do not agree 
to sign. However, we need to increase awareness. By doing so, our culture 
would be improved. When a mother knows her daughter has the right of 
divorce, she accepts the condition for her sister in law too.  
 
Similarly, Akram, who saw herself as a religious women’s rights activist, argued that 
as women nowadays are more rational than at the time of Mohammad (Muslim 
prophet), this law should be re-read in the Quran: 
Now, women have the right of divorce in their terms of marriage contracts. 
However, it is not enough. With the reasoning of women being more 
emotional than men, they have been deprived of this right in order to prevent 
the separation of the family. However, we believe that women nowadays are 
more aware and therefore more rational than women of previous eras, which 
is why they should have the right of divorce. 
  
While these women disagreed with this discriminatory law most, except for the 
conservative participants, raised some problematic issues related to the right of 
divorce for women. The majority of secular and religious reformist women 
highlighted the balance between limited legal equality and cultural norms. They 
talked about the living problems that divorced women are faced with. For example, 
Monica, a self-identified secular feminist, illustrated how a divorced women 
experiences painful life events, both in society and with her family. She believed that 
not only should women have the right of divorce, but also that the state should have a 
policy to transform cultural issues:    
Society ignores a divorced woman and she cannot form a relationship with 
others or find another husband. Therefore, if a woman gets divorced and only 
sits at home, this is not good. Sometimes, when you hear that a judge does 
not agree with a divorce, you think I understand why. When a twenty-year-
old woman gets a divorce, she would sit at home and be oppressed by her 




have other rights as well and if society does not have a negative reaction. The 
government needs to have different policies simultaneously. 
 
Similarly, Azin, a psychologist who defined herself as a Islamic feminist, mentioned 
that women are discouraged from getting a divorce in Iranian society: 
It can be related to the personal fear of being lonely. She probably worries 
that, after her divorce, no man will marry her.  
 
The above quotations illustrate how, in most of the participants’ views, achieving the 
right of divorce for women is not enough to achieve gender equality, as cultural 
norms influence the post-divorce life of a divorced woman, thus discouraging women 
from getting divorced. In other words, as these women argued, it is not enough only to 
give women the right of divorce; they must also consider the public acceptance of 
divorced women. This is in contrast with a few researchers, for example Mojab 
(2001), who have been concerned with the issue of cultural inequality, and claim that 
Iranian feminists and women activists struggle for formal equality and do not focus on 
the informal inequalities existing in culture. The issues around divorce suggest limits 
to legal/political change that are more likely related to the risks created by everyday 
social reality. The complex situation of women who suffer in marriage shows how the 
decision making for a woman who needs a divorce is difficult. As explained earlier in 
this chapter, the majority of Iranian women depend financially on their husband. 
Understanding the complexities of what is involved in seeking to change women’s 
rights and familial contexts highlights how women activists need to improve women’s 
situations legally, culturally and financially at the same time. 
 
Secular and religious reformist women: assigning priorities in the Iranian context 
Most of the women, regardless of their arguments about gender equality and gender 
justice, shared similar ideas in terms of a law that was not prioritised by them. Despite 
their agreement on the right that women should choose to wear the Hijab, they did not 
put this right as a priority. The Hijab, including both the head-covering and modest 
Islamic styles of dress, is compulsory in public settings in Iran. The majority of the 




changed and Iranian women should have the right to choose what they wear. 
Importantly, even most of the religious reformist women said that they were against 
coercing women to wear the Hijab. However, obtaining this right was not considered 
a priority. These women thought that everyone should choose to wear the Hijab or not 
and the state should neither ban it, since religious women prefer to wear it, nor impose 
it. For example, Simin, who viewed herself as a religious women’s rights activist, 
stated:   
This law is not in the priority list for us… I believe in the Hijab personally 
but compulsory Hijab has not shown any results. If we take statistics, we will 
see that, compared to 25 years ago, the amount of those who understood the 
real meaning of the Hijab has now decreased. This is because the 
compulsory Hijab was introduced. I am just as much against the fact that the 
Hijab should not be compulsory as I am against a girl in France being denied 
education or employment due to her Hijab. 
 
Akram, a self-identified religious women’s rights activist, made the same point:  
I personally agree with wearing the Hijab and I believe that it is in the best 
interest of society. If a woman wears the Hijab she is viewed as a person and 
not a woman. However, I disagree with compulsory Hijab because I think it 
should come from a person’s own desires, not by force… the right to choose 
to wear the Hijab or not is not our priority. This is a very sensitive issue in 
Iran. The cleric who made a speech about the Hijab not being compulsory 
was very brave and managed to express his idea clearly. 
 
While Simin and Akram are religious women who personally believed in wearing the 
Hijab, they argued that it should not be compulsory and women should have the right 
to choose. Most of the secular and religious reformist participants raised different 
reasons for defending the right of women to not be forced to wear Hijab. These 
reasons aligned with the participants’ identities. The first reason was the association 
between wearing the Hijab and gender construction. A few participants, who were 
feminist and rejected the assumption that there is an essential difference between men 
and women, argued that the Hijab attributes a specific characteristic to women and is 
a symbol which differentiates men from women:  
Women’s repression began from 1978-1979. At the first women’s day, 
women were beaten and forced to wear a scarf. Its consequence was a 
compulsory veil. Such pressures, plus the revocation of family laws, required 
a reaction. We wanted to form a resistance nucleus about these issues …after 




Hijab, and it was seen everywhere. In this way, a gap was created between 
girls and boys. (Anahita, a self-defined secular feminist) 
 
The second reason, according to some religious reformist women, related to the 
particular meaning of the Hijab. They believed that making the Hijab compulsory 
removes the personal religious meaning of the Hijab for the wearer. These religious 
reformist women argued that forcing Iranian women to wear the Hijab has a negative 
impact on the concept of the Hijab. For example, Nahal, who identified herself as a 
religious women’s rights activist, asserted that the result of the compulsory Hijab 
became a source of mockery in Iran:  
The compulsory Hijab has not been successful and has not been able to make 
women more covered. Rather, it has become more something to be ridiculed 
and it has lost its real meaning. This is the current situation which exists in 
our country.  
 
While the right to choose to wear the Hijab was significant for most of the 
participants, including the secular and religious reformist women, they failed to 
prioritise this as a rights issue. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, some 
interviewees who viewed themselves as secular and Islamic feminists argued that Iran 
is a religious country and some women in Iran are sensitive about the Hijab. 
Therefore, these feminists avoided prioritising the choice to wear the Hijab in order to 
prevent conflict with the views of religious women. These feminists argued that they 
need to be linked with the majority population of women in Iran. For example, 
Parastoo, a self-identified secular feminist, talked about women in Iran who preferred 
to wear the Hijab. She believed the connection between women activists and Iranian 
women could not be severed due to being against this law: 
There are some women in Iran who prefer to live in a society in which 
women wear the Hijab. Several months ago I needed to go to the south of 
Tehran where the majority of women are religious. As we had NGOs in this 
area, I wore the Chador in order to work with these women. The point I am 
trying to say is that as women activists want to have a strong connection with 
women’s needs in Iran, they do not prioritise this law, otherwise they lose 
their position among women with different beliefs.  
 
Some women also argued that this is an area that conservative women are highly 
sensitive about. Sima, as a self-identified secular feminist, illustrated that conservative 




Wearing the Hijab is considered a boundary for religious women. Some 
religious women who are close to secular women are not sensitive about 
wearing the Hijab. However, for religious women who are conservatives, the 
Hijab is very important. Therefore, it is not our priority.  
 
The above quotation appears to suggest that the issue of wearing the Hijab is a point 
of disagreement between conservative and reformist and secular activist women. 
Sima’s account suggests that it is important for women’s rights activists to work on 
areas that are more inclusive of all women. Secondly, another factor that women 
raised to explain why the Hijab is not their priority was linked to the political 
sensitivity around it. Most participants echo the dominant view that the Hijab is an 
important issue for the political system or Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, 
Parvaneh, who saw herself as a conservative woman and agreed with compulsory 
Hijab, explained how much wearing the Hijab is important for the Iranian Islamic 
government:  
At the beginning of the revolution, the state could decide whether the Hijab 
should be compulsory or not. However, this is now a political issue rather 
than a religious issue. Removing the compulsory Hijab now would be 
disadvantageous to the government.  
 
This account suggests that the Islamic state is firm on the issue of women wearing the 
Hijab. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Two, conservative leaders are against some 
feminist activities such as calling for the right to choose whether or not to wear the 
Hijab, as they are considered un-Islamic and threatening to the legitimacy of the 
Islamic republic. These issues related to the Hijab seem to influence most of the 
women to not prioritise this, despite its importance for them. Contrary to most secular 
and religious reformist women, most conservative participants advocated the 
obligatory Hijab. These conservative women believed that the Quran advised women 
to cover their body.  
It is important to mention here, as there is a very hard gender politics around gay 
issues, that participants preferred to avoid talking about this right, arguing that they 
would put themselves in danger. In the previous chapter, I explained that while 
secular women advocated human rights, despite their personal beliefs, they did not 
call for gay rights as they were concerned about the perceived risks involved with this 




the political system and the sense of fear impacted on the way they expressed 
themselves. 
 
Having discussed the ways secular and religious reformist women prioritised 
women’s rights, for conservatives, the Quran is understood in a traditional way, and is 
the source of women’s rights. In the next section, I will explore how these women 
gave priority to women’s rights. 
 
Prioritising women’s rights according to the Quran from the conservatives’ view 
The majority of conservative women disagreed with the notions of gender equality 
and gender justice, as proposed by the women who were secularists and religious 
reformists. These women prioritised women’s rights in accordance with the Quran 
and in most cases without any re-interpretation. In this section, I will only discuss the 
conservative women’s view of some particular rights, such as testimony, divorce and 
employment, as these do not necessarily defer to the teaching of the Quran, but are 
interestingly debated by conservative women. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
conservative women argued that they became women activists to defend ‘their rights’. 
They believed that feminist demands are not their demands. In fact, they called for 
saving the existing laws that secular and reformist women were attempting to change. 
For example, Yasi, who viewed herself as a conservative woman, thought that gender 
differences are innate, and because of their differences women and men cannot have 
equality, as they complement each other: 
I believe in women’s rights as discussed in the Quran… I do not believe in 
either justice or equality. They are both the same. My opinion is similar to 
Parsons41 I believe this because family is very important to me. I think if 
everyone plays their own role, then the family system works well and society 
gets the benefit of it. So I do not believe in gender equality… I believe 
gender differences are innate. When you are a woman your body works 
                                                 
41 This participant believed in Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), an American sociologist. Parsons argued 
that the family operated most efficiently with clear-cut sexual divisions of labour and, in turn, with a 
complementary set of roles that link men and women. According to Parsons’ view, men should support 
the family financially by working outside, while women should take the role of raising children and 
managing the household. Therefore, he believed that complementary roles would ensure the stability of 




different from men, for example breast feeding and pregnancy. So, how  can 
they be equal? 
 
As their argument is based on Islam, conservative women believed in different rights 
for men and women. For example, Parvaneh, a self-defined conservative participant, 
claims that men and women have different rights and obligation due to their essential 
differences: 
We have both biological and psychological differences. All the psychological 
differences cannot be socially constructed. From a religious perspective a 
part of the psychological differences are genetic differences. Therefore, this 
creates differences in the roles and responsibilities. Secular and reformist 
women activists do not believe this idea. They think these psychological 
differences are constructed in society. So, these women activists do not 
believe in differences in rights, obligations and roles. They seek equality 
while we believe men and women have different rights and obligations due 
to their genetic differences. For example, if God makes a man a guardian of a 
woman because of his genetic differences, he will have some rights 
according to his position. 
 
Hani, another participant who self-defined as a conservative based on her 
understanding of religion, argued that Islam is a system in which both men and 
women have different roles and rights and, therefore, this forms a balance: 
I am a women’s rights activist and I believe that Islam has the solutions to all 
women’s issues. If we accept Islam as a system and a package we would not 
consider one part of the package as a separate part of the whole package. For 
instance, a women’s inheritance in Sharia law is half of a man’s. This is one 
element of the system which is meaningful in the system. Out of it does not 
make sense. In this system, a woman would not lose her high position as a 
human being and would not be condemned as a woman. My criticism of 
feminism is that they perceive women are lower than men and they attempt 
to reach equality between them. This is not good enough to start with. In 
Islam, women are not in a lower or higher state than men. They are different. 
And their differences do not lead them to be unequal. Men and women 
complement each other. Such that if a woman does not play her own role 
there would not be a balance in the system. In my opinion, equality between 
men and women is not justice. Men have the responsibility to be of service to 
women in order that women may then be able to play their own roles.  
 
The above account illustrates the conservative women’s views of women’s rights built 




and obligations in the Quran through which men and women play their roles. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, in contrast to reformist participants, they do not believe the 
Quran should be re-read according to the time and place they are living in, which 
explains how their understanding of religion impacts on their views in terms of 
women’s rights, gender differences, and equality. This led them to avoid defending all 
the rights supported by secularist and religious reformist women, as discussed earlier. 
For example, in terms of the Iranian civil code that values the testimony of two 
women as being equivalent with one man, these women address the Quran and God as 
the source of this law and therefore in their view it cannot be changed.  
 
The majority of conservative women disagreed with prioritising and defending the 
equal rights between men and women in terms of testimony. Instead, they agreed with 
the existing law as it is based on the Quran. They argued that there are some 
biological justifications for this law, such as ‘women are more emotional than men’ 
and ‘women’s menstrual cycle’. These biological ‘differences’ in their view influence 
women and their testimony. For example, Anoosh, who identified herself as a 
conservative, appeared to believe that this law is rigid and this was justified because 
of ‘the emotional nature of women’: 
I agree with this law. There are some Ahkam that come from the verses in 
Quran. These are called the first Ahkam and therefore we cannot change 
them. This law comes from this type of Ahkam and this is why I do not argue 
with this law. Fuqaha believe that the reason of this law is due to the 
emotional nature of women, which prevents them from giving a rational 
testimony in court.  
 
Similarly, Azam, a self-defined conservative and a researcher on Muslim women and 
Islam, said:   
I have done some research in this matter with a team of doctors; we found 
that during a woman’s menstrual cycle, some may experience a particular 
syndrome that causes them to behave out of character. Therefore, if women 
are affected by their hormones during this period, this could affect the 





The above quotation suggests that these women insist on the particularity of religion 
in a traditional way. This approach is very different to that of the religious reformist 
women. They argued that this law arose many years ago, when women did not 
participate in the public sphere. This suggests that while both the conservative and 
religious reformist women valued religion, they had different approaches to which 
laws should be open to change. The majority of conservative women maintained that 
laws articulated by the Quran should not be changed. While upholding the Quran, 
there was some tension over what they recognised as an inequality embedded in it. 
For example, as an educated woman who was not happy with this law, Parvaneh, a 
self-identified conservative, commented: 
The issue here is not whether I agree or disagree with this law. As a woman I 
may not be happy with the current situation of testimony. However, when 
something is rooted in Fiqh, it must not be challenged. As an educated 
individual this law may offend me, but I have to accept it because it has 
come from God. We may attribute some reasoning to this law but it is 
unknown if this is the same reason that God has. We are usually not able to 
identify the real reason for Ahkam.  
 
Yasi, who viewed herself as a conservative woman, held similar views and was 
seeking an answer: 
I have a problem with this law. I have had this experience many times where, 
after a certain amount of time, I have understood the reasoning of Ahkam. 
Therefore, I have decided not to make rash decisions. At present I am 
unhappy with this law, but I do not have any solution. Why are women 
overlooked? There must be an answer.  
 
This illustrates how some conservatives did feel uncomfortable with the law on 
testimony, but believed that it cannot be changed. These feelings suggest that these 
participants are in a complex situation. While they are reluctant to accept some laws, 
their understanding of religion discourages them from challenging Islam’s 
commandments and affects their priorities, despite their feelings.  
The uncomfortable feeling of conservative women is also seen around the right of 
divorce being only for men; however, they call for some changes. While all of the 
religious conservative women did not advocate that women should have the same 




for women should be more feasible. As mentioned already, according to Shariah law, 
if a woman can prove to the court that she is in critical circumstances, she can be 
granted the divorce. Therefore, all of the conservative women believed that divorce 
should be limited to circumstances in which women ‘have great difficulty’. However, 
these participants disagreed with the broader rights of divorce for women as they 
believed that increasing the divorce rate may cause some problems for society and 
families: 
Divorce is increasing in our society. This is damaging as there are now two 
extremes in situations of divorce; in one situation, a woman will have great 
difficulty in justifying why she deserves to get divorced. I am advocating 
women in these situations. In another circumstance, a husband and wife are 
able to come to an agreement without any issues arising. Therefore, we 
cannot say that divorce is difficult; rather, it has become much easier for 
some individuals, and thus it is damaging the solidarity of their family and 
society. I think it would be bad if divorce became the norm in society. 
(Zahra, a self-defined conservative woman) 
 
According to the conservative women, particular readings of the Quran on concepts 
such as family, the responsibilities of women in home, and the role of men as 
protectors, are highly valued. The values they associated with these concepts led them 
to avoid advocating certain rights, such as employment for women. Instead, they 
argued that women should execute traditional female roles rather than working 
outside the home.  
 
Amongst the conservative participants, the family, a woman’s heterosexual partner, 
and her children, were highly valued in shaping women’s identities. Many of the 
religious conservative women spoke about the importance of the family to the extent 
that they expected women to stay at home and prioritise looking after the family over 
paid work. For example, Parvaneh, who viewed herself as a conservative woman, 
prioritised the responsibilities of women in the private rather than public sphere. She 
valued marriage more than employment:  
My priority is the importance of a female’s roles in the home rather than 
roles outside the home. Experience shows that previously, our policies 
encouraged the employment and education of women. Women who attended 





Analysis of the respondents’ views about motherhood shows that a number of 
religious women highlight the importance of the roles of a mother in the family, to the 
extent that women need to stay at home because of their responsibilities as a mother. 
They argued that during the first three to four years it is crucial for children to spend 
time with their mother. For example, Saba, a self-defined conservative woman 
argued:  
The role of men and women are very different in socio-economic and family 
situations. A mother who has given birth to the child has different duties 
compared to the father, at least for the first three years. If these different 
responsibilities did not exist, it would harm both the mother and the child. It 
should not be my responsibility to go out and work to provide for the family.  
 
The majority of conservative women constructed women as having a particular 
responsibilities based on their essential characteristics, as defined within the Quran, in 
the private sphere. Because of this, some sought support from the state in order to 
enable women to stay at home and nurture their children. For example, Saba argued 
that women should be supported financially by the government according to their 
roles such as housekeeping and babysitting:  
A woman marries and does the housework for forty years without an income. 
The law should be modified. As the woman of the house raises the children, 
does housework, makes handicrafts42 and provides a dowry,43 the 
government should provide the woman with some money.44 
   
These views show how, for most conservative women, more emphasis was placed on 
women’s responsibilities within the family and as a mother. This led them to seek a 
particular solution, welfare provision, to Iranian women who only worked in their 
own household. This means that the conception of citizenship for these conservative 
women is more likely grounded in valuing women’s activities in the private sphere 
rather than in paid employment, primarily in the mothering role. Also, calling for the 
support of the government demands that the state recognise that women’s activities in 
                                                 
42 In some rural areas, women make handicrafts such as rugs to sell or keep at home.  
43 In the Iranian culture, women are responsible for bringing a dowry after marriage.  




the private sphere are a part of civil society that the government should be responsible 
for supporting financially.  
 
As the concept of family is highly valued by conservative women, they support the 
view that women belong in the private sphere. They argued that, in this way, the 
family is more likely to be protected as women will have limited interaction with 
other men. For example, Yasi, who defined herself as a conservative, argued that 
women who work outside the home become familiar with different men. In her view, 
these situations are more likely to lead to divorce:  
Do the reformist women predict the impact on society after women become 
employed? In reality, the man will no longer support his wife and also 
women will be exposed to other men, so the rate of divorce will increase. 
  
This suggests upholding particular values of conservative influence on some women’s 
rights, such as employment. In addition, Yasi believed that employed women 
challenge the role of men as a protector at home. This was mentioned by the majority 
of conservative women who raised two main reasons that men are viewed as the 
protector of the family. Firstly, conservative women believed that men are decision 
makers at home and all had a special attachment to their status as a wife, who is 
‘passive’ in decision making. In terms of the importance of considering men as a 
decision maker, Parvaneh, a self-identified conservative, argued that it is a 
characteristic of a well-arranged family: 
I wish to follow my mother’s lead in making my father the decision maker, 
as I liked this structure and felt that we had a well arranged family. 
 
Similarly, Zahra, who identified herself as a conservative, said: 
I have done research about decision making among couples and the points in 
which women have their say. For example, women mainly interfere when 
choosing family friends. However, in terms of selling their house, despite 
men consulting with their wives, they have the final say. Most women are 
content with this arrangement, as they believe that the man is the source of 
income and therefore is more aware of what the family can afford. Therefore, 
within the family, women have the right of consultation but the final decision 





This assumption, which considers men as a key decision maker and protector, 
supports the law that limits married women to be employed only with the permission 
of their husband.45 While this law is challenged by secular and reformist women, 
conservative participants support it.  
 
The second reason for men being perceived as the protector is the idea of considering 
men as the breadwinner, which is held by the majority of conservative female 
participants. The following quote from Anoosh, a self-defined conservative, illustrates 
this dominant point:  
From a religious perspective, employment issues for women are not 
important. The religious government should manage women activists’ 
demands.  In this [Islamic] framework, women working is not seen as a main 
issue… In an Islamic country, the work force should mainly consist of men.  
 
For conservative women, staying home was seen as the best option, but for women 
who choose to work, finding a job in line with conservative women’s views of 
morality and which contributes to gender differences is prioritised. Despite male 
conservative politicians not advocating the participation of women in the public 
sphere (Chapter two), some conservative women supported particular jobs for women, 
who preferred to work outside the home, such as nurses, primary school teachers, and 
gynaecologists. Their preferences came from the gender differences they perceived 
between men and women and also the issue of morality. Women’s modesty and the 
social mixing of men and women are considered key issues within the public sphere 
that Islamic politics seeks to control. Some conservative women associated moral 
issues as well as gender differences in the choice of professions with choosing 
professions for women. For example, Azam, a self-defined conservative woman, 
prioritised some jobs for women which, in her view, benefit women in the Islamic 
context and are related to morality. For her, social mixing between men and women 
and ‘morality’ are considered essential issues, e.g. having female doctors or 
gynaecologists is important for pregnant women. Also, she values being a teacher for 
                                                 
45 According to Article 1117 of the Iranian Civil Code, a man can ban his wife from working if he 




a woman as it is linked to employing mothering skills. This valuation results from 
considering women as child bearers: 
If we did not have female teachers, then who would nurture our school 
children? Morality is important in Islam. With female doctors, a pregnant 
woman will feel more at peace. Women should have a role in specific jobs 
such as gynaecologists, to benefit Iranian women. However, some jobs, such 
as clearing rubbish, it is the duty of a man and not a woman. This is due both 
to a female’s physical structure and her responsibilities such as bearing a 
child, cooking, and nurturing her child. It is therefore more ideal for a 
woman to stay at home and do the housework rather than to go out and clear 
rubbish. The Islamic religion does not accept a man staying at home while 
the female goes to work to earn money.  
 
In Azam’s view, living in a religious context means women need to choose jobs that 
have functions for other Muslim women. Her idea that ‘With female doctors, a 
pregnant woman will feel more at peace’ and having women gynaecologists suggests 
that some religious women prefer to go to female doctors, and thus these gaps should 
be filled efficiently for the needs of women. In addition, she believed that women 
should choose particular jobs because of essential differences between men and 
women. For example, she assumed that particular jobs such as teaching are more 
appropriate for women due to their nature. Importantly, analysis of the data illustrates 
that the idea that women should choose particular jobs was supported only by 
religious conservative women activists. Göle (1997) had a similar discussion; 
although, her research on Muslim people generally was in the context of Turkey. She 
suggested that in the Islamic context in Turkey women are presented differently, as 
they are in the complex situations of both a patriarchal structure and morality, which 
is considered an essential issue in the Islamic public sphere, and constrains women to 
be employed equally. In the western context, however, studies (e.g. Fraser, 1995) 
suggest that only the patriarchal structure plays a significant role in limiting women’s 
labour activities. For example, in Fraser’s argument (1995), considering men as 
breadwinners impacts on the way in which women appear in Western society. She 
argues that women are presented differently, for instance, primarily as working 
mothers and working wives. They are only secondarily seen as workers, part time 
workers, and members of the helping professions employing mothering skills, such as 
nurses, primary school teachers, childcare workers, and social workers. While this 




problematic influence on the segregation of the labour force, this study suggests that 
in the Iranian context moral issues are valued by the majority of conservative women, 
and also play an important role. 
 
While most of the conservative women disagreed with the ways that secular and 
religious reformist women prioritise women’s rights, their disagreements are not 
always complete and tensions remained around certain issues. For example, analysis 
of their accounts on legal testimony and the right of divorce being only for men 
illustrates some were uncomfortable with these laws. In addition, despite male 
conservatives, these women are more flexible about the inclusion of women in public 
arenas. In addition, they would attempt to give women more room in the private 




Secular feminists and some religious reformist participants who labelled themselves 
feminists, including Islamic feminists, held similar views on gender equality. While 
some religious reformist women called for gender justice to express themselves 
differently from feminists, they shared the same priorities for women’s rights; 
however, in some cases, this was in a more limited way. Applying the term gender 
justice instead of gender equality is more likely to be due to the emphasis the women 
placed on their religious identity, alongside a strategy for these women to advocate 
women’s rights in the difficult gender politics of Iran. Some studies such as for 
example, Kadivar (2013), Mir-Hosseini et al. (2013), Mir-Hosseini et al. (2015) and 
Duderija (2017) suggest gender justice in Islamic debate has its particular meaning, 
which relates to the essential places of men and women in society. As this term is 
accepted in Islamic debate, some religious reformist women used this term to 
legitimize their activists. However, as discussed, they act in a way to improve gender 
equality. Despite the focus of studies on the limitations of women activists in Iran 
(Ahmadi, 2006; Afshar, 2016; Tohidi, 2016), most have not considered how feminists 
and women activists tackle the existing constraints and priorities of women rights in 




advocate gender equality by different strategies, they avoid giving priority to a few 
controversial rights, such as choosing to wear the Hijab and gay rights. Additionally, 
as shown in Chapter Two, while most scholars focus on the importance of legal 
inequality, very few have been concerned with cultural inequality. Mojab (2001) is 
one example of such a study, who claims that Iranian feminists and women activists 
struggle for formal equality and do not focus on the informal inequalities existing in 
culture. In contrast, the women’s accounts in this study illustrates that both legal and 
cultural inequality are the focus of both secular and religious reformist participants. 
Moreover, calls by secular and reformist religious women for cultural and legal 
equality at the same time suggest the complex context in which these women work. 
Secular and reformist religious women take their complex context into consideration 
when assigning priorities. This suggests that, in spite of the assertion of conservative 
participants that these women are linked to western feminists and echoed their goals, 
secular and religious reformist women take their context and contemporary gender 
politics into account for their activities. This illustrates how their characteristics are 
home-grown and are distinct from other feminists around the world (Tohidi, 2016). 
While conservative women disagreed with the ways that secular and religious 
reformists advocated women’s rights, they shared some disagreements with male 
conservatives’ views. Based on the ways that participants advocate women’s rights, 






CHAPTER SIX: Concepts of Democracy and its Possibilities 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the women’s views of models of democracy and their 
possibilities in the context of Iran. Although Iran is now an electoral democracy in 
terms of political process, it may not be considered a fully democratic country. The 
views of women activists about democracy are crucial because, as Sen (2009: xiii, 
cited in Richardson and Monro, 2012) states, ‘democracy has to be judged not just by 
the institutions that formally exist but by the extent to which different voices from 
diverse sections of the population can actually be heard’. This illustrates the 
importance of the ways in which the participants define democracy and their views on 
which kinds of factors act as barriers or enablers to move toward democratisation. 
While research has been carried out on democracy in Iran (e.g. Jahanshahrad, 2012; 
Moghadam and Haghighatjoo, 2016; Moghissi, 2016), no single study exists which 
explores concepts of democracy for Iranian feminists and women activists, and the 
possibilities they advocate for democratisation.  
 
This chapter examines the extent to which there are differences regarding models of 
democracy, and the centrality of Islam and gender for interviewees. It explores 
whether democracy in the participants’ view is Islamic or secular. In addition, it 
examines the women’s views about the factors which may prevent or aid democracy 
in the context of Iran. The first section examines how Iranian feminists and women 
activists understand democracy and what this means to them. The second section 
explores the factors that feminists and women activists believe act as barriers to 
democracy. The final section describes the perspectives of the participants on what 





The centrality of Islam and models of democracy 
Analysis of the interviews suggests that the participants viewed two models of 
democracy: a model of democracy which is defined within the framework of Islam, 
and another based on secularism. Most participants talked about a secular model of 
democracy, and these women disagreed with limiting democracy by using the word 
‘Islamic’. However, all the conservative women advocated a particular type of 
democracy based on religion, and they accept these concepts only to the extent that 
they do not undermine Islamic principles such as wearing the Hijab.  
 
Religious conservative women, Islam and democracy 
As discussed in Chapter Four, all of the conservative women argued that Western 
feminist issues are different from Iranian women’s issues, and that the term feminism 
cannot be applied in an Iranian context. Democracy for these women, in the same 
vein, is associated with Western liberal values that are inapplicable in Iran. These 
participants talked about the incompatibility of Western democracy and the specific 
religion of Islam which needs to be practised in Iranian society. For these women, 
religion influences the model of democracy they were proposing. The data analysis 
illustrates that the key binary for these women was ‘West’ and ‘Islam’, and that they 
were not in full agreement with ‘Western democracy’ in the context of Iran. Instead, 
they advocate particular types of democracy in which religious values are protected. 
This group of participants argued that democracy should be Islamic in three different 
ways of describing the same model of democracy: Islamic democracy, Mardom-
salari-ye dini, and the model of democracy that currently exists within Islam. All 
conservative women believed that, in a democratic system, firstly, a Supreme Leader 
plays an important role and, secondly, laws and Islamic orders should not exclude or 
contradict each other. 
 
The majority of conservative participants believed in Islamic democracy. This form of 
democracy for these women is seen as different from Western democracy, within 




decisions are considered only if they are within the Islamic framework. The following 
quotation illustrates this position/approach to democracy:  
I do not agree with the democracy applied in the West […] Islamic 
democracy has been defined in the Iranian constitution whereby we have a 
Supreme Leader, with the highest position, then the president, the members 
of parliament and the Khobregan Majlis and …. All of these members are 
voted for by the public, this is Islamic democracy. If the people are against 
the Shariah, the Iranian constitution does not allow this. Anything that goes 
against the Shariah cannot be made legal. The role of The Guardian Council 
is to make sure that all of the laws are in accordance with the Shariah. 
(Zahra, a self-identified conservative woman) 
 
While the term Islamic democracy was used by most conservative women, a few of 
these women talked about Mardom-salari-ye dini. Mardom-salari-ye dini is a literal 
translation of Islamic democracy in Iran. It is worth mentioning here that when 
speaking Persian the English term ‘democracy’ (دموکراسی) is normally used. However, 
a few conservative participants used the word Mardom-salari-ye dini instead of 
Islamic democracy.46 For example, Anoosh, who defined herself as conservative, 
stated: 
I’m thinking about how much democracy and Islam are compatible. We have 
a debate called Mardom-salari-ye dini; however, this must be in accordance 
with Islam. This means that in some areas which involve governing, certain 
policies and activities may not be in accordance with democracy. 
 
The use of the word Mardom-salari-ye dini by these conservative women suggests 
that they even avoided applying the English term democracy, and this illustrates their 
desire to distance themselves from the West. In espousing an Islamic model of 
democracy, the language they used illustrates how they take a position in terms of the 
‘West’. In addition, a few conservative participants who talked about a model of 
democracy within the framework of Islam discussed how using the word ‘Islamic’ 
with ‘democracy’ means that Western democracy is practised alongside religion, 
which is problematic in their view. These women believed that there is a model of 
democracy in the Quran which is the ‘advanced’ and perfect type that in their view is 
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the best existing model of democracy. Therefore, they believe that the Iranian state 
should maintain the type of democracy in Islam. For example, for Pari, who viewed 
herself as a conservative, ‘Islam is a type of advanced democracy in itself’ and she 
questioned those who support ‘Western democracy alongside religion’ or Islamic 
democracy. She disagreed with a society within which ‘management and thinking 
styles are based on Western democracy’ but ‘wearing the Hijab, behaviour and diet’ 
are Islamic: 
You can imply that Islamic democracy is the same as Western democracy 
with the notion of religious tone. It means using the word ‘Islamic’ before 
Western democracy is not correct… Democracy exists in Iran because Islam 
exists and Islam is a type of advanced democracy in itself. The fact that some 
presidents in the past did not commit to Islam does not reflect on Islam, but 
on the people who were in power. Otherwise, the democracy that exists in 
Islam is better than that of Western societies. I do not agree with having a 
Western democracy alongside religion. In such a system, it is possible that 
wearing the Hijab, behaviour and diet could be Islamic, but management and 
thinking styles are based on Western democracy, which is wrong from my 
point of view. 
 
Azam, who also saw herself as a conservative, went on to detail Islamic thinking style 
and argued that Islam teaches Muslims better behaviour compared with democracy:  
Islamic ideology teaches better social values compared to Western 
democracy. For example, telling a lie, talking or thinking badly about others, 
are perceived as bad behaviour, as it does create behavioural biases when 
interacting with others. Also, in the Quran, other people’s rights are 
prioritised compared to your individual rights. This is a far better idea than 
the democratic idea of freedom in Western countries. 
 
While most (if not all) of the conservative women advocated a particular model of 
democracy in which the binary of Islam and the ‘West’ is significant, this notion was 
critiqued by the majority of the participants, including reformist religious women and 
secular feminists, who believed that democracy cannot be translated into an Islamic 
version. These women proposed a model of democracy without any qualification. 
This is illustrated by the following quotation from Donya, a self-defined religious 
women’s rights activist, who argued that democracy means democracy and it cannot 




Democracy has its own definition, and we cannot label it as ‘Islamic’ or 
‘Western’. I do not agree with these labels as a democracy is a democracy; if 
people are given the right to speak for themselves there is no Western or 
Eastern way of this.  
 
Similarly, Sima, a self-identified secular feminist, argued that the concept of 
democracy cannot be limited by combining it with religion. She believed that during 
Khatami’s time the term Islamic democracy was a strategy created to move society 
towards democratisation: 
There is no such thing as an Islamic democracy, this term is a paradox [...] 
Democracy cannot be given a prefix just as human rights cannot. If it is a 
human right, it should apply to all whether they are Muslims or not. We 
cannot restrict democracy by adding a prefix to it. 
 
The raising of the notion of a binary type of democracy, as suggested by the 
participants and their views over whether democracy should be secular or Islamic, in 
which the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ play important roles, needs to be understood in the 
context of the issues these women raised about democracy. All of the participants 
talked about certain issues that in their views are fundamental for a democratic 
society. All of the women, based on their beliefs, commented on key issues such as 
having the right of people to be political decision makers in the country, freedom of 
speech and behaviour, and gender issues. However, the women viewed the relevance 
of these issues differently. 
 
Secular feminists, religious reformist and conservative women: democracy and 
related issues 
The majority of secular feminists and religious reformist participants argued that for 
democracy to exist in practice people should have the right to choose the best option 
for a type of government, such as a secular or religious state. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the Iranian state has both a president who is elected by votes and unelected 
institutions and bodies, such as a Supreme Leader, and The Guardian Council,47 
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which holds the most power and impacts the process of both the election of the 
parliament and voting in parliament. Later, it will be discussed how, in the view of 
secular feminists and religious reformist women, this political structure might have a 
negative impact on democratisation. Interestingly, for some of the religious reformist 
women who had political experience, this idea is rooted in the way that they 
understand Islam. These women reflected on how in Islam it is recommended that 
people should be the decision makers, and even those citizens who call for a secular 
state should have their demands accepted. For example, Akram, who viewed herself 
as a religious women’s rights activist, viewed the aspects of democratic practice from 
her Islamic faith. As a religious reformist woman who had political experience, she 
understood the concept of democracy through the behaviour of Imam Ali:48  
Democracy is when people govern themselves; people decide their own fate 
and build their own future. This is what Islam is about. Islam says that people 
must decide for themselves. Imam Ali did not come to power till people 
asked him to rule the society. Within a democratic system people’s will is 
significant. If people now do not wish to have The Supreme Leader in the 
state, he should not stay in power.  
 
In the same way, Simin, who identified herself as a religious women’s rights activist, 
and was an ex-MP reformist, argued:  
Shariah is the basis of an Islamic Republic. The right interpretation of 
Shariah is not against people’s will. Therefore, people’s decision to have a 
non-Muslim representative in parliament is their right. It is their right not to 
have Islamic governance. We can see in Islam that when people decided not 
to have Imam Ali as their leader, he accepted it and it means that he himself 
honours people’s rights.  
 
The above quotations appear to suggest that different readings of Islam may have an 
impact on a person’s understanding of democracy. This understanding of democracy 
is similar to other secular feminists and religious reformists, which means that for 
these women the people’s will is significant in ruling the state to the extent that in 
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dedicated to Islamic values) for the presidential election of the parliament.  




their view it is acceptable even for people to wish not to have an Islamic state or 
Supreme Leader. However, this idea is problematic for the conservative participants. 
 
When we look at what the conservative women argued, their approach to democracy 
was more cautious or limited based on their way of thinking about Islam and its 
relationship to the operation of government. Contrary to the religious reformist 
participants, conservative women believed that the Quran cannot be reinterpreted and 
that a fair society is one in which a society has a religious Supreme Leader in power. 
In their view, this type of society is governed by God’s will. This notion influenced 
the conservative women’s view for not considering the people as the only decision 
makers. While most of the women associated different aspects of democratic practice 
with the right to make political decisions, most of the conservative women argued that 
democracy can be problematic due to this feature. They argued that the people’s will 
cannot be fully trusted. For example, Zahra, Parvaneh and Yasi, who all identified 
themselves as conservative women, talked about different aspects that explain why 
the issue of the people’s will is controversial. Zahra discussed how governors who 
have money and power influence and manipulate people’s ideas through advertising 
and adopt the process of democracy to pretend that they support individual benefits in 
society. She constructed Western democracy as a type of state that only supports 
particular individuals who have more financial and political power, in the name of the 
people’s will. This suggests that in their view democracy, particularly in a capitalist 
society, can be used in favour of capitalists:     
Democracy in today’s form is a mechanism for the benefit and rights of 
people in power with money. This means they decide who comes to power in 
the name of democracy. If democracy is about people’s benefit, this is good. 
According to the constitution in an Islamic Republic, people should choose 
the president and parliament representatives. All the people should be 
involved in the decision making process; however, not in the form of 
Western propaganda which influences people’s opinions. It is important that 
people’s opinion in a democracy should not be deceived in order for one 
specific group to benefit.  
 
Parvaneh raised another aspect of people’s will that she saw as problematic, and this 




My view is that the Quran has Mardom-salari-ye dini’ in it. People can 
choose but their choice is not sufficient to us. Actually their choice should 
not be against Shariah. For example, homosexuality is not in accordance 
with Islam, and therefore we cannot accept this.  
 
Yasi disagreed with both Islamic democracy and Mardom-salari-ye dini and claimed 
that Islam has its own advanced democracy. She talked about the issue of the people’s 
will and its limitations because of the capabilities of humans. She argued that 
currently in Iran representatives who are chosen by people are not experts or qualified 
and, therefore, she found it difficult to rely on their abilities to make decisions for her. 
In her view, God’s authority has no restriction in the same way as humans, and is 
therefore more reliable: 
Democracy exists when the law is not determined by religion. When you put 
your trust in a representative, at the end of the day he could say that this is all 
that he is capable of. However, when God’s authority governs, this will not 
be an issue. We have a full package called Islam, where our obligations are 
clear. Concerning matters such as work, family and inheritance, you know 
what you need to do. Even if there is an issue that we do not have an answer 
to, we can refer to Valie Faghih. 
 
The above accounts appear to suggest that conservative women are supportive of the 
limitations of people’s will, and in this their view is very similar to their male 
counterparts in the conservative groups (see Chapter Two). In the current Iranian 
political structure, the question of whether God or the people should be considered as 
decision maker has resulted in conflicts between two main groups, namely reformists 
and conservatives (Mir‐Hosseini, 2006). In the society desired by the conservatives, 
the people are ruled by ‘true Islam’ and led by The Supreme Leader and God’s will. 
As this view is threatened and questioned by reformists and secularists, conservative 
leaders (mainly male politicians) have established some barriers to defend their ‘ideal 
state’. These limitations aim to curb the scope of reformists and secular activities by 
suppressing them, in order to hold on to the theocratic side of the state. Therefore, 
from a male conservative politician’s perspective and conservative women’s views, 
constraining some democratic practices and limiting an individual’s freedom and 





Contrary to the conservative participants, most of the women raised the issue of 
freedom of speech and behaviour and democracy. The reason that these women raised 
this issue is more likely rooted in their experiences as women’s rights activists in a 
society influenced by restricted gendered politics. In Chapter Five, I explained how 
the enforced wearing of the Hijab is an important issue for Iranian women activists; 
however, they avoided prioritising this right as the women argued that this issue is a 
red line for the state and the conservative groups. In addition, I discussed in Chapter 
Four that the term feminism is controversial within Iranian society and women need 
to be cautious about which women’s rights they demand and what language they use. 
Based on this context, the majority of participants talked about the issue of having 
freedom through which individuals can freely talk or behave. For example, for Gita, 
who identified herself as a secular feminist, a democratic system plays a central role 
in allowing individuals to have freedom of speech and behaviour. In her view, in Iran 
individuals need to pretend that they are religious to carry out their activities. 
Importantly, while she mentioned that in Iran democracy is partial and citizens do not 
have the freedom of speech, she also critiqued other parts of the world, including 
Western countries where individuals have similar issues:  
I feel some feminists in Iran are even irreligious, but they express themselves 
under cover of religion, considering interpretation, and their interpretation 
may be based on human rights but attach to it an Islamic label to proceed to 
their goal…There is a partial democracy here, but the presence of this 
democracy is better than its lack. There is also democracy in other countries, 
but we can see that it is sometimes violated. For example, in the US police 
may kill someone and they treat people severely. In Europe, there are no 
political prisoners in reality but I have seen and I know the place of political 
prisoners is in asylum. It means you cannot oppose a system, you can express 
yourself but your idea should not threaten conservatives and capitalists of 
different lobbies. Therefore, democracy is relative. 
 
Laleh, who viewed herself as a Muslim feminist, used to organise meetings with other 
women activists in her house in order to talk about women’s issues. She preferred to 
be active and contribute to women’s movements in her private space rather than in the 
public because of the Iranian political situation that discourages such activities: 
Democracy is freedom of speech so I can easily speak with you to give you 
my opinion without having any problems with the system. I could wear what 
I like. There are no limits in my doing such as why I danced, or made a film, 




interesting for all Iranians, as some freedom has been taken off us such as 
wearing clothes. We have to wear what we have been told.  
 
The above quotation illustrates how freedom of speech and behaviour is important for 
Laleh. Her statement illustrates her resistance to the enforced wearing of the Hijab, 
suggesting the extent to which she closely associated women’s status and democracy. 
In the following sub-section, the participants’ views about the Hijab issue will be 
elaborated and the link between the ways that gender and sexuality are constructed 
within a democratic system will be discussed.  
 
Democracy and issues of gender and sexuality 
The ways in which issues of gender and sexuality are understood within the 
democratic system was a subject raised by the majority of participants. The women 
discussed different issues related to women and democracy such as democracy and 
the right to wear the Hijab, equal rights between men and women, welfare, sexuality 
and violence against women. 
 
As discussed in Chapters Two and Five, wearing a Hijab in public spaces is 
compulsory for women and has become, perhaps, one of the most controversial issues 
in Iran. Wearing the Hijab in public became obligatory following the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979, but many Iranian women have been attempting to challenge these 
boundaries. Recently, they have questioned the wearing of the Hijab in cars, arguing 
that this space is a private space.49 In other words, while wearing the Hijab is 
compulsory for Iranian women in public, including while driving, many women drive 
with their headscarves resting on their shoulders. Another example is that of White 
Wednesdays,50 considered to be a movement to protest the compulsory Hijab. The 
leader of this movement is a feminist activist located outside Iran. As discussed in 
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Chapter Five, most of the participants in this study avoided giving priority to the right 
to choose to wear the Hijab due to the perceived level of risk for them. However, 
every Wednesday many Iranian women walk individually down different streets 
without wearing the Hijab for a few minutes, sometimes while holding a white scarf 
on a stick. Also, they share photos and videos through the leader of this movement on 
social networks such as Facebook, to show their opposition to the mandatory dress 
code. Despite different forms of resistance by women to this law, the state is firmly 
standing against changing the requirement. For example, some women face having 
their cars confiscated, court fines or even being detained. 
While most participants associated democratic practice with the freedom to choose to 
wear the Hijab, for a few women, primarily the conservatives, women not wearing the 
Hijab was considered as an issue in a democratic system. For these women, there is 
recognition of the need to limit freedoms, even though they spoke about democracy. 
In these women’s views, the association between democracy and being free is 
considered a problematic issue because of their faith. As discussed in Chapters Four 
and Five, there are some obligations that religious participants, particularly 
conservatives, advocate for women, such as wearing a Hijab. These responsibilities 
and obligations are drawn from their understanding of religion and priorities. The 
majority of conservative participants believed that if women do not wear a Hijab, this 
could bring about immorality in society. These understandings and beliefs might 
partly explain why wearing a Hijab is a significant issue for them. For example, 
Anoosh, who self-identified as a conservative women’s rights activist, talked about 
the potential tensions that exist between the responsibilities advocated by 
conservatives and Western democracy:  
For example, it is possible that women will be obliged to wear a Hijab. This 
is not compatible with the Western democracy. Wearing the Hijab is 
important for us as it contributes to the chastity and modesty to society. From 
a religious point of view, Western democracy cannot be practised in our 
country. If we have Western democracy, people might not want to wear the 
Hijab, in contrast with the religious values and morality. 
 
This quotation suggests that the religious foundation of conservative women plays an 




their faith. It seems that Western democracy, in their view, is more likely to be a 
liberal democracy which focuses on individual rights and choices, and is unable to 
support their beliefs, such as the importance of wearing the Hijab.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the majority of women called for equal rights between 
men and women. Those who believed in the equality of men and women defined 
democracy as a system that defends equal rights between individuals. These women 
critiqued the current state for not providing them with equal rights: 
Democracy is when no one has priority over another. Everyone is the same 
according to the government. This means The Supreme Leader has the same 
position as a woman in a remote area. This is an important basis of 
democracy. Women’s movements attempt, at least, towards equality between 
men and women. However, these movements are linked with other 
democratic needs in the country. (Haleh, a self-defined secular feminist) 
 
Similarly, Bita argued that democracy is about equality between men and women and 
freedom from discrimination. As a Kurdish Sunni who saw herself as a Muslim 
feminist, and who had suffered from discrimination due to being a female and because 
of her ethnicity, she stated:  
Until now democracy has been the best option for governing people as it 
gives people of different genders and ethnicities equal rights and freedom. 
Perhaps in the near future we could find a more suitable alternative that 
could meet the needs of people from different backgrounds more 
appropriately… the truth is that the current state does not view people as 
equals. I am a Sunni Muslim and I have experienced discrimination. Not just 
me but other professionals, some of whom are men, struggle to work in 
politics due to their faith. Therefore, my situation is much harder because I 
am also a woman. 
 
Contrary to these women, who talked about the association between democracy and 
equality between men and women, a few women, mostly secular feminists, critiqued 
particular types of democracy, namely Western liberal democracy, for creating 
economic inequality between men and women. These women believed that capitalism 
resulted in class differences between men and women: 
Because liberalism in capitalism, I mean neoliberalism, has worsened 




women, and this is its achievement. It has destroyed the world from 
economic and health aspects and from every aspect which is related to 
money, facilities and wealth (Parastoo, a self-identified secular feminist). 
 
Some women, including secular, religious reformists and conservatives, raised the 
issue of democracy and violence against women. These women shared their views 
about the different ways that violence against women is practised in Western 
democracy. For example, Alice, as a self-identified secular feminist, mentioned that 
women’s bodies are exploited in Western countries that are supposed to be democratic 
societies:  
In Europe, although democracy exists, there is homelessness, racism and 
prostitution. I do accept that that there are lot of issues or rights that are 
valued and protected in Western countries; however, half naked woman 
standing next to a petrol station to get the attention of the drivers so they will 
fill their vehicles in that station. This is violence and abuse against women. 
When pornography, sex trafficking, is one of the major trades after arms 
sales and drug smuggling, is this a real democracy?  
 
Azam, who identified herself as a conservative woman, made the same point: 
I do not criticise the true meaning of democracy, I even accept it. In my 
opinion true democracy is not practised anywhere in the world. Why is 
pornography so prevalent and no one opposes it? Pornography is not 
beneficial to women. When in supermarkets dog food is advertised with a 
woman, what does it mean? I do not dispute that women are smart and 
beautiful. They have their own potential. I think that God has created them 
for nurturing human beings. However, women in Western countries they are 
seen as economic tools. Wherever you go you see women used for economic 
benefit. Is this really women’s intellectual potential or do they only view and 




The above accounts appear to suggest that some women believe that in Western 
capitalist countries women are violated. This illustrates that for some women from all 
backgrounds capitalist society can be seen as controversial as it influences the ways 
that democracy is practised in society. The issue of improving women’s right to be 
protected from violence united all the women, regardless of whether they were 
conservative, reformist or secularist; however, they disagreed on the issue of gay 




which affects women from minority groups, such as lesbians, for a few of the women, 
mostly the secularists, minority rights was one essential factor in a democratic system. 
Anahita, who identified herself as a secular feminist, was concerned about minority 
and gay rights; she commented: 
I believe in personal freedoms and also I accept socialism which focuses on 
personal freedoms as well…To the extent that it does not limit another 
individual’s freedoms. I am a person who also cares about minority rights 
within a democratic community. I think minority rights must not be ignored 
within a democratic system. They ought to have the possibility to turn into a 
majority. 
 
While for some secular feminists a democratic system should advocate gay rights, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, they did not take any action to improve this right due to the 
sensitivity of this issue in Iran around the issue. However, this right was considered 
problematic for the majority of religious women, both for the conservatives and some 
of the religious reformist participants who distanced themselves from the label 
feminist. For them, this subject was where they drew limitations around democracy in 
Iranian society. Analysis of their accounts showed the extent to which the boundaries 
related to sexuality issues are highlighted within a democratic system. For example, 
Simin, a religious reformist who saw herself as a religious women’s rights activist, 
mentioned ‘the people’s will’ as a significant element of a democratic society, and 
talked about limitations of the people’s will in terms of gay rights. This contradiction 
in her ideas suggested the extent to which she regarded the centrality of hetero 
sexuality in relation to democracy: 
I do not believe in absolute freedom, perceiving a human can do whatever 
they want without any boundaries. This absolute freedom is a basis for 
human rights. I do not believe that we can change the natural human creation 
ideals and provide a platform to do whatever they want. I mean people who 
are not sexually straight. 
 
As discussed above, two models of democracy were proposed by the participants, 
namely Islamic and secular models. Moreover, the women in this study raised 
different issues about democracy. These issues are important as they related to the 
proposed models of democracy and map across the binary of Islamic and secular 




conservative women, such as whether people should be the only decision makers and 
individuals should have freedom of speech and gay rights, illustrate how for 
conservative women Western democracy is seen as a liberal system that does not fit 
their Islamic beliefs. Similarly, Collins and Owen (2012) in their empirical study, 
distinguish between secular democracy and Islamic democracy and emphasise the role 
of religiosity as an influence on the choice of Islamic democracy over secular 
democracy. Moreover, considering Western democracy as a capitalist system, in 
conservative women’s view, resulted in important issues such as violence against 
women. The concerns of the conservative women about different issues suggest how 
Western democracy and their religious values play a significant role for them in 
advocating Islamic models. These models of democracy enabled them to protect their 
particular religious values and define a model of democracy different to those in the 
West.  
  
The views of some religious reformist participants who had political experience and 
who distanced themselves from the label feminist indicate that they called for 
individuals to have the right to be the only decision makers, have freedom of speech, 
and to choose whether not to wear the Hijab. Some issues that affect women, such as 
gay rights, there were mixed views on whether they would or should advocate for 
them. Their views on issues that affect women indicate that while they refute the label 
of feminism they are involved in activity focused on the rights of women.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, religious reformist women called for the 
reinterpretation of the Quran to achieve a more egalitarian society. They supported a 
society governed by Islamic laws which have been reinterpreted based on human 
rights. Reinterpreting the Quran in accordance with human rights instead of accepting 
certain human rights on their own suggests that religious reformist women saw the 
need for Islamic values to be protected. The gendered boundaries in the majority of 
these women’s views map onto the Islamic and secular model of democracy and it 
suggests that despite their suggestions for a secular model of democracy, issues 
related to gender and sexuality discussion prevent them from being in full practical 





Analysis of data showed that secular feminists and some religious reformist women 
who called themselves Muslim feminists called for a secular model of democracy. 
Their support for the secular model does not mean that they were in favour of 
Western democracy. They raised some issues related to Western democracy, such as 
the capitalist system and its influence on creating class differences between men and 
women. Also, the Western political and economic conditions, in their view, violated 
and exploited women. This suggests that secular and Islamic feminist women 
preferred a secular model of democracy different from the Western model. In fact, 
they advocated a specific Iranian democracy that is secular and is neither Islamic nor 
Western. Having discussed the models of democracy and the issues related to 
democratic practices outlined by the women, I now turn my discussion to the factors 
that participants considered as barriers to democracy.  
 
Barriers to democracy 
The majority of participants did not believe Iran was fully democratic. In their view, 
three key aspects might prevent democratisation: political-religious leaders, freedom 
of information, and the economic situation. Most of the women argued that the roles 
of The Supreme Leader and Guardian Council act as a barrier to the democratic 
process. Moreover, a minority group across the sample talked about how the absence 
of freedom of information in Iran hindered democracy. These women were a 
significant number of those who were reformist politicians. In most of all participants’ 
views the economic system was also considered an obstacle to democracy.  
 
Political-religious leaders 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Iran has a distinctive political structure which 
maintains the role of The Supreme Leader and The Guardian Council in terms of 
ruling the society. The role of The Supreme Leader is seen as the true power in Iran 
and no individual unit of the power structure can act without co-ordinating with him 
(Parsa, 2016). The Supreme Leader is called the ‘Guide of the Revolution’ and 




allows him to dismiss the President and appoint the heads of the military, media, 
revolutionary guards and judiciary (Abootalebi, 2000). Similarly, with regards to the 
power of The Supreme Leader, Article 113 of the Iranian Constitution states that after 
The Supreme Leader, the President is the highest official in the country. The President 
is responsible for implementing the Constitution and acting as the head of the 
executive, except in matters directly concerned with The Supreme Leader. For most of 
the women, having The Supreme Leader, who has to be a cleric and is the highest 
ranking religious (which means he is more powerful than presidential figures in the 
West) and political authority in Iran, meant that Iran is not completely a democratic 
country. They talked about the role of The Supreme Leader in the Iranian political 
structure as incompatible with democracy. For example, Simin, who saw herself as a 
religious women’s rights activist, expressed this view: 
The most important thing in order to establish democracy is the structure of 
the government and the political system. Within the structure of the 
government, again the most important thing is the lack of concentration of 
power – which means that power should be divided into different 
constitutions… However, there is a Supreme Leader who has all power, and 
therefore moving toward democracy is a kind of dream as long as we have a 
Supreme Leader. That is why I think we are so far from a democracy. There 
is too much of a distance between the current structure and the democratic 
structure. 
 
Farah, a self-defined Islamic feminist, made a similar point: 
Although our country has some criteria for democracy, such as having voting 
rights to select some state positions, I can still say we do not have much of 
the criteria for democracy. Our democracy is incomplete in Iran. We have in 
place a Supreme Leader who is very involved in executive matters, but who 
is not elected by the people. It might be said that The Supreme Leader is 
chosen by the Assembly of Experts elections; however, the members of the 
Assembly of Experts are elected by The Guardian Council. The Guardian 
Council are appointed by The Supreme Leader. This is a vicious circle! 
Although it is true that we have a President and Parliament who are chosen 
by a public election, the non-democratic appointment of The Guardian 
Council and The Supreme Leader are obstacles that restrict true democracy. 
 
Accounts such as these illustrate the view of majority of the women activists who 
regarded democracy in Iran as being incomplete due to the complicated political 




which the political system limits the scope of the democratic process within political 
state structures. For example, Abootalebi (2000: 46) argued that ‘Iran has a complex, 
cleric-dominated but popularly driven political system. The institutional framework 
designed for the Shi’a Islamic Republic embraces both popular participation and a 
balance of power within the ruling elite circle’.  
 
In a similar vein, Parsa (2016) asserts that the unelected Supreme Leader has 
unlimited power and that this negates the principles of democracy. He argues that the 
structure of the Constitution cannot be reformed without The Supreme Leader being 
in agreement. Accordingly, the power of The Supreme Leader has a great impact on 
the way in which society is governed. Moreover, as Parsa (2016) points out, The 
Guardian Council, which includes conservative religious lawyers appointed by The 
Supreme Leader and also supervises the laws elected by the parliament, ensures that 
all legislation conforms to Islamic law. Analysis of the interviews showed that the 
majority of participants believed that The Guardian Council could restrict decisions 
made in the parliament. For example, in the case of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which was agreed by the parliament 
during Khatami’s time (discussed in Chapters Two and Five), the majority of 
participants believed that the Convention was rejected by The Guardian Council 
because it was incompatible with their conservative understandings of religion. This 
illustrates how sometimes political decisions by parliament can be ignored and 
undermined by the religious elite in Iran. For example, Monica, who identified herself 
as a feminist activist, stated: 
As long as The Guardian Council have this structure, stories like these will 
continue to occur. ‘The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women’ was included in other Conventions, and was already accepted by the 
government, so its rejection is nonsense. 
 
She went on to explain why The Guardian Council rejected joining the convention: 
…because it is the opposite of their interpretation of the Sharia, they rejected 
it. Our situation is very disappointing. 
 




These disagreements are rooted in the patriarchal structures of The Guardian 
Council. From their viewpoint, if women cross the red lines which they have 
defined, Islam will be in danger… There are two views about Islam that 
eventually must be involved in these decisions. 
 
As there is disagreement between reformist and conservative parties in terms of 
joining the Convention, Maria believed that this is a point on which ‘two views about 
Islam’ (reformist and conservative views) struggle. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
there are two different understandings of religion in the Iranian political system, 
reformist and conservative, and sometimes there are clashes between these two 
different viewpoints. The power of these two approaches/groups is sometimes 
unbalanced due to the support of Supreme Leader for conservatives. Therefore, even a 
parliament conducted by reformists is not considered the place where the final 
decision is made that will enable changes in Iranian law. This political system within 
which conservatives sometimes challenge the policies of the reformist groups can 
result in censorship of information. In the next section, I will discuss how the lack of 
freedom of information acts as a barrier to democracy. 
 
Freedom of information  
Some of the religious reformist women who had been involved in politics had 
experienced censorship of information during Ahmadi Nejad’s time. They called for 
the end of censorship and emphasised how suppressed freedom of information in the 
Islamic state was an obstacle to democracy. It is likely that the reason these women 
raised this issue is linked to their experiences as women politicians who identified as 
reformist MPs or ministers. Analysis of the interviews illustrated that it was not only 
the censorship of information related to women’s issues which caused suffering, such 
as violence against women, but also the fact that as reformist politicians they were 
suppressed. For example, Nahal, a reformist MP, talked about the important issue 
related to girls abused by their fathers. She describes how she was under pressure 
because she was told to be silent about this issue: 
In people’s view, the family is a safe place but there are still cases of family 
sexual abuse. In the first or second year of working in parliament I came 
across different cases of sexual abuse; however, the problem was far too 




exaggerated the problem. For example, one woman, after discovering her 
husband was abusing her daughter, was convinced that she would not be 
protected if she took action. In 2002 when I was following and addressing 
these issues in parliament I was told to keep quiet and not talk about it.  
 
This account suggests that reformist religious women who are politicians can be 
censored publicly to prevent them from questioning the political system of Iran, and it 
also shows the extent to which the prevalent male dominant view was to keep 
information about violence against women’s rights suppressed. Moreover, another 
reason that influenced religious reformist women to emphasise the lack of information 
is related to the difficult situations that they have faced in the recent years. As 
discussed throughout this thesis, there have been disagreements between reformist 
and conservative views. As the reformist view supports democracy and questions the 
role of The Supreme Leader in moving toward democratisation, the reformist groups, 
including reformist women, have been under pressure particularly from the Green 
Movement (see Chapter Two).  
 
Some of the religious reformists who were politicians talked about two main sources 
for accessing information, including activists and the media such as satellite TV and 
the internet. These women believed that people can access information through 
women activists and media that are not controlled by Iran. For example, Setareh, who 
identified herself as a religious women’s rights activist, believed in the role of civil 
activists in promoting clear information: 
In order to move toward democracy, people should receive clear information 
about what is happening in the political sphere. Civil activists should disclose 
the information which has been censored and promote the awareness of 
people. Political elites want to censor the information. 
 
Maria, a self-defined religious women’s rights activist, also talked about how 
information is censored within ‘official broadcast channels’ in Iran, but went on to 
state that people can receive information through media outside Iran. There are some 
Iranian channels and websites active outside Iran and people can access them via 
satellite or the internet. It should be mentioned that despite satellite TV being 




For example, our national media does not give out clear information, but 
some people can have open access to clear information through social 
networking, satellite and virtual spaces ... some people now receive their 
information and news in these ways, not from official broadcast channels 
regulated within the country. 
 
In today’s Iran, there is a lack of political structure that enables people to have a say 
in the operation of the state. This has resulted in the censoring of information in order 
to direct the society in the ‘desired’ way, as perceived by political leaders. For 
instance, Abbotalebi (2000) asserts that writers and editors who have spoken out and 
questioned state leadership have been punished.  
 
While the majority of participants perceived that the Iranian political structure and its 
policies, including limiting freedom of information, have a negative impact on the 
process of democracy, most women also talked about another key factor, which is the 
influence of the economic barriers on transitioning to democracy. This is a significant 
point in understanding how they realise that religion is not the only issue at play when 
considering the democratic possibilities in Iran. In particular, the women raised 
different factors such as the role of the welfare system and the influence of the West 
on the process of democracy in Iran.  
 
Economic barriers 
Some respondents believed that the shortcomings of the welfare system in Iran and its 
effect on society have an impact on democratisation. For example, Alice, a self-
defined secular feminist who worked in rural areas, believed that a strong state is 
needed for democracy in Iran and argued how the poor economic situation might 
affect women’s education and early marriage: 
I think that the democratic government must make education compulsory. In 
remote areas of Iran, due to the poverty they face, both culturally and 
economically, girls cannot be educated and are forced to marry at a young 
age. Therefore, this is the government’s responsibility to give these people 





Shabnam, who viewed herself as a Muslim feminist, echoed the importance of welfare 
and facilities in Iranian society. However, she went further and called for a strategy 
which is about the needs of NGOs that can lobby for people’s requirements in society: 
The democratic government must provide facilities to people to secure their 
welfare. It is the responsibility of the government because it has been elected 
by the people. Therefore, the government must respond to people’s demands, 
and the first demand is welfare, peace and security. Welfare is not a thing 
that should be given to people, but it must be provided. We need NGOs to 
consult with and lobby the government and discuss people’s needs and 
demands. 
 
Gita, a self-defined secular feminist, also identified the issue of welfare in a 
democratic system; however, she associated democratisation in Iran with broader 
economic issues in the world. She critiqued the current global situation and argued 
that the impact of international capitalism on the state meant it had become ‘less 
responsible toward their citizens’: 
The period of national welfare has passed. Governments are less responsible 
towards their citizens after Thatcherism. The world is mostly in the hands of 
multinational companies and international capitalism. The fact is that 
governments do not decide anymore but some multinational companies 
which have influence over different countries make decisions for you. 
However, a national welfare government was defined so that it fulfils the 
primary needs of individuals such as food, clothes, housing, employment, 
health, legal rights, and civil rights. The government must be the people’s 
representative for these things and it must not have a place beyond law.  
 
Gita questioned the capitalist system, particularly after Margaret Thatcher’s period of 
office, suggesting that in her view the West has negatively affected the process of 
democracy across the world, including in Iran. As most of Iran’s exports are oil and 
gas, it seems for her that international companies have influenced the country through 
these products.  
 
The relationship of Iran and the West through oil has led to changes to the economic 
model of the country. These changes link to the dynamic that exists in Iran between 
what is good for Iran and how it is mediated. Oil brought wealth for some, but at a 




of the external impact on the economic model of Iran was highlighted by some (19 
women) of the women activists, including secular and religious reformist and 
conservative women. These women expressed their views about how economic 
changes related to oil have influenced the process of democracy. In other words, these 
women believed that oil has had a negative impact on democratisation. For example, 
in the words of Haleh, a self-defined secular feminist:  
There is a special political and economic construction in Iran. The political 
elite has become the economic elite. This is an important barrier to 
democracy. The state depends on the oil rather than citizens’ taxes. 
Therefore, oil enables the government to move independently from the 
people. The major problem that hinders democracy in Iran is the political 
elite who took power. Otherwise, surveys show that Iran’s condition is one 
that is ready to go towards democracy. The level of educated people in Iran 
is high and this country has engaged with the concept of democracy since 
1906. Iran has a good social background to move toward democratisation but 
the political elite, which has the economic power, resists constructing 
democracy…  
 
She went on to say: 
I do not want to say that as long as we have oil we cannot reach democracy. 
Oil can help the country… I mean that instead of resisting, the political elite 
should accept that democracy can improve Iran’s future. If we do not move 
toward democracy, Iran’s position would be dangerous and it could 
degenerate.  
 
One of the women believed that the impact of oil resources, particularly in the case of 
Iran, has had a significant effect on the roles of NGOs. Saba, who identified herself as 
a conservative, argued that oil is the source of financial power of a small number of 
groups close to the operation of the state: 
Our society is different from that of the West. In the West NGOs and civil 
organisations are shaped by the citizens’ tax. However, our society is 
managed by the oil budget. It means that NGOs for people who are in the 
political structure act as instruments to reach their aims. Our NGOs are a 
power tool outside the body of the government. Our NGOs have political and 
executive arms…therefore people (political elites) who have money establish 






Haleh also discussed the problems which oil may cause, such as empowering political 
leaders and making them independent of the people. However, in her view the 
negative role of oil could become positive in the hands of democratic leaders and 
elites. In addition, Saba illustrated the way in which powerful leaders with power and 
money due to their access to oil can establish particular NGOs (funded and 
established by political leaders empowered by oil), and extend their power outside of 
the political structure into the public sphere. She argued that NGOs should be 
characterised by concentration on grassroots involvement and they need to actively 
critique the ways that the state acts. She was the only voice who believed that these 
particular funded NGOs may not be places where people can forward their interests. 
Instead, she suggested that they support the political leader’s interests. In Saba’s view, 
the role of oil could impact the economic and political structure of the state by 
emphasising particular NGOs that do not threaten state sovereignty but support it. 
This suggests how oil revenues may potentially reformulate the position of some 
NGOs and become a tool for political leaders who receive their financial power from 
oil resources. In Saba’s view, oil resources enable the political leaders to control the 
roles and performance of NGOs, thus turning them into organisations which support 
them. Therefore, she argued that these organisations that are considered a factor in the 
democratic process can in practice become barriers to a democratic system. It is worth 
noting that this is a minority opinion. The majority of participants who talked about 
NGOs saw them as independent. The concerns some women had over oil echo 
concerns amongst some scholars, who note the negative impact of oil on the 
democratic process. For example, Ross (2001) argued that any nation state’s policy 
spent considerable sums of money to dampen the pressure for democracy. Also, by 
keeping the finances hidden, autocratic states empower their governments and remain 
undemocratic (Ross, 2011). It is important to understand that in these women’s view 
the Iranian democratic process is shaped within the bigger international context. 
Having oil as a commodity in Iran is crucial but a mixed blessing. This illustrates how 
in a few women’s views, the West has an influence through oil and therefore an 
economic and democratic impact.  
 
The direct role of the West on the democratic process in some Arab countries was 




resources in Arab countries. The Arab Spring ,which began in 2010 in Arab countries 
in the Middle East, was a revolutionary wave of both violent and non-violent 
demonstrations, protests, coups and foreign interventions. A few participants, 
including secularists, religious reformists and conservative women, talked particularly 
about the interference of the West and the capitalist system on the democratic process 
in the Middle East. They argued that Western countries and the capitalist system are 
not only helpless in the process of democracy in the Middle East, but also led these 
countries to a chaotic situation. For example, Touran, who viewed herself as a 
conservative woman, talked about the Arab Spring in Arab countries and its 
consequences. In her view, the ways in which the West in the name of democracy 
interfered in diverse countries in reality resulted in making these countries more 
violent, and individual situations became even worse: 
Humanity has experienced a lot of different ways but has not reached true 
democracy. Power is evil and when it is in the hands of a group of people it 
becomes an obstacle to democracy. For example, in the Arab Spring a 
country such as the US implied that the Arab Spring could result in 
democracy. However, in the same country in which the Arab Spring took 
place, for example, Egypt, a coup d’etat could happen and the US would 
accept it. This has a negative effect on the notion of democracy in my 
opinion. You feel this has been a game all along for the benefit of a certain 
group. Other examples of interventions in Arab Spring in the name of 
democracy include Libya and Syria. 
 
The above quotations illustrate how some women, regardless of being secularist or 
religious, distrust the role of the West and capitalism in establishing democracy in 
other parts of the world, particularly in the Middle East.  
 
In this section, I discussed how in the view of most of the women who were not 
conservative the role of religion is significant in being a barrier to democracy. 
Notably, the economic situation of Iran was also seen as an obstacle, as participants 
argued that the lack of welfare system and oil income might also act as a barrier. 
Within their discussion, the role of the West was seen as a negative influence on the 
economic structure identified by some secular, reformist and conservative women. 
While some scholars such as for example Gellner (1983), Huntington (1993), Rowley 




significant negative association between Islam and democracy, others for example 
Collins and Owen (2012), Tessler (2002) and Karatnycky (2002) fail to accept this 
correlation and argue that the link is more complicated in an Islamic country. For 
example, Karatnycky (2002) questioned the notion that Islam is inherently 
incompatible with democracy, and instead points out that there is a negative 
relationship between natural resource wealth, such as oil and gas, and democracy in 
the Islamic world. Analysis of the data illustrates that in the women’s views there are 
different factors, such as the particular political structure of Iran, the role of resources 
and the West, which have an influence on the democratic process in Iran. Moreover, it 
is significant that women from different groups shared similar ideas in terms of the 
role of the West as an obstacle to democracy. In the next section, I will discuss which 
aspects the women considered might be influential on the process of democracy in a 
positive way. 
 
Potential enabling factors for democracy 
Most women, except those who were conservative, suggested various factors related 
to cultural change that could enable the Iranian system to move toward democracy. 
The majority of women talked about cultural transformation in Iranian society and a 
few emphasised the role of cultural change amongst political leaders. These factors 
overlapped.  
 
As the history of Iran shows, civil society has not yet fully developed. The state has 
often considered the expansion of political and civil rights as ‘un-Islamic’ and, as 
such, threatening to the foundation of the state’s ideological and political bases 
(Abootalebi, 2000). However, it is notable that the pressure of the state on the public 
sphere has been fluctuating since the Islamic revolution. As Abootalebi (2000) argues, 
a fairly large middle class has been created by socio-economic modernisation after the 
Islamic Revolution and the professional and intellectual community has taken 
advantage of any opportunity to press for civil rights. Especially during Khatami’s 
time, the pressure and debate over civil society, Islamic leadership, politics and 
religion has been more tolerated. Also, the post-revolution generation, who were 




able to criticise state policies during Khatami’s time. However, in Abbotalebi’s view, 
these conditions do not imply that organised associations in Iran effectively 
influenced policy outcomes during that time. Indeed, for the majority of women 
activists, secular and religious reformist women, civil society is a key factor that 
would contribute to democracy in Iran. For example, Nazi, a self-defined Islamic 
feminist, argued: 
I think that revolution does not work in Iran. Rather, I think the best way to 
create the reform necessary for the transition to democracy is through civil 
society. 
 
Similarly, Nadia, who identified herself as a secular feminist, said: 
In order to move towards democracy, the role of civil society is vital. Civil 
activities, and strong civil protests which force the government to step back, 
are important so that people can breathe. 
    
In the majority of the respondents’ views, the important components of civil society, 
including civic culture/cultural transformation, are the foundation of democracy. 
These women talked about civic culture amongst Iranian individuals. However, most 
of the participants, at the same time talked about another aspect of civic 
culture/cultural change linked to women’s rights. They believed that this culture needs 
to be promoted by educating Iranian women about their rights. For these participants, 
women activists should have a role in cultural transformation amongst Iranian women 
to improve women’s rights and lead to democratisation. Through grass-root levels, for 
example, Atena, who viewed herself as a religious women’s rights activist, argued for 
the role of women activists in promoting awareness of women’s issues among 
women, to inspire them to have more of a presence in the social sphere rather than, 
traditionally, staying at home:  
I think that women activists can help the democratic process if they seriously 
attempt to promote awareness of women’s issues and improvement of their 
situation, and also by encouraging women to be more active in society. 
 
The above account is an illustration of how most of the women felt that in order to 




confines of kinship and become active in the modern public domain. It seems that the 
idea that cultural transformation contributes to democracy is seen as more practical 
and achievable for most of the women. They believed that cultural change has an 
important role to play in transitioning to democracy.  
 
While the majority of the women focused more on grassroots, some religious 
reformist women who had political experience argued that cultural change amongst 
the political leaders is also an important factor in enabling democracy. In these 
women’s view, there is a need for influential senior politicians to advocate for 
democratic practices/ideals. These women, who during the interviews talked about 
their experiences in the political system and the problems they faced within this 
realm, argued that a democratic system needs democratic governors.  
 
To help understand why these participants who have been involved in the political 
system at key stages think the way they do, it is useful to highlight the Green 
Movement which has shaped their approach to democracy. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, many people who protested in the Green Movement were arrested and 
imprisoned and, importantly, the reformist leaders of this movement are, at the time of 
writing this thesis, still in prison. Within this context, some religious reformist women 
involved in the political realm highlighted the role of having a democratic leader in 
advocating democratisation. For example, Akram, who saw herself as a religious 
women’s rights activist, talked about the particular characteristics of Khatami, the ex-
president, such as ‘tolerance of different ideas’:   
Also, for the institutionalisation of a democracy we require a series of 
practices. The most important action is the practice of democracy by political 
elites. When the slogan of Mr. Khatami is ‘long live my opponent’, he shows 
his commitment to democracy. When he says that someone whose ideas are 
against my own thoughts has his/her own right to live, or that someone who 
disagrees with me should not be removed from the face of the Earth, this is a 
manifestation of democracy. I witnessed his behaviour when I was in the 
political structure. He asked others to propose ideas and even if their 
thoughts were against his own notions, he accepted them happily. The 





Akram admired Khatami’s values and behaviour as a democratic leader who 
respected and tolerated opponents’ ideas. Nahal, who had previously been an MP, 
made the same point by speaking about her case and her negative experiences in the 
political realm. For Nahal, a self-defined religious women’s rights activist, who stated 
that she avoided using the word ‘feminism’ as she would be stigmatised in the 
political realm, democracy takes place when democrats appear in the political system: 
Democracy is when people govern themselves through organisations that can 
facilitate this. In my opinion, democracy is complicated, and unfortunately it 
has been simplified in our country. We choose a representative for our 
country, but they do not know the meaning of this; they do not know what is 
expected of them. For democracy to be successful, it first needs elites and 
people who claim they want to establish democracy by becoming democrats.  
 
The above accounts illustrate the importance of the democratic culture, for some 
religious reformist women, amongst political leaders who they perceive might enable 
democracy. As discussed in Chapter Two, Iranian society experienced good progress 
toward democracy during Khatami’s time. Based on the experiences of these religious 
reformist women who had political experiences in the time that Iran had a promising 
democratic process, they argued that the democratic behaviour of political figures 
could impact positively on democratisation.  
 
The analysis of the data also shows that there is a link with the democratic culture of 
the religious leaders for conservative women. For the majority of conservative 
women, ‘Islamic democracy’ or ‘Mardom-salari-ye dini’, which is legitimised by The 
Supreme Leader, can be practised instead of democracy. This particular democracy 
was accepted by conservative women only to the extent that it does not oppose Islam: 
The Quran has a democratic meaning, but not pure democracy. The Supreme 
Leader has a debate called ‘Mardom-salari-ye dini’. (Anoosh, a self-
identifies conservative woman) 
 
As discussed earlier, the conservative women believed that the state should be ruled 
by God’s will and the role of Supreme Leader is significant for them. His position and 
ideas are highly respected by these women. The above quotation illustrates how the 




legitimised by The Supreme Leader. This suggests that while the secular model of 
democracy is not supported by The Supreme Leader, his advocacy of an Islamic 
model influenced the conservative women and implies how the culture of leaders can 
be important in the democratic process. Some researchers such as Mainwaring (1992) 
have also highlighted how commitment to democracy, both in terms of behaviour and 
values, on the part of political elites plays an important role in democratisation. In 
their argument, a firm commitment to democracy on the part of political elites can 
make democracy possible. Moreover, as discussed, the role of cultural change is 
highlighted by women activists in the search for democracy. Similarly, some studies 
(e.g.Harik, 1994; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Tessler, 2002; Tohidi, 2016) emphasise 
the role of democratic values on the process of democracy. 
 
Conclusion 
There is a connection between where people sit in the continuum of beliefs, including 
secular, religious reformist and conservative women, and their views on whether 
Islam should be involved in democracy. The majority of the secular feminists and 
some of the religious reformist women who called themselves feminists and Islamic 
feminists, called for a secular democracy. For some religious reformist women, who 
called themselves religious women’s rights activists, Islam is very important in 
protecting their values, including not supporting gay rights. However, they believed 
that the involvement of Islam in democracy should be minimal or very limited. For 
religious conservative women, however, Islam matters to such a degree that it should 
be central to democracy. Similarly, in their empirical study, Collins and Owen (2012) 
distinguished between secular democracy and Islamic democracy, because the former, 
in their view, has been ideally related to Western liberal theory, and the latter is a 
religiously-oriented democracy supported by many Muslim individuals and theories. 
By regarding Islamic democracy as a type of democracy, they show that religiosity 
influences the choice of Islamic democracy over secular democracy. While their study 
relates to Muslims and is not only limited to women activists, their idea is similar to 
the women’s views in this research. Importantly, some of the participants, despite 
being from different backgrounds (secular, religious reformist and conservative) 




negative interference of the West, impacting on the democratic process in Iran. The 
negative associations between resources and democracy have also been highlighted in 
some studies (e.g. Herb, 2005; Ahmadov, 2014). Instead, most women believed that 
cultural change was a key factor in moving toward democracy. This is also illustrated 
by other scholars (e.g. Harik, 1994; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Tessler, 2002; Tohidi, 
2016) who focus on the importance of political cultures, including the beliefs and 
values of ordinary citizens, in the process of democratisation. In addition, in 
questioning Western democracy, secular feminists pointed to economic inequality 
between men and women and the exploitation of women, suggesting that they seek a 





CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
I began to investigate studies and literature related to feminists and women activists in 
Iran. By interviewing forty seven women in one to one semi-structured interviews, I 
collected rich data to respond to my research questions. I examined the characteristics 
of Iranian feminists and women activists and their views about gender equality and 
democracy by exploring their views about the terms feminist and feminism, the ways 
that they understood and prioritised gender equality, and their perspectives about 
secular and Islamic democracy and its possibilities in Iran. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section One summarises the key findings. I 
will discuss the typology of the feminists and women activists of this study and their 
strategies to improve women’s rights. The variety of strategies of the participants, 
including secular and religious reformist women and religious conservatives, will be 
elaborated in this section. In Section Two, I describe the contribution of this research 
to the existing literature and discuss how some of the findings support and reinforce 
existing studies, while others help to fill gaps in existing empirical research and 
studies. Section Three discusses suggestions for further study. Finally, in Section 
Four, I explain the limitations I have faced in conducting this research.  
 
Summary of key findings  
This thesis answered the research questions by examining the characteristics of 
feminists and women activists in Iran, the ways that these women prioritised women’s 
rights and understood gender equality and their notions about democracy. In terms of 
the characteristics of women, the three categories that emerged from the research are: 
secular feminists, religious reformist women (including women who called 
themselves as feminist, Islamic feminist and religious women’s rights activists) and 
religious conservative women. These categories are an important research finding of 
this thesis. I explained in chapters Three and Four that these categories developed 




identified themselves within the interviews. Moreover, this typology not only helped 
me to structure the sample of the second and third stages of the fieldwork, this was 
also used as an analytical tool to understand different positions taken by the 
participants about different strategies such as being feminist and the notions of fair 
society, gender equality and democracy. 
 
To address the characteristics of feminists and women activists, as discussed in the 
data chapters, the participants had a spectrum of beliefs and strategies to improve 
women’s status in Iran. Religious reformist women in this research, including all 
those who identified themselves as feminist, Islamic feminist and religious women’s 
rights activists, advocated a re-interpretation of the Quran to improve women status. 
These participants also supported human rights to differing degrees. When we look at 
the religious conservative women’s arguments, although they argued that women’s 
rights should be improved within an Islamic framework in a traditional way and 
without re-interpreting the Quran, they were uncomfortable with male conservative 
gender policies and sought a new approach to advocate women’s rights in the 
framework of Islam. In contrast, secular feminists had different strategies and argued 
that the Iranian political system and religion should be separated. These interviewees 
believed that legal codes need to be in accordance with human rights rather than the 
Islamic framework. Here, I discuss, in turn, the participants’ beliefs and strategies 
about feminists and feminism, gender equality, and democracy in relation to the 
typology of this research. 
 
Secular feminists, religious reformist women, and religious conservative women took 
different positions in terms of being feminists and supporting feminism. As there is a 
stigma around the terms feminist and feminism, particularly among political and 
religious conservative leaders, some of the religious reformist women, alongside all 
the conservative women, preferred not to be identified as feminist. Those religious 
reformist women who engaged with politics preferred to be defined as religious 
women’s rights activists rather than feminists. The existing gender politics impacted 
on the language and strategy that these religious reformist women apply to improving 




equality in line with other women who identified themselves as feminists (Chapter 
Five). The contradiction between their dis-identification with the label ‘feminist’ and 
their defence of women’s rights in ways similar to women who did identify as 
‘feminists’ highlights the current field of possibility within which these women work 
in Iran. However, the stigma around the terms feminist and feminism had a strong 
influence, and to some extent had been re-created by conservative women. They re-
inforce this stigma because of their beliefs and perspectives on a re-interpretation of 
Islam, secularity, and the West. This position has the potential to limit their room to 
advocate women’s rights and link themselves with feminists in Iran. In spite of the 
existence of problematic issues with the terms feminist and feminism, all secular 
feminists and some religious reformist women who are not involved in the political 
sphere called themselves, respectively, secular feminists and Islamic feminists. In 
order to reduce the risks involved in feminist activities, these categories of women 
managed their visibilities in different historical periods in relation to political shifts 
between conservatism and reformism. That is, they were less likely to publicly 
associate themselves with feminist approaches during times of conservative rule.  
 
 
While secular feminists and religious reformist women theoretically advocated human 
rights, in practice they prioritised women’s rights in accordance with the Iranian 
context. To address the ways that feminists and women activists prioritised women’s 
rights, this study illustrated that secular feminists and religious reformist women 
shared the same priorities about improving women’s rights and both legal and cultural 
equality are supported by these women. However, they avoided giving priority to 
contested rights in Iran, such as choosing to wear the Hijab and gay rights. In contrast, 
religious conservative women disagreed with the idea of equal rights and they 
prioritised women’s rights as defined in the Quran and tradition. Notably, this priority 
is also not in line with male conservatives’ views. For these women, tensions remain 
around particular issues such as the right of divorce for women, and the legal 
testimony of women in the court. Moreover, compared with male conservatives, they 





Feminists and women activists in this study shared different ideas about gender 
equality. Most participants, including secular feminists and some religious reformist 
women who identified themselves as Islamic feminists, called for gender equality. 
However, some religious reformist women, who defined themselves as religious 
women’s rights activists, talked about gender justice rather than gender equality. For 
these women, using the term gender justice enabled them to differentiate themselves 
from other feminists in Iran who called for gender equality. In fact, they applied 
different language from Iranian feminists; however, there were not significant 
differences between the views of these women and other secular feminists and 
religious reformist women also calling for gender equality. Importantly, conservative 
women disagreed with both of the terms of gender equality and genders justice. These 
women believed that women’s rights should be practiced in accordance with Quran 
without any reinterpretations. 
 
In terms of their views and strategies about democracy, most of the participants, 
including secular feminist and religious reformist women, argued that democracy 
should be secular – to differing degrees based on participants’ beliefs – and non-
Western. They believed that Iran is far from being a ‘full’ democracy, and in order to 
move toward democratisation they argued that cultural change is a key factor. 
However, in religious conservative women’s views, democracy should be Islamic and 
keep its current status quo. Importantly, all participants with distinct beliefs viewed 
factors such as oil and the West as having a negative impact on the process of 
democracy (see Chapter Six).  
 
While there are some differences between religious conservative women on one hand 
and religious reformist women and secular feminists on the other, they share similar 
ideas and strategies. For example, they all disagree with the gender politics supported 
by conservative males and with copying the Western version of democracy in Iran. 
These findings demonstrate that participants with a spectrum of beliefs and strategies 
share much in common, as, within their women’s rights work, all of these women are 
responding to the possibilities and limitations of pursuing such work in the context of 




beliefs and strategies that resulted from the particularity of their context. Their 
particular strategies and prioritisations illustrate that participants, including secular 
feminists, religious reformist women and religious conservative women, are home-
grown feminists and women activists who take their own context and beliefs into 
consideration when advocating women’s rights (Tohidi, 2016).  
 
Contribution to knowledge 
The research to date has tended to focus on secular and Islamic feminists. Using the 
term Islamic feminists in these studies was limited to religious reformist women, and 
so the studies failed to consider/include religious conservative women. While a small 
number of studies (e.g. Afray, 1997; Mojab, 2001; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2006) 
acknowledge the existence of religious conservative women in Iran, their interest, 
involvement in and significance to activism focused on women’s position in society 
are ignored in these studies. This means that the existing typology within the current 
literature is unable to capture the identities of the participants in this research.  In 
contrast, this study explored different set of categories and typologies of women’s 
activism that were developed through the analysis of the interviews and based on how 
women identified themselves. This typology, including secular feminists, religious 
reformists and religious conservative women, is a significant contribution to the 
existing literature. Moreover, the perspectives of different categories of women acted 
as a means of analysing the participants’ ideas on key concepts and issues such as 
feminism, women’s rights, gender equality and democracy. Analysis of the women’s 
accounts illustrated that, despite the differences between participants with a variety of 
identities, they all disagreed with the limited gender policies advocated by male 
political and religious leaders, particularly conservatives. In addition, they are all 
home-grown feminists and women activists who use a variety of strategies to improve 
women’s rights. Similarly, Tohidi (2016) placed emphasis on this idea and argued that 
due to national and international push and pull factors, Iranian feminists and women 
activists have maintained their home-grown roots.  
 
Most literature has mentioned that feminists and women activists in Iran have 




2002; Ahmadi, 2006; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2006; Tohidi, 2016). However, this 
research study elaborates participants’ strategies in detail on distinct issues, such as 
being feminist and supporting feminism, women’s rights, gender equality, and 
democracy. Analysis of the data indicates that women took different strategies to 
improve women’s status in Iran. These strategies include women’s attachment to, or 
distance from, the terms feminist and feminism, the re-interpretation of the Quran, the 
language they use to advocate gender equality, the ways they prioritise certain 
women’s rights, and their approach to contributing to democracy.  
 
In terms of the strategies that the women adopted about the terms feminist and 
feminism, a review of feminist and gender studies research suggests that there is 
hardly any research which explores the different positions that feminists and women 
activists in Iran take regarding the application of these terms. However, this study 
illustrated that the self-definition of being feminist and supporting feminism is not 
only associated with the participants’ beliefs, but also with the strategies they take to 
improve women’s rights.  
 
For example, participants who avoided identifying themselves as ‘feminist’ talked 
about how this term is problematic. Some religious reformist women and religious 
conservative women argued that calling themselves ‘feminist’ is problematic, and 
they raised different issues associated with the terms feminist and feminism. 
Conservative women associated feminists and feminism with ‘problematic issues,’ 
such as the West, secularity and the rights of women over their own body. However, 
some religious reformist women involved in the political sphere preferred not to be 
identified as ‘feminists’ due to the limited gender politics existing in Iran. These 
women talked about the different strategies and languages they needed to apply in 
order to improve women’s rights in Iran. This suggests that at heart they might 
consider themselves feminist, but publicly identified themselves as religious women’s 
rights activists due to the particular context in which they are working. Despite the 
importance of the terms feminist and feminists, the problematic issues around using 




activists and feminists, have been overlooked within the existing literature (Povey, 
2001; Ahmadi, 2006; Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 2008). 
All religious reformist women in this study argued that re-interpretation of the Quran 
is essential in order to reach to a fair society. This approach had a positive influence 
on the flexibility of religious reformist women on their views about feminists and 
feminism, gender equality, human rights and secular democracy. This finding adds to 
the debate around the associations between Islamic feminists and religious women’s 
rights activists with western feminism, and reinforces the assertions of some scholars 
(e.g. Najmabadi, 1998; Ahmadi, 2006) who suggest that religious reformist women 
detach themselves from the ideas of ‘West phobia’(Ahmadi, 2006: 33). Similar to 
these studies, this research illustrates that religious reformist women, through their 
strategy of re-interpreting the Quran, have opened the door and woven new 
connections to western feminism, secular feminism, and human rights.  
 
The analysis of this study indicates that religious reformist women, after the Islamic 
Revolution, changed their trust in and loyalty to the state, and took different strategies 
including the re-interpretation of Islam and supporting reformist politicians, such as 
Khatami, to be able to negotiate women’s rights using reformist language with them. 
Similarly, Rostami Povey (2001) argued that Islamic feminists and religious women’s 
rights activists changed their loyalty to the state, especially male conservative 
politicians. However, she failed to examine the strategies women took to improve 
women’s rights in detail.  
 
While religious reformist women changed their faithfulness to the male conservative 
politicians and became disappointed with their gender policies, they still needed to 
prove to the political system that they were neither against Islam nor following the 
West. Therefore, religious reformist women in this study argued that they need to 
apply different approaches to prove that they are indeed indigenous women activists. 
Some preferred to re-interpret the Quran based on human rights. However, others 
believed that women’s rights should be improved through the process of re-
interpretation of Islam; they also proved their loyalty to the system by calling for 




have highlighted the need for feminists and women activists in Iran to show loyalty as 
insider women (Moghadam, 2002; Mir-Hosseini, 2006; Tohidi, 2016; Mir- Hosseini 
et al., 2015). However, this study went further and analysed the strategies they applied 
and to what extent participants advocated human rights. 
 
In spite of the existence of literature about Islamic and secular feminists in Iran, there 
is hardly any research exploring how feminists and women activists from a spectrum 
beliefs and strategies including secular, reformist, and conservative women, prioritise 
women’s rights in Iran. Therefore, this thesis has explored the way that interviewees 
gave priority to women’s rights in Iran. Analysis of the data showed that secular 
feminists and religious reformist women defended gender equality with a variety of 
strategies. However, these participants avoided prioritising a few contested rights such 
as choosing to wear the Hijab and gay rights. In contrast, conservative participants did 
not share the same priority with secular feminists and religious reformist women. 
 
The research findings illustrate that secular feminists and religious reformist women 
were both concerned with legal and cultural equality. These women’s arguments 
about the necessity of improving women’s rights in both legal and cultural domains 
illustrated the complexity of the context along with their attempts to improve both 
cultural and legal equality. This finding is in contrast with most studies that have 
focused only on the role of Iranian feminists and women activists on legal change 
rather than cultural inequality. Only a very few authors (e.g. Mojab, 2001) have 
highlighted the importance of cultural change; however, they have claimed that legal 
change is the primary issue for Islamic feminists and women activists. In contrast, this 
study has shown that inequality in cultural domains is the concern of secular feminists 
and religious reformist women, including Islamic feminists and religious women’s 
rights activists.  
 
Despite the importance of women’s views about democracy and its possibilities in 
Iran, the existing literature on women and democracy in Islamic countries, including 




and democracy by considering the participants’ views over whether democracy should 
be secular or Islamic and how far Iran is from being a ‘full’ democracy. Most of the 
women including secular feminists and religious reformist women preferred a secular 
version of democracy; however, to differing extents. Moreover, these women believed 
that Iran is far from being a ‘full’ democracy. In contrast, religious conservative 
women called for Islamic democracy. This type of ‘democracy’ matches the current 
‘democratic system’ in Iran. While there were different views on Islamic democracy 
and secular democracy, all participants shared the same ideas about the negative 
impact of distinct factors such as oil resources and the negative interference of the 
West on the process of democracy. This view of the participants is in contrast with 
some secular views (e.g. Gellner, 1983; Huntington, 1993; Rowly and Smith, 2009; 
Potrafke, 2012; Tezcur et al., 2012) which argue that religion is the only factor 
influencing the process of democracy.  
 
Further study directions 
As discussed throughout this thesis, Iran is a country that has limited gender politics, 
and the role of women activists on cultural change to improve gender equality and 
democratic system is highly significant. Future studies might usefully examine the 
ways through which Iranian feminists and women activists attempt to fight against 
cultural inequalities such as the assumption that women should be financially 
dependent on men and the ‘male bread winner model’. As this unequal cultural 
assumption is the root of much discrimination and encourages women to remain in the 
private sphere, investigating this subject would enable understanding of the extent, 
and via which strategies, feminists and women activists attempt to raise women 
consciousness of this issue. Iran is a country in which, despite the high rate of 
educated women, the rate of employed women is surprisingly very low; therefore, 
examining women activists’ attempts to enhance women’s awareness about the 
importance of being financially independent and equal with men may be significant.  
 
In addition, I would also like to make suggestions to other researchers considering 
women activists’ voices and ideas in terms of their self-identification. Analysis of the 




Iranian women’s views on the label feminist (see Chapter Two). This thesis proposes 
that researchers who work on feminists and women activists in Iran be more 
conscious of labelling women activists in Iran, as they might not accept this 
attachment. Instead of attributing the term feminist to all women activists in Iran, they 
can use terms like feminists and women activists to show their attention to the self-
identification of women. While this strategy has been seen in a few studies (e.g 
Afshar, 1996; Tohidi, 2016), most only identify women activists as feminists and 
limit the space in which women can express their identity.  
 
Other studies can also contribute to women studies by acknowledging the existence of 
different women activists with a variety of beliefs, including conservative women 
activists. As discussed in Chapter Two, most studies ignore the role of conservative 
women in Iran and even avoid mentioning them in their studies. While the views of 
conservative women in Iran might not be in line with other women activists’ ideas, 
they do exist in Iran and they attempt to challenge male conservative views. Their 
existence within studies on women activists in Iran should at least acknowledge the 
need for a more detailed contextualisation, in order to improve understanding of the 
wider picture. 
 
Research Limitations  
Research in the area of feminists and women activists is a sensitive and contested 
subject, not only in developed countries but also in developing societies. This issue in 
the socio-political context of Iran is even more controversial. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, religious conservative politicians associate feminist/ism with the West, and this 
assumption has led them to problematic and discriminatory gender politics. This 
limitation has also influenced me as a woman researcher during this PhD. From the 
literature review stage to data collection and fieldwork, I have dealt with several 
different types of challenge, for example, the lack of Iranian literature in relation to 
this topic in addition to operational challenges regarding conducting such a sensitive 
topic in the very contested gender political context of Iran, which may not be the case 





Another point which I want to reflect on is the difficulties of avoiding the 
implementation of a comparative study. I tried to avoid to attaching particular values 
to different strategies and views supported by the participants of this study. Also, as 
explained in Chapter One, the aim of this research was not to compare women’s 
views with different beliefs in Iran. Instead, this research focused on the perspectives 
of Iranian feminists and women activists in terms of their political identity and 
priorities. Through this process, I attempted to adhere to the aims of this study under 





Appendix A: Interview schedule used for the first stage of the fieldwork 
 
 
What is distinctive about Islamic and secular 
feminism? What are their characteristics? 
What is distinctive about Islamic and secular 
feminism’s notions of women rights? 
 
What kinds of democracy do Islamic and 
religious feminists propose? 
1. How was your upbringing?  
- Would you describe it as mostly religious or 
mostly secular?  
- How was that for you? 
- Has your family background and upbringing 
influenced the ways you think as a feminist? 
 
2. What was your family experience in relation 
to how gender roles were distributed in your 
house? How did your mum and dad decide 
things?  
 
12. Several days ago some dancers who were 
Iranian girls and boys were arrested as they 
danced in a clip in which girls did not have 
Hijab. What is your view on that? 
 
-Were they guilty of something?  
 
-If so why? (because of being unveiling or 
dancing) 
 
-If not why? 
24. What does the term democracy mean to 
you?  
 
-Where do your ideas about this come from do 
you think? 
 
25. How do you think Iranian feminists can 
impact toward democratization?  
 
-Do you think democracy is an important issue 




3. (If participant indicates they are married on 
the form) How are decisions made in your 
household? 
 
- is one of you more leader than another? 





4. Are some gender differences a matter of 
nature? Are there some things that should be 
the responsibility of men and some the 
responsibility of women? 
 
5. What is the view of Quran on women? 
 
 
13. A woman could not be a president, minister, 
religious reference and member of Assembly of 
Experts in Iran, What are your views on that? 
  
 
14. In Islamic laws women are considered as 
someone who is dependent economically to 
men, in which ways you think this impact on 
women’s roles in the family?  
 
-In the society? 
 
 - Do you think this influence is positive or 
negative? 
 
15. Iranian women need their husband’s 
permission for working in the society and also 
for continuing their education.  
 
-Is democratisation something you are 
interested in? 
 
26. Which kinds of laws do you prefer? Why? 
 
- laws according to the Quran  
 
- Laws according to human rights? 
 
-Laws according to Islamic human rights? 
What is this? 
 
27. Does interpretation of Quran help to the 






6. Can you tell me a little about how you came 
to be a feminist activist? 
 
- When did it happen? 
 
- Was there a particular event or experience or 
person that led you to get involved in 
feminism? Could you tell me a little bit more 
about that? 
 
- What did you want achieve? 
 
7. Why it is important to be a feminist?  
 
 
- Have your feminist values and priorities 
changed over time, in what way? 
 
-Why is that do you think? 
- Do you think it matters, could it be different?  
-Would that be a good thing? 
 
16. Googoosh (a famous Iranian singer) sang a 
song, called Behesht, in advocating lesbian’s 
rights. What is your idea about this song? 
 
Drawing from your feminist beliefs what do you 
think about how these laws treat women? Would 
you like to see them change, in what way, how 
might you/other feminists go about changing 
them? 
 
17. The amount of “blood-money” to be paid to 
the family of a murdered woman which is 
stipulated should be half the amount payable to 
the family of a murdered man. 
28. What is Islamic democracy?  
 
29. If collective decision (parliament)would 
make a decision which is in contrast with the 
Sharia, in your view which of them is more 
important? 
 
-How do you balance the authority of god with 
the authority of the people? 
 
30. Do you think all Iranian must have equal 
rights? 
 
-If so do you think that matters if a Cristian 
person be a president? If not why? 
 
31. Which one of the following powers should 
make a decision for a country: parliament or 





8. What should be the key goals for the 
feminist movement in Iran? 
 
9. What does gender equality mean to you? 
 
- Do you think other feminists in Iran would 
define gender equality in the same way? 
 
- In which ways are your ideas different, why 
is that do you think? 
 
10. Is there a way you would describe the type 
of feminist you are? 
 
-  Do categories such as secular feminist or 
religious feminist help to describe your type of 
feminism? How? 
 
18. In court, women’s legal testimonies are 
valued less than a man’s and in some cases 
worth nothing unless corroborated by a man 
 
19. polygamy is allowed in Iran 
 
20. Child custody 
 
21. The share of a woman in inheritance 
 
22. Without the permission of husbands, women 
legally are forbidden to travel abroad. 
 




32. If your vote was different with your 
religious reference, would it impact on your 
own decision for voting? 
  
33. In spite of the agreement of sixth 
parliament with joining to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, Guardian Council rejected 













- Are they categories that are meaningful to 
describe feminism in Iran and differences 




11. Are there things that you have seen change 




- Were you involved in that? 
 
- If things haven’t changed, or just to some 



















  Appendix B: Interview schedule used for the second and third stages of the fieldwork 
 
 
 The characteristics of secular and religious feminists and women activist 
 
 
1. Can you tell me a little about your upbringing?  
- Would you describe it as mostly religious or mostly secular?  
- How was that for you? 
- Has your family background and upbringing influenced the ways you think as a feminist or woman activist? 
 
2. What was your family experience in relation to how gender roles were distributed in your house? How did your mum and dad decide things?  
 
3. (If participant indicates they are married on the form) How are decisions made in your household? 
- is one of you more of a leader than another? 
- does it depend on the issue? 
-can you think of specific examples? 





4. Can you tell me a little about how you came to be a feminist or woman activist? 
- When did it happen? 
- Was there a particular event or experience or person that led you to get involved in feminism or women activist? Could you tell me a little bit 
more about that? 
- What did you want achieve? 
 
5. Why is it important to be a feminist or woman activist?  
 
 
6. What should be the key goals for the feminists’ and women activists’ movement in Iran? 
 
7. Is there a way you would describe the type of feminist or women activist you are? 
 
8. Do categories such as secular or religious feminists or women activists help to describe your type of feminism or activism? How? 
- Are they categories that are meaningful to describe feminists and women activists in Iran and differences between them? If so how, If not why? 
-If it is meaningful to you, what is your opinions about other kind of feminism and activism (secular/religious)? 






Participants’ idea regarding transition to democracy  
9- How do you think Iranian laws, related to women such as polygamy, permission of husband to work outside, are practising in the society?  
- In your opinion how extent Iranian laws such as polygamy, are in accordance with our culture?   
10. What does the term democracy mean to you?  
- What is your idea regarding the possibilities of democracy in Iran? 
- What kinds of factors may help to the process of democratization?  
-How do you think Iranian feminists and women activists can impact toward democratization? 
 
How do you think Iranian feminists and women activists can impact toward democratization?  
-Do you think democracy in Iran is an important issue in your agenda as a feminist and women activist?  
-Is democratisation something you are interested in? 
 
 





12. What does gender equality mean to you? 
- Do you think other feminists and women activists in Iran would define gender equality in the same way? 
- In which ways are your ideas different, why is that do you think? 
- What is the meaning of “justice” that some Iranian Muslim feminists and women activists speak about? 
 
13. Do you think all Iranian women for instance Kurdish, Baluch and other women from different ethics should have the same rights? Why do 
you think like that?  
 
14. Are some gender differences a matter of nature? Are there some things that should be the responsibility of men and some the responsibility 
of women? 
 
15-How much should the state say about how people should live their lives? 
-How strong should welfare provision be?  
- Which one is more important for you: providing people with welfare by government or not government intervene? 





16. What is the view of Quran on women? 
-What is your interpretation based on? 
-Is that a common interpretation do you think? 
-Is it a matter of debate what the Quran says about women? 
 
Which kinds of laws do you prefer? Why? 
- laws according to the Quran  
- Laws according to human rights? 
-Laws according to Islamic human rights? What is this? 
 
17.( applicable for Muslim feminists and women activists) How extend do you think Iranian women’s rights could be in accordance with human‘s 
rights? 
- In what ways do you agree/disagree with human’s rights? Why you think like that? 
 




-do you think reformist’s understanding of religion had the positive impact on women’s situation and women’s rights? How was the situation 
of women activists and feminists during Khatami’s time?-was it different compared with conservative time? In what ways? 
- In spite of the agreement of sixth parliament with joining to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
Guardian Council rejected this. What do you think about this controversial story? 
19. What is Islamic democracy? 
-What is your view on that? 
 
20. (This question only applicable for religious women) If collective decision (parliament) would make a decision which is in contrast with the 
Sharia, in your view which of them is more important? 
-How do you balance the authority of god with the authority of the people? 
 
21. Do you think all Iranians must have equal rights? 
-If so do you think that matters if a Cristian person be a president? If not why? 
 
22- How do you prioritise the following women’s issues in your work? Why? 




-women’s working in the society 
-improve the access of women to political arena 
-women allows to divorce men 
-fighting with domestic violence 
 
In Islamic laws women are considered as someone who is dependent economically to men, in which ways you think does this impact on women’s 
roles in the family?  
-In the society? 
 - Do you think this influence is positive or negative? 
23. Iranian women need their husband’s permission for working in the society and also for continuing their education.  
-Why is that do you think? 
Drawing from your feminist or women activist beliefs what do you think about how these laws treat women? Would you like to see them change, 
in what way, how might you/other feminists and women activists go about changing them? 
24. In court, women’s legal testimonies are valued less than a man’s and in some cases worth nothing unless corroborated by a man 
25. polygamy is allowed in Iran 




27. Age of marriage for girl is 13 
28. What is your idea about women can be arrested by police in streets if they do not have “proper Hijab”? 
 
 If your vote was different with your religious reference, would it impact on your own decision for voting? 
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